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ABSTRACT
This study examines the governance of social protection in Egypt. In light of rising poverty
rates and economic and political instability, the government of Egypt has started shifting part
of its focus towards reforming the social protection system, especially after the revolution in
2013. Because economic reforms have not translated in household income growth and since
the currency devaluation have worsened socio-economic conditions, it is crucial and timely to
examine the social protection arena in Egypt, focusing predominantly on the conditions and
challenges of the governance of the system. This study adopts a framework that identifies three
operational entry points of governance— Rules, Roles and Controls— as well as two spheres
of analysis— program and sector levels. Twelve in-depth interviews with policy-makers and
experts in relevant governmental, international and non-governmental bodies are used. The
analysis focuses on the level of the social protection system as a whole and the program level,
by examinig the contributory social insurance system as well as the non-contributory cash
transfer programs, Takaful and Karama. Although Egypt has reformed the legislative
framework of the social protection system, this analysis finds that the system still faces a
number of shortcomings. Social protection in Egypt is confronted with the challenge of
inadequate inter-ministerial coordination which hampers the establishment of a
comprehensive, coherent and sustainable system that achieves social justice. The programs
show a disconnect between design and implementation. Indeed, the two programs have
designed and developed an adequate institutional infrastructure and monitoring and evaluation
capacity. However, they face diverse implementation challenges. The recommendations of this
analysis center around the establishment of an institutional home for social protection, the
establishment of a common vision, the development of the necessary institutional and
administrative capacity, a rigorous monitoring and evaluation toolkit, undergoing regular
governance examinations, among others.
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Arab Spring has highlighted the need for a new era of social justice in the Middle East
and still. Social Protection (SP) issues were set aside after the revolution and more attention
was given to political turn-overs, power arrangements as well as religious-secular conflicts
(Gamal, et al., 2014). Nine years after the revolution, the concept of social justice is regaining
its importance in the Arab region and governments are starting to recognize the importance of
shifting a part of their focus to the development of adequate SP systems, an endeavor that was
initiated right before the revolution in many countries but was halted due to the rebellions and
later the eruption of conflict in many countries (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).
A growing youth population, rising levels of food insecurity, political and economic
instability as well as poverty and spatial inequality are some of the obstacles facing Egypt and
its commitment towards SP (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Egypt is a lower middle-income
country (World Bank, 2017) which faces persistent socio-economic challenges. Poverty rates
grew from 26.3% in 2012 (WFP, 2013) to 32.5% in 2017-2018 (World Bank, 2019), whilst
food insecurity rates rose from 14% in 2009 up to 17.2% in 2011 (World Bank, 2019).
According to the 2014-2015 Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Expenditure
Survey (HIECS), one in every four Egyptians is poor and almost one in every two citizens is
poor or near poor (ERF, CAPMAS, 2014, as cited in: Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).
Moreover, a very large percentage of the country’s middle class is vulnerable to shocks and
risks and can therefore, fall easily below the poverty line (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). For
this reason, the country has been undertaking several economic reforms that have so far
improved the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 4.2% in 2016 to 5.3% in 2018 (WFP,
2019). Nevertheless, this has not translated in household income growth. Indeed, poverty keeps
rising while income of the bottom 40% keeps declining (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). This
highlights the importance of developing an effective and efficient social protection system.
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The Egyptian government, aware of the importance of putting in place a SP system that
cushions the effects of the current political and economic reforms on the middle class as well
as those living in poverty, has pledged to expand social safety nets (SSN) and their coverage
for the most vulnerable (Government of Egypt, 2015). Using savings gathered from the energy
subsidy reforms gradually adopted since 2014 as well as the reforms that were made to the
whole subsidy system (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2019),
the country aims to transform the design, delivery and scope of the current SP programs. This
is why, the government has increased spending on social security and social assistance
programs while it reduced spending on the subsidy system (Ministry of Planning, Monitoring
and Administrative Reform, 2018). The evolution of social policies is therefore important and
requires an in-depth analysis of developments in the country (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015).

1.1.

Statement of the problem

Although there is no universally accepted definition of social protection, all definitions
highlight the fact that social protection grants an effective response to poverty and vulnerability
in the Global South (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Arjona, Ladaique, & Pearson, 2003; Holmes
& Slater, 2007). Social protection measures provide a response to risk, deprivation, poverty
and vulnerability which is accepted by the polity and the society (Conway, De Haan, & Norton,
2000).
As previously mentioned, Egypt is currently at a potential turning point in its efforts to
reform the social protection system (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). In addition to the rise in
poverty, the structural adjustment programs as well as the political instability, the government
of Egypt has recognized the deficiencies in the existing SP system and has committed to
improve targeting and delivery systems as well as reform the legacy programs that were neither
efficient nor effective (World Bank, 2015). With regards to SSN, the government is slowly
moving away from universal subsidies to more targeted programs (Selwaness & Messkoub,

8

2019). In 2014, the government introduced reforms to the food subsidy system (FSS) which
aimed at enhancing the supply chain, providing the beneficiaries with a number of subsidized
commodities to diversify their consumption, among others (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).
Moreover, the government has set aside 10-15% of the savings from the structural subsidy
reforms to launch Takaful and Karama, the country’s first targeted cash transfer program
(World Bank, 2015, p. 4). Finally, new social insurance and health insurance laws have been
passed in the last two years to transform the systems. The new social insurance law tries to
mitigate many of the challenges of the old system, whereas the health insurance law provide
universal health insurance (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019).
Design and capacity limitations are some of the major challenges facing most developing
countries in the extension of social protection programs (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009).
Developing countries face a number of challenges at all levels of the policy cycle, starting with
the design of the program, to the service delivery, institutional capacity as well as evaluation
mechanisms (Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). In this regard, Egypt is not different. Despite its
efforts in designing a program that fits international standards, Takaful and Karama, the
program still faces a variety of challenges in terms of its targeting, service delivery as well as
evaluation (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Moreover, the country’s social protection system is
fragmented and is therefore, uncapable of achieving social justice and reducing poverty
(Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Similar to other Arab countries, the Egyptian SP system is
incorporating innovative programs into the existing political and institutional frameworks and
hence, fails to have a transformative impact (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007; Jawad,
Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).
Most studies on SP in Egypt either focus on specific programs (e.g. Selwaness I. , 2012;
Ido, 2018; Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018; Loewe & Westemeier, 2018) are outdated or do not
delve deep into the SP system as a whole. This is why they often neglect many of the enduring
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challenges in the SP system. Moreover, Egypt is at a potential turning point where a number
of reform efforts are being implemented. For this reason, it is crucial to open the “Black Box”
of the SP system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) and analyze the governance of
the social protection system and the programs being implemented in Egypt.
Although Governance is a term which is conceptually ambiguous and vague (Pierre &
Peters, 2020) and has been defined differently by different strands in the literature, for the
purpose of this study, governance in SP is defined as a set of incentives and accountability
relationships which improve the delivery of services, their quality, efficiency and outcomes
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 5). An examination of the governance of a SP
system in a country focuses on the “system” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). as
well as the program level. Not only design and implementation features are assessed, but also
the regulatory framework, coordination among the relevant stakeholders as well as the
accountability relationships governing the system and the programs are in the cornerstone of a
governance analysis. Hence, effective governance aims to enhance the design, implementation
and outcomes of SP programs (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). It aims to create an integrated social
protection system which is comprehensive, transformative and achieves social justice. Since
design, delivery and coordination obstacles are some of the challenges currently facing the
Egyptian SP system, an in-depth assessment of the governance of SP in the country is both
timely and necessary.

1.2.

Research Objectives

This thesis aims to provide an analytical framework that identifies the governance
conditions and challenges that are currently facing the Egyptian SP system. If the country does
not reform the underlying constraints which have precluded it from developing an effective SP
system in the past, reform efforts can go in vain. Established programs can also demise, similar
to Mexico’s Prospera cash transfer program, which was abolished in 2019, 21 years after it
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was launched and - at the time - represented an iconic and innovative conditional cash transfer
program (Kidd, 2019). Thus, this study aims to examine the facilitators of SP which have been
established to improve the SP system as well as challenges the system and the programs are
still encountered with. This way, reform efforts can be guided by an evidence-based and indepth examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the current system.
As such, the study does not engage with the conceptual debates on general SP issues, such
as whether to target programs or not, whether to provide conditional or unconditional transfers,
whether to provide in-kind or cash grants, among others. Although these are debates that are
also essential within the context of the design of the SP system in the country, they are out of
the scope of this paper. Instead, this study examines the challenge most countries face:
fragmentation of services; and the poor governance of SP systems with limited institutional
and administrative capacities (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). This thesis seeks to offer an in-depth
understanding of the challenges and conditions in the governance of SP in Egypt. It also maps
the development in the field after the revolution, an endeavor which has not been undertaken
by many scholars. While the impact of Covid-19 on the social protection system in Egypt might
be significant, this study was conducted before the outbreak of the pandemic and thus, its effect
on the social protection system in Egypt are not included in this thesis.
In order to do so, the conceptual framework Rules, Roles and Controls developed by the
World Bank to enhance the governance of SP systems is employed (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop,
& Ringold, 2012). The framework defines governance in terms of accountability relationships
and incentives and provides three operational entry points for governance; (1) the rules of the
game which establish the regulatory and legal context of SP systems and programs, (2) roles
and responsibilities which identify the institutional relationships as well as the incentive
structures as well as (3) the controls and accountability relationships which aim to reduce error,
fraud and corruption, improve transparency, monitoring and evaluation, among others. The
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governance of SP is examined at three spheres; (1) macro-level or policy-/legal framework, (2)
meso- or sector-level which focuses on coordination efforts as well as the (3) micro-or
program-level which delves into an assessment of the design and implementation of SP
programs. This conceptual framework is unique insofar as it can be applied to both contributory
and non-contributory schemes, as it provides operational parameters to measure the different
entry points and as it does not merely focus on the program level but most importantly the
policy and coordination issues related to the SP system in a country.
By conducting in-depth interviews with twelve policy-makers, experts and consultants in
the SP system in Egypt, and using the previously identified parameters, this study assesses the
governance of SP in Egypt. The interviewees represent governmental agencies such as the
Ministry of Social Solidarity, the National Organization for Social Insurance, the Ministry of
Supply and Internal Trade as well as a number of international organizations. Data provided
by the interviewees are triangulated with a content analysis of scholarly work on contributory
and non-contributory schemes in the country. Both the meso- and the micro-levels of
governance are examined.
At the program level, the focus lies on the social insurance system as well as the Takaful
and Karama program for a number of reasons. First, not only was I able to gain access to data
and documents on these programs, but I had the opportunity to interview policy-makers and
consultants working on both programs. Moreover, the two programs have been operating for a
number of years and hence, an evaluation can be rendered. On the contrary, the new universal
health insurance scheme has not been fully implemented yet and therefore, a judgment of the
program is still premature. Assessing the old health insurance scheme would be outdated since
a new one is already in play. In terms of SSN, the inclusion of the Food Subsidy system would
have been plausible and imperative, however, the area of food subsidies is complex and could
have drastically widened the scope of this study. Moreover, data on food subsidies are scarce
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and I was not able to interview many experts in the field. Nevertheless, food subsidies require
an in-depth analysis on their own especially since they have been the most important but least
efficient and effective SSN for decades (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). With regards to active
labor market policies and programs, on the one hand, this field is evolving but there is a lack
of coordination between the players in this field (Barsoum, et al., 2019). Indeed, the
government is not playing an active role in steering labor interventions and hence, an
assessment of the governance of these interventions would not have been representative. On
the contrary, the government is directly involved in steering the social insurance system as well
as its first targeted cash transfer programs Takaful and Karama.
Although the examination of the two programs does not claim total representativeness of
all other programs in the country, however, many of the findings can be generalized to other
social protection programs in Egypt. Especially because the study examines a contributory as
well as a non-contributory program, which differ in their nature, the common characteristics of
the two programs can often be generalized to other programs in the country.
The study finds that the main challenge facing the social protection system is the lack of
coordination across social protection programs. SP programs are mostly fragmented, do not
have a common vision and thus, mandates can often overlap. Not only does the inadequate
coordination prevent the system from achieving social justice, but it can impede service
delivery. Another finding relates to the existence of a disconnect between design and
implementation of the programs. While the legislative and regulatory framework seems to be
designed according to international best practices in most programs, implementation
challenges are more apparent and require an in-depth investigation of the governance, at the
micro-level. Additionally, more rigorous assessments need to be undertaken in order to
evaluate programs based on their outputs. Developing the necessary human and institutional
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capacity is also one of the main necessities. Indeed, the lack of performance incentives often
impedes effective service delivery.

1.3.

Research Questions

As previously mentioned, this study aims to examine the governance of the social
protection system in Egypt. Especially with regards to the country’s ongoing efforts to reform
SP, it is crucial to place these efforts within the framework of good governance and to elaborate
on the challenges and facilitators of the system. The contributory and non-contributory social
protection systems are in the focus of this work. Instead of solely focusing on governance
challenges, this study also highlights the existing conditions in order to build on the system’s
strengths. This thesis tries to answer the following research questions using qualitative research
methods.
Main Question: In light of the increase in the percentage of poverty and the ongoing reform
efforts of the social protection system in Egypt, what is the status of the governance of the
social protection system in Egypt and the challenges facing it?
First Sub-Question: What are the prerequisites needed to enhance the governance of
Egypt’s social protection system?
Second Sub-Question: What are the main challenges facing the governance of the
Egyptian social protection system, as a whole?
Third Sub-Question: What are the main governance challenges facing the country’s
contributory and non-contributory schemes, taking the social insurance system as well as
Takaful and Karama as case studies?

1.4.

Structure of the thesis

This study is sub-divided into seven chapters which focus on the following aspects:
Chapter One introduces this thesis’ research topic, as well as the problem which is being
addressed in this work. The research objectives are also examined in this chapter in addition to
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the scope of the study. This introductory chapter also provides insights into the methodology
used as well as the findings of the study. It also incorporates the main questions this work aims
to address.
Chapter Two provides a background about the social protection system. It starts by
providing this study’s conceptualization and understanding of social protection as well as the
typology and classification which is used here. It then attempts to map the different social
protection schemes and programs in the country, focusing predominantly on changes that
occurred after the January 21st Revolution in Egypt. This chapter is sub-divided into
contributory and non-contributory schemes followed by an examination of active labor market
interventions in the country.
Chapter Three presents a review of the literature that is relevant to this paper. First, the
concept of governance is in the highlight. This section shows that governance is an ambiguous
concept which can be used in various domains. Tracing the development of governance and its
relation to social protection starts with the relationship between governance and social policy.
Indeed, the first scholarly works on the relationship focused on social policy. Contemporary
studies concentrate on the governance of social protection. Before providing an in-depth
examination of the governance of social protection, governance is placed within the discourse
on social protection. At the end, the review emphasizes the studies focusing on social protection
in the Middle East and Egypt and especially the governance of social protection in the region.
Chapter four elaborates the conceptual framework used to analyze the governance of
social protection in Egypt. It provides a visualization of the framework and highlights the
parameters that are most relevant to this study.
Chapter five describes the research methodology that is used in this study. The rationale
for the use of qualitative research methods is elaborated and the data collection methods are
described. This chapter also elaborates on the sample selection, the study framework, how the
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data were analyzed, which ethical dimensions were taken into considerations as well as the
study limitations.
Chapter Six presents the collected data and analyzes them. It is sub-divided according to
the conceptual framework into the meso- or systems-level which tackles the sector of social
protection and the coordination among the actors in it as well as the micro- or program-level.
At the program level, this chapter focuses on a governance assessment of the social insurance
system followed by an examination of Takaful and Karama program.
Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by providing the main findings of the analysis and
offering a number of recommendations based on the identified strengths and weaknesses of the
social protection system in Egypt.
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2. CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND ABOUT SOCIAL
PROTECTION IN EGYPT
This chapter provides an outline of the social protection system in Egypt. It focuses
predominantly on changes that were initiated after the January 21st revolution in Egypt. In order
to start a discussion on social protection, it is crucial to first elaborate on this study’s
conceptualization and definition of social protection. Afterwards, using the World Bank (2012)
typology of social protection programs, the background section is sub-divided into contributory
and non-contributory schemes as well as labor market interventions. The two most important
contributory schemes in the country are the social insurance and the health insurance systems.
With regards to non-contributory schemes, the food and fuel subsidies as well as the cash
transfer programs - whether the Solidarity pension or Takaful and Karama - are in the
cornerstone of this section. In Egypt, there are not many passive labor market interventions,
this is why, the field of active labor market policies and programs is analyzed. Although the
analysis section only focuses on Takaful and Karama and the social insurance scheme, this
chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the social protection arena and therefore,
tries to describe and incorporate the most important schemes. Not all programs are included in
this chapter, however, as elaborated above, the focus lies on the most important interventions
that were identified based on the literature and scholarly work in the field.

2.1.

Defining Social Protection

Social protection is a key contributor to social inclusion and the goal of leaving no one
behind. It is a key contributor to all of the 2030 sustainable development goals, particularly
goal one, which aims at eliminating poverty in all its forms everywhere (UN ESCWA, 2015).
It is important to start by having some clarity about what is meant by social protection and
how it is understood. There is no universally accepted definition of social protection mostly
because countries’ social protection measures vary across the developed and developing world
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(Yemtsov, Honorati, Evans, Sajaia, & Lokshin, 2017). The working definition that is used in
this paper is adopted from the World Bank’s book Measuring the Effectiveness of Social
Protection (2012). The World Bank defines social protection as these policies that assist
individuals and societies in managing risks and vulnerabilities and that protect individuals from
poverty. These policies enhance resilience, equity and opportunity (World Bank, 2012). Social
protection schemes are sub-divided into contributory schemes, non-contributory schemes as
well as labor market interventions.
A. Contributory or Social Security schemes are central to income security. They refer
to health insurance, social insurance and pension schemes that are funded by workers’
contributions, which can either be voluntary or compulsory. The main aim of
contributory schemes is to leverage income in order to cushion workers from the impact
of shocks such as unemployment, inability to work due to health issues or maternity,
and retirement. Workers contribute regularly throughout their work life to a fund in
order to claim benefits. There are two main types of contributory schemes: benefitdefined schemes where individuals contribute to a collective fund and have specified
benefits at the time of receiving pensions; and contribution-defined schemes where
contributions are made to individual accounts and benefits are defined based on the
contributions made. Health insurance programs are also an imperative part of the social
security system.
B. Non-Contributory or Social Assistance schemes are social safety nets that aim to
reduce poverty and vulnerability. Such social welfare programs assist individuals and
households to adapt to chronic poverty and reductions in income which would lead to
them sinking into poverty. Unconditional and conditional cash transfers as well as inkind transfers are some of the social assistance programs where recipients are generally
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not obliged to make any advance payments to receive benefits. These non-contributory
schemes involve other informal forms of transfers and support.
C. Labor market programs and regulations help the unemployed and the underemployed. These measures include passive and active approaches. Passive labor market
policies (PLMPs) incorporate contributory and non-contributory unemployment
assistance. Such interventions are often a part of the social security or social assistance
system of the country. This is why, PLMPs will not be discussed in depth in the context
of labor market regulations.
Active Labor Market policies (ALMPs) are interventions that seek to improve the
prospects for gainful employment among their participants (OECD, 2008). Youthfocused ALMPs are often paired with the key objective of facilitating the school-towork transition process, by increasing the employability of new entrants to the labor
market or by increasing labor demand (Angel-Urdinola & Leon-Solano, 2013). ALMPs
are often regarded to have an inside-outsider role on employment (Rovny, 2014).
Indeed, outsiders are those who are disadvantaged in the labor market such as the
unemployed, low-skilled, immigrants, among others (Rovny, 2014.). ALMPs are
generally divided into four main categories (Kluve, et al., 2016). These are (1) training
programs, possible formats include: in-classroom, on-the-job, life skills, second-chance
programs, non-formal apprenticeship, financial literacy, and mentoring; (2)
entrepreneurship promotion programs, in the form of financial and non-financial
assistance; (3) employment services, counselling, search assistance or job placement;
and (4) services in the context of subsidized employment and public works projects.
Table 1 shows the objectives and types of programs that fall under each of the abovementioned categories. When mapping the social protection arena in Egypt, this thesis focuses
on these types of programs which are important for the contemporary social protection system
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in Egypt. The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social insurance and health
insurance schemes, while the most important non-contributory schemes are the food subsidy
system, the old solidarity pension as well as the targeted cash transfer programs Takaful and
Karama. Finally, ALMPs are the most relevant labor market interventions in Egypt.
Table 1: Social Protection and Labor Market Interventions
Social protection and labor
programs
Social safety nets/ social
assistance (noncontributory)

Social insurance
(contributory)

Labor market programs
(contributory and
noncontributory)

Objectives
Reduce poverty and inequality

Ensure adequate living standards in
the face of shocks and life changes

Improve chances of employment and
earnings; smooth income during
unemployment

Types of programs
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Unconditional cash transfers
Conditional cash transfers
Social pensions
Food and in-kind transfers
School feeding programs
Public works
Fee waivers and targeted subsidies
Other interventions (social services)
Contributory old-age, survivor, and
disability pensions
Sick leave
Maternity/paternity benefits
Health insurance coverage
Other types of insurance
Active labor market programs (training,
employment intermediation services, wage
subsidies)
Passive labor market programs
(unemployment insurance, early retirement
incentive)

Source: Author’s compilation based on World Bank (2018)

2.2.

Contributory Schemes

The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health insurance
schemes which are currently undergoing legal and regulatory reform efforts (Government of
Egypt, 2015). This section highlights the reform efforts in both schemes as well as the
challenges facing both schemes.
2.2.1. Social Insurance
This section describes reform efforts and challenges of the social insurance system (SIS)
in Egypt. The old and the new social insurance frameworks are contrasted. The current legal
framework, Law 148/2019 was officially launched on the first of January 2020, however, since
it introduces drastic changes to the system, many of its provisions are still being implemented
gradually. Thus, understanding the old legal scheme remains essential as many of the system’s
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challenges are caused by the complexity of the old social insurance legal and regulatory
framework.
Law 148 for 2019 is currently the main legislative framework governing social
insurance in the country. It unifies the different laws that were governing the SIS prior to its
passing1, creates a unified contribution rate and amends several of the flaws of the old legal
framework. According to law 148/2019, the National Organization for Social Insurance
(NOSI) should become the main body responsible for social insurance in Egypt and thus,
should become independent from the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS). Indeed, a full-time,
independent and qualified managing director should soon be hired to manage NOSI.
Before law 148/2019 was passed, the contributory social insurance scheme in Egypt dated
back to the laws developed in the 1970s (Social Security Administration, 2017). Although
public and private employers are required to provide the contracted employees with access to
social security, a large proportion of workers are not covered, especially in the private sector.
These include temporary workers, self-employed and casual workers, artisans, domestic
servants and small-scale farmers. The situation particularly affects new entrants to the labor
market from the working youth (Barsoum, 2016). Egypt’s social insurance schemes caters to
disability, maternity, old age, sickness and unemployment2 (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015, p. 7).
In June of 2010, Law 135/2010 was passed. It aimed at unifying the social insurance laws
and resolving several of its core obstacles. Yet, due to the discontinuity and political transitions
that occurred in early 2011, the law was annulled by the Presidential Decree No.79 in 2013.

1

Before law 148/2019 was passed, four main laws were governing the social insurance system; Law 79 for
1975, Law 108 for 1976, Law 50 for 1978, Law 112 for 1980. A more elaborative account on the old social
insurance system can be found in the following studies; Ido (2018); Loewe & Westmeier (2018); Selwaness &
Roushdy (2014); Selwaness (2012); Sieverding & Selwaness (2012).
2
Unemployment benefits are rarely provided to the beneficiaries due to a technical flaw in the system. According
to the Ministry of Manpower and Migration, unemployment benefits are only given to insured persons who are
dismissed involuntarily from their jobs. The majority of the private sector obliges employees to sign a resignation
letter (Form 6) whilst signing the contract. This way, these companies evade many of their insurance liabilities
and the dismissed workers do not receive their unemployment benefits (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019)
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Most recent statistics depict that around 17 million citizens contribute to the different
social insurance schemes (ILO, 2019). Roughly 28.7% of the working age population and
53.6% of the labor force takes part in the system (ILO, 2019). Social insurance coverage among
male participants dropped from 44.9% in 2006 to 39.8% in 2012, while female participation in
the labor force increased and hence, their participation in social insurance increased from
43.2% to 54.5% in the same years (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019). Nevertheless, the relatively
low social insurance coverage can be attributed to several factors, among which the decline in
public sector hiring that started in the late 1990s as a part of vast structural adjustment programs
and economic reforms initiated at the time (Loewe & Westemeier, 2018; Assaad, 2009).
The Egyptian SIS faces various challenges and shortcomings. These can be
summarized as follows:
A. There are wide gaps in coverage especially among youth. This is mainly due to the fact that
the system was expanded for public sector employees in the 1970s and 1980s. At the time,
a large number of citizens were being employed in the government and hence, SIS coverage
was high. However, due to the decline in public sector hiring (Assaad, 2009) and the
expansion of informal employment (Gatti, Bodor, Angel-Urdinola, & Silva, 2014), there
was a significant decline of SIS among the younger groups (Sieverding & Selwaness,
2012). Moreover, due to the particularly low labor force participation among women, SIS
coverage remains low (Assaad & Krafft, 2015; Barsoum, 2018). In particular, 18.7% of
Egyptian women aged 15 to 24 were part of the labor force in 2017 (ILO, 2017). Moreover,
the high cost of participation and the inadequate enforcement of law within the SIS have
exacerbated the issue of low coverage (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). Finally, the lack of
awareness about the SIS, especially among the poor or near-poor, which represent the
largest portion of workers (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019) is another main cause for the
coverage gap (Loewe, 2014; Sieverding, 2016).
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B. The current scheme intensifies socio-economic disparities as it covers the more privileged
groups in the labor market, the formal sector, whilst neglecting the most vulnerable, farmers
and casual workers (Loewe, 2014). Less than 20% of the casual workers in Egypt had
access to the SIS in the last decades (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). This exacerbates both
the urban-rural divide in the country as well as socio-economic inequalities. Indeed,
according to the World Bank (2007), 80% of pension-spending in Egypt goes to the nonpoor (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).
C. Another challenge facing the SIS is the evasion from social insurance contributions. A high
percentage of the private sector either evades fully from SIS contributions of their
employees or partially by under-reporting employees’ salaries. Indeed, around 40% of the
Egyptian private sector under-reports its social insurance contributions (UNDP, 2005). One
of the main reasons why the system disincentives enrolment are the high contribution rates
(Loewe, 2014; Maait & Demarco, 2012; Roushdy & Selwaness, 2015). Indeed, the
Egyptian SIS is regarded as one of the most expensive in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region (Maait & Demarco, 2012). Prior to the ratification of law 148 for 2019,
the contribution rates were 41% of the payroll, of which 26% are covered by the employer,
14% by the employee and 1% by the Treasury. Thus, both employers and employees have
an incentive to under-report their earnings. Another reason why under-reporting is
relatively high is the fact that pensions are calculated based on the monthly earnings of the
last years in service (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019). As they come closer to the pensionable
age, contributors start fully reporting their salaries.
D. The system also puts a ceiling on pensionable wage. This way, low-wage workers should
pay their social insurance contributions on their total salary while high-wage workers
whose revenues are above the pensionable wage ceiling do not report their total earnings
(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). This way, not only does the system worsen socio-
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economic gaps and inequalities, the SIS is deprived of contributions that could have been
collected from high-wage workers.
E. Finally, the social insurance system’s inadequate law enforcement and monitoring capacity
worsens all of the above-mentioned challenges and shortcomings of the system (Sieverding
& Selwaness, 2012; Roushdy & Selwaness, 2015).
As noted previously, law 148 for 2019 is currently the only law regulating social
insurance benefits. The most important changes that were included in the law and
consequently, in the new system are briefly highlighted here. This section is based on a report
published by NOSI about the most important tenets of the new law (NOSI, 2019).
The main challenges that depicted a dire need for a new legal framework governing social
insurance are, firstly, an anticipated actuarial budgetary deficit that would have occurred in
2037 (NOSI, 2019). The above-mentioned challenges and shortcomings of the old system
including the low coverage rate and the evasion of social insurance contributions in addition to
the increase in the percentage of early retirements and the low pension benefits were some of
the main triggers to start working on a reformed legal framework.
In order to mitigate these challenges and upgrade the SIS, law 148/2019 was passed on the
first of January 2020. It unifies all social insurance laws which should reduce the complexity
of navigating the system. Furthermore, it lowers and unifies social insurance contribution rates
but increases the minimum and maximum insurable salary. Law 148/2019 works with a unified
global salary instead of fixed and variable salaries. It also includes the automatic adjustment
of pensionable wage by 15% on an annual basis for the first seven years of its implementation.
Afterwards, the rate would be adjusted based on the inflation rate. According to the new law,
within the next couple of years the two social insurance funds managed by NOSI, Government
Social Insurance Fund (GSIF) and Public and Private Business Sector Fund (PSIF) should be
merged. Also, within one year from the implementation of the new law an independent
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managing director should be appointed to head NOSI. This way, it would become independent
from MoSS. Social insurance coverage for casual workers is also enhanced in the new system,
thus, contributing to the inclusion of the informal economy and increasing the coverage of the
system. Finally, the new law also foresees a voluntary social insurance scheme that is based on
defined contributions and which would be invested in the country’s new sovereign wealth fund.
2.2.2. Health Insurance
Before the Arab Spring, from 1965 to 1997, several laws extending health insurance to
large portions of the population were being developed in Egypt (ILO, 2009b). Law 32/1975
extended health coverage to public servants whilst Law 79/1975 provided it to private sector
employees. Successive laws broadened the coverage to include widows of pensioners, children,
among others (ILO, 2009b, p. 4). Egypt’s health care system included different and fragmented
types of service providers and funders including tax-funded and social health insurance
schemes. The tax-funded as well as the insurance-based systems both manage their own
hospitals and health care facilities that provide primary, secondary and tertiary care. Moreover,
the Ministry of Health and Population (MOHP), the Health Insurance Organization (HIO), the
Ministry of Education as well as the Curative Care Organizations all run their own facilities
(ILO, 2009b). The social health insurance system is mainly managed by HIO and a number of
government hospitals and healthcare providers that grant services for the uninsured at
subsidized rates (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). The HIO has its own network of healthcare
providers but it also works with private doctors and facilities to provide additional services for
those covered by the health insurance system (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012).
This system faces many challenges and shortcomings. In terms of the coverage of the
system, roughly 30% of the labor force was covered by the HIO in 2008 (Maeda & ElSaharty,
2008), among which less than 5% were private sector workers. This discrepancy can be largely
attributed to the fact that private sector companies are not obligated to enroll their employees
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in the health insurance scheme. Moreover, the poor quality of medical services and the
exclusion of several services from the health insurance scheme has increased the pay out-ofpocket share of those insured under the system (Maeda & ElSaharty, 2008). In addition to many
financial constraints and limitations that resulted from the legislative framework of the health
insurance system and that have resulted in the unsustainability of the system, health insurance
benefits the rich more than the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, 80% of the subsidized
health care services are provided to the two highest income quintiles, according to MOHP
(Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). Other forms of inequality exist between the coverage of the
urban and the poor, men and women as well as the formal and the informal sector (Sieverding
& Selwaness, 2012). One of the main causes of these shortcomings is that many institutions
and laws regulate the same coverage scheme. This leads to inefficiency, lack of coordination,
in addition to several other obstacles and challenges.
The Government of Egypt has committed to reform the health insurance system
(Government of Egypt, 2015). The government’s efforts culminated in the passing of Law 2
for 2018 adopted in January 2018. It covers all citizens including all ages, all parts of the
country, private employees, seasonal workers as well as women and children on a mandatory
basis (NATLEX, 2018). Additionally, the law provides coverage against disease and health
injuries. It also guarantees free healthcare services to those unable to meet the required
contribution fees. Not only does the new law extend health insurance coverage geographically,
demographically and by the level of service, it regulates all aspects of health insurance. In
addition, it increases the revenues of health insurance and incentivizes quality and efficiency.
Finally, the law focuses on the delivery of high quality services and guarantees the
sustainability of funding (NATLEX, 2018). In June 2020, the World Bank has approved the
provision of US$ 400 million to support the development of the universal health insurance
scheme (World Bank, 2020). The pilot phase of the law is being launched in Port Said where
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approximately 506,000 citizens were registered in the first couple of months. Universal Health
insurance is set to be rolled out gradually until 2030 (Egypt Today, 2019). No assessments can
be rendered on the new law yet due to the lack of data about the pilot phase in Port Said that
has only started in July of 2019.

2.3.

Non-Contributory Schemes

Non-contributory social protection programs - also referred to as social safety nets or social
assistance schemes - are interventions which do not necessitate direct contributions from the
beneficiaries as a requirement to the entitlement to benefits (Behrendt & Hagemejer, 2018).
Such programs help individuals adapt to chronic poverty, destitution, deprivation and
vulnerability, thus, targeting the poor and vulnerable (World Bank, 2018a). As noted above,
non-contributory schemes include conditional and unconditional cash transfers, in-kind
transfers, non-contributory social pensions, food and in-kind transfers, school feeding and
public works programs, fee waivers, among others (World Bank, 2018a).
In Egypt, the most important social safety nets are the subsidies as well as cash
transfers. The focus of this section lies on the food and fuel subsidies since they are among the
most important commodity subsidies and SSN in the country as well as the solidarity pension
and Takaful and Karama cash transfer programs. Changes which were initiated after the Arab
Spring are highlighted here.
2.3.1. Food and Fuel Subsidies
Subsidies play an important role in Egypt’s social, economic and political landscape.
Spending on subsidies, grants and social benefits amounted to an annual average of 9.7% of
the GDP for fiscal years 2011/12 to 2015/16 (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). The most
important category of subsidies in Egypt includes commodity subsidies which reached an
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average of 7.9% of the GDP in the same period3 (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Commodity
subsidies can be divided into six categories; (1) Food Subsidies (Tamween) (2) Farmers’
Subsidies (3) Fuel Subsidies (4) Electricity Subsidies (5) Subsidies for medicine and children’s
milk (6) Transfers to public water companies.
Egypt’s non-contributory social assistance scheme has long focused on fuel and food
subsidies. These policies have been often described as both expensive and regressive since
80% of their benefits are reaped by the non-poor (Devereux S. , 2016, p. 14). Step-by-step
liberalization of energy prices is currently being implemented and a portion of the savings from
these fuel subsidies is invested in reform, transformation and development plans of SSN,
healthcare and education (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).
Food subsidies remain, however, the cornerstone of Egypt’s SSN, especially since the
country is constantly faced with the double-burden of malnutrition4 - in spite of the prevalence
of the subsidy system since the early 1900s (Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, & El-Batrawy, 2016).
The Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MOSIT) is in charge of regulating the FSS in
Egypt. It is estimated that roughly 80 million Egyptians are registered in the system (Emam,
2019). Spending on the FSS is the second-largest among Egypt’s SSN, preceded by fuel
subsidies (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Finally, the FSS has always played the role of
mitigating price shocks and cushioning the population from falling into poverty and deprivation
(Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). The removal of food subsidies - without an immediate
substitution - could lead to roughly a 10% increase in the national level poverty (WFP, 2013).
Upper Egypt, the region with the highest poverty rate in Egypt would be affected severely
(WFP, 2013).

3

Subsidy spending in Egypt can be divided into four categories (a) commodity subsidies (b) subsidies and grants
for social services (c) subsidies and grants for lagging regions and (d) subsidies and grants for economic activities
(Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).
4
The double-burden of malnutrition resembles the co-existence of undernutrition and obesity or diet-related
noncommunicable diseases (Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, & El-Batrawy, 2016).
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In line with the new social contract and the demands for social justice and inclusive
growth after the country’s 2011 and 2013 revolutions, MOSIT started introducing a series of
structural reforms aimed at enhancing targeting, efficiency, delivery, coverage or benefit level
of the FSS (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). A smartcard-based system where citizens are
allowed to buy a number of loaves per day replaced the old scheme in which the government
provided the flour for the bakeries at a subsidized price. In 2015, approximately 88.6% of all
families made use of food subsidies through the smart-card system (Machado, Bilo, Veras
Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio, 2018, p. 134). This is why, in 2017, the eligibility criteria were
narrowed down to households earning below a certain income threshold. Additionally, only
four family members are now allowed to be registered under one smart-card, however, this
does not apply to already listed households (Machado, Bilo, Veras Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio,
2018, p. 131).
The contemporary system Tamween incorporates two principal elements; Baladi Bread
(BB) and Ration Cards (RC). Starting from mid-2014, subsidized commodity quotas were
replaced with monthly cash allowance that provide ration cards’ beneficiaries with a variety of
commodities to choose among. Several other reforms that incentivize beneficiaries to use RC
instead of consume BB have been undertaken, as well (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018). Thus,
Egypt has changed its food subsidy system from the provision of in-kind subsidized goods to
an open voucher-style system. Moreover, the system is technologically developed so as to
allow for the personalization of the subsidized food commodities (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby,
2018, p. 108). One of the major shortcomings in the system that still persists is the universality
of food subsidies. Up until now, targeting mechanisms for the food subsidy system have not
been fully developed.
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The most important tenets of the reformed FSS are the following5.
A. The BB subsidy shifted from an input-based subsidy to an output-oriented one. Instead of
subsidizing the wheat flour distributed to bakeries, in the new system bakeries buy wheat
flour at the market price and sell the loaves at the agreed-upon price (5 piastres). MOSIT
now subsidizes the difference between the subsidized price and the real cost of the loaves.
This change has helped in reducing leakage as well as the prevalence of a black market for
wheat.
B. The FSS system is now an automated smart system. The BB and RC systems are linked
and bakeries have to have POS readers. This way, financial transactions between MOSIT
and the bakeries as well as the bakeries and the beneficiaries are now automated.
C. The new system also caps the number of bread loaves a family can purchase daily, enhances
the quality of the bread and incentivizes families to alter their food choices by rewarding
beneficiaries who do not purchase the maximum amount of BB. This way, the system
promotes a more diverse diet which might have positive nutritional effects.
D. The new FSS has encouraged commercial activities and market competition by allowing
groceries which sell subsidized commodities to sell other goods in addition to the RC
produce.
In spite of the upgrade of the system, FSS still encounters a number of challenges. First,
the FSS still faces distortions in the market. Also, there have often been reports of shortages of
basic commodities such as Rice and Oil. Many beneficiaries also complain about the value of
the benefits. Indeed, after initiating the change to the RC point-based system, the relative value
of the food subsidy has declined as opposed to earlier systems. Moreover, the system does not
provide enough incentive to replace BB with other commodities. Indeed, beneficiaries are

5

This section is predominantly based on Abdalla & Al-Shawarby (2018) since it is one of the most
comprehensive and recent accounts on the issue of subsidies. Their account includes a more detailed review of
the FSS.
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compensated with 10 piasters on their RC for every loaf of bread they save. This amount does
not render beneficiaries many other options to purchase. Finally, the biggest challenge facing
the sustainability of the FSS is the targeting. The FSS covered nearly 88.6% of the Egyptian
population in 2015, among which are 77.7% of the richest decile and 90% of the second to
fourth richest deciles (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018).
2.3.2. Cash Transfers
Social assistance had been managed in the form of monthly non-contributory pensions
since the Anwar El-Sadat government. At the time, it was named Sadat pensions and afterwards
it was changed to Mubarak pensions and finally, the scheme was called Solidarity Pension or
Ma’ash Al-Daman. This scheme targets casual workers as well as those not covered under the
SIS. Although it is named pension, this scheme is considered as one of the principal SSN
together with other social assistance programs. This program has received criticism for its
limited coverage, the low pension benefits as well as its bias in administration (Sieverding &
Selwaness, 2012). The system reaches less than 10% of the poorest quintile (World Bank,
2015). Despite the heavy criticism, before and after the revolution, the pension was raised
several times in an ad hoc manner by most governments due to social pressures (Ido, 2018).
This exacerbated the issue of the financial sustainability of this pension scheme.
With regards to the provision of cash transfers, before the January 25th Revolution,
MoSS initiated a geographical targeting program aimed at reaching the 1000 poorest villages
in Egypt and providing them with conditional cash transfers (Ido, 2018). The conditions for
the obtainment of the monetary transfers were minimum school attendance, constant visits to
healthcare facilities and clinics as well as other nutritional issues. For a very long period of
time, only 2% of the SP budget was targeted at non-contributory schemes (Devereux S. , 2016,
p. 44), however, reforms are being undertaken in this area.
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After the revolution and responding to the call for Social Justice MoSS launched the
Takaful and Karama Program (TKP) – Dignity and Solidarity. Takaful is an income support
program for under-privileged households with children (0-18 years). Conditional on school
enrollment and attendance, health screenings, among others, eligible families receive monthly
cash transfers (World Bank, 2015). The amount of Takaful monetary transfer is dependent on
the number of children as well as their school level. It is notable that 89% of the recipients of
this program are women (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Karama is a social inclusion scheme that
provides SP and decent living standards to elderly people, persons with disabilities and more
recently, orphaned children. Karama grants a fixed cash amount per individual. Both programs
use proxy-means-testing (PMT) formula to target the most vulnerable households. In
December 2016, the programs reached almost 5.5 million citizens (Ministry of Social
Solidarity, 2016) and the spending on the two programs amounted to LE 1.7 billion in 2015 to
2016 (Ministry of Finance, 2017).
As opposed to Karama, Takaful is regarded as more of a developmental SP scheme that
aims at the enhancement of human capacity (Ido, 2018). Takaful is a conditional cash transfer
program. Although conditionality has not been implemented yet, it aims to enhance the
beneficiaries’ education and health indicators as well as their quality of life (World Bank,
2018b). Additionally, Karama grants individuals with cash transfers whilst Takaful endorses a
feminist design that targets female heads of households (World Bank, 2018b).
Both programs are supported by the World Bank’s Strengthen Social Safety Net Project
from 2015 up until 2019 (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, setting up the program, designing and
maintaining its infrastructure, among other needs were financed by the World Bank’s loan of
LE 400 billion. After assessing the progress of TKP, the loan was renewed in 2020 in the
amount of LE 400 billion that should last for four more years (World Bank, 2015). At the
starting phase of the program in 2015, a portion of the loan was dedicated to the cash transfers.
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Afterwards, the program was included in the government’s budget and currently, the cash
transfers are being provided by government’s resources. The budget allocated to TKP increased
by 250% from 2015 to 2017-2018 (MoSS, 2019). Within this period, not only was the program
rolled out on a national scale, but the impact assessment conducted by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) revealed that the program produced positive impact on the
beneficiaries (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; Breisinger, et al., 2018b;ElDidi, et al., 2018).
The most dire challenge facing SSN in Egypt has always been the targeting efficiency, as
shown from the assessment of the FSS as well as the Solidarity pension. To mitigate this
challenge, the MoSS together with the World Bank developed a multilayer targeting formula
to enhance the targeting of Takaful and Karama cash transfers; first through geographical
targeting with the help of poverty maps, then a household targeting formula based on a PMT
and finally, using categorical criteria such as children, the elderly and persons with disability
(World Bank, 2015). Kurdi et al. (2018) provide a more detailed description of the targeting
procedures. Criteria for the indicators of poverty were based on the HIECS conducted by the
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) for the year 2012 to 2013
(ERF, CAPMAS, 2014). The poverty map focuses to a large extent on the least developed
geographic regions - predominately the Southern parts of the country which were previously
neglected (Government of Egypt, 2015). This is why, the government’s outreach efforts and
awareness campaigns towards the program were mostly targeted at the Southern poorest areas
of the country (Breisinger, et al., 2018a).
Accepted beneficiaries receive cash transfers that are calculated depending on the
number of children, their age groups, the number of elderly or people living with disabilities,
etc. TKP benefits increase depending on the government’s budget allocation.
Table 2 depicts the calculation criteria for the different benefit levels of TKP
households.
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Table 2: Calculation of TKP benefits
Takaful

Karama

Monthly Payment

Mother with Children

Monthly Payment

EGP 325 = US$ 20
EGP 6 = US$ 0.38
EGP 80 = US$ 5.4
EGP 100 = US$ 6.30
Other parameters

Base
Primary school child
Preparatory (middle) school child
High school child
Capped at 3 children (highest
education level)

EGP 350 = US$ 22.06
EGP 700 = US$ 44.11
EGP 1,050 = US$ 66.17

Paid to female in household

Other parameters

Elderly + Living with
Disability
1
2
3
Capped at 3 eligible
members in one household
Paid to each individual
separately

Source: Adopted from: World Bank (2015)6
From an institutional point of view, the Central Social Protection Department at MoSS is in
charge of the overall management of TKP while the Central Unit for Social Pension is
responsible for the daily handling of the program (World Bank, 2015). A Project Task Force
(PTF) under the Central Unit for Social Pension has also been assigned to lead the
implementation of the program at the central level as well as the coordination with relevant
partners (World Bank, 2015). The PTF incorporates staff members and consultants in charge
of Management Information Systems (MIS), procurement, communications, research,
coordination, M&E, among others. The program’s infrastructure was designed with the help of
a number of international organizations, the most important of which is the World Bank which
helps ensure the program’s infrastructure matches international standards. MoSS is in charge
of the registration, enrollment, payment Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), as well as the
grievance redress mechanism (GRM) of TKP through its offices at the governorate, district and
village levels (World Bank, 2015).
Capitalizing on the database of Takaful and Karama, MoSS is providing the program’s
beneficiaries with other related and integrated packages of SP services (World Bank, 2015).
These include a project for the eradication of illiteracy among Takaful women, La Ommeya

6

Dollar Equivalence calculated by researcher. Calculation is based on the following exchange rate (August
2020): US$ 1 = LE 15.86.
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(MoSS, 2019a); a decent living housing program, Sakan Karim (MoSS, 2019b); a program
which aims at limiting the demographic growth of Takaful beneficiaries, Etnen Kefaya (MoSS,
2019c); among others (World Bank, 2018b).

2.4.

Active Labor Market Programs

In Egypt, the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MoMM) is the primary public
employment agency. MoMM is in charge of labor policies, enhancing employability and
managing the demands of the labor market (ILO, 2017). MoMM runs 300 public offices that
are dispersed around the country (Barsoum, 2017). Since the initiation of the Economic Reform
Structural and Adjustment Program in 1991 which launched privatization projects and limited
employment opportunities in the public sector, several governments as well as donor-funded
projects in the field of youth employment and school-to-work transition have been
implemented in Egypt. This directive aimed at the mitigation of the impact of the abovementioned policy shift. Nonetheless, the government is still regarded as the employer of first
choice for a large portion of Egyptians (Barsoum, 2017).
ALMPs in Egypt integrate skill development programs - focusing primarily on
technical and vocational training - with entrepreneurship promotion as well as financial
services and access to credit. Only 2% of ALMPs in Egypt target subsidized employment
(Barsoum, 2017).
One of the most important steps towards the development of ALMPs in Egypt was the
establishment of the Social Fund for Development in 1991. The Social Fund was established
as a semi-autonomous agency that targets the establishment of employment opportunities, the
development of the capacities of different communities as well as the encouragement of smalland medium-sized enterprises (Ameta & El Shafie, 2015). The program is an important tool in
the fight against unemployment, the alleviation of poverty and the enhancement of living
standard as well as social and economic development (Abou-Ali, El-Azony, El-Laithy,
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Haughton, & Khandker, 2009). The Fund was established as a joint initiative between the
Egyptian Government, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the
World Bank. In 2015, the Social Fund for Development funded a total of 15,211 small
enterprises in sectors such as trade, industry, service, agriculture, among others (UNDP, 2016).
In April 2017, a decree from the Egyptian Prime Minister established the Micro- Small- and
Medium Enterprise Development Agency to replace the Social Fund for Development (GIZ,
2017).
It is worth noting that comprehensive ALMPs combining skill development with
employment services and entrepreneurship promotion have only been established after the
January 25th Revolution (ILO, 2017). In the context of Social Fund for Development, the
Emergency Labor Intensive Investment Project as well as the Emergency Employment
Investment project were launched with the support of the World Bank, UNDP and the
European Union in 2012. Both projects grant temporary employment opportunities to
unemployed unskilled or semi-skilled workers through labor-intensive projects (Social Fund
for Development, 2013). These two programs target the mitigation of the economic downturn
that occurred after the Arab Spring (ILO, 2017). At the macro-economic level, national
standards for the provision of skill training were developed in partnership with the relevant
industries, the Social Fund for Development – and later the Industrial Training Council – the
World Bank as well as other international organizations. At the program level, the national
program for training for employment was implemented by the, World Bank as well as the
Industrial Training Council (ILO, 2017). In Egypt, civil society organizations play an important
role in the development of ALMPs. The line between state and non-state providers is blurred,
especially given that the Social Fund for Development used to work with hundreds of NGOs
in the provision of ALMPs (Barsoum, 2017).
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The Ministry of Social Solidarity has designed an ALMP to complement Takaful and
Karama; Forsa Program - Opportunity - which is still at an early phase of its development
(MoSS, 2019d). Forsa is the employment and livelihood support component of TKP (World
Bank, 2015). TKP graduates should seek training and employment opportunities through Forsa
(El-Shabrawy, 2019). Forsa targets TKP beneficiaries who are of age to participate in the labor
force, those rejected by the PMT formula of TKP and people with disabilities who are capable
of working, among others (El-Shabrawy, 2019) . The following are the services provided to
Forsa beneficiaries; (1) behavioral and cultural awareness sessions focusing predominantly on
financial literacy (2) mentoring especially with regards to entrepreneurship and the
management of micro-enterprises in collaboration with the ILO (3) Job-specific and demanddriven skill-training in cooperation with the USAID (4) Financing micro-enterprises (5) linking
beneficiaries to a database of employers and employment opportunities, among others (ElShabrawy, 2019).
Egypt’s ALMPs face several challenges related to the country’s welfare regime structure
(Barsoum, 2017). Not only are inefficient and unsustainable models of public employment still
bolstered, but the government does not spend sufficient funds on skill development. Moreover,
the activities in this field are fragmented due to the multiplicity of players that leads to a lack
of coordination as well as donor-dependence (Barsoum, et al., 2019). Indeed, very often no
clear outputs or monitoring and evaluation reports are available for these programs. Finally,
despite the political support for entrepreneurship programs in the region, the number of
beneficiaries, especially start-ups, is small, as compared to other activities (Semlali & AngelUrdinola, 2013). Thus, Egypt focuses on financial services – as is clear from the Social Fund
for Development - whilst few programs incorporate mentoring, coaching or business
incubation (Semlali & Angel-Urdinola, 2013).
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3. CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW
While most social protection and social policy discourses have centered around evaluation
studies, design and implementation questions, regional divergences and similarities, limited
attention has been given to institutional arrangements and governance of SP. This literature
review examines the concept of governance and its relation to Social Policy and Social
Protection. It also places governance within the works on SP. Finally, policy, design and
implementation conditions and challenges of SP systems in the MENA region and in Egypt are
examined.

3.1.

Governance as a Concept

Over the years, the concept of governance has become an overarching approach which
covers a number of phenomena in political sciences, economics, management, public
administration as well as public policy (Pierre & Peters, 2000). From a state-centered
perspective, governance is sometimes seen from the lens of public management (Hood, 1991;
Du Gay, 1996; Hill & Lynn Jr, 2004; Lynn Jr, Heinrich, & Hill, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert,
2017). It also often deals with the coordination of different actors through policy networks
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Rhodes, 2017; Börzel, 1997) as well as the coordination of a variety
of sectors in the economy (Campbell, Hollingsworth, & Lindberg, 1991; Hollingsworth,
Schmitter, & Streeck, 1994). Governance has also come to denote the collaboration and
coordination of efforts between the public and private sector in public service delivery (Ansell
& Gash, 2008; Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2012). In the private sector, corporate governance is a
term which incorporates a variety of structures, rules, procedures and mechanisms that steer
and control corporations and their relationship with stakeholders (Almqvist, Grossi, van
Helden, & Reichard, 2013; Tricker & Tricker, 2015). Finally, international organizations such
as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have coined the term good governance
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as a development reform objective especially in the Global South (Leftwich, 1994; Santiso,
2001; Woods, 2000; Mkandawire, 2007).
Not only does the concept of Governance resonate in many academic domains and is
understood in different lenses, but Pierre and Peters (2020) differentiate between Governance
as a structure, Governance as a process and Governance as an analytic framework. In
structural terms, governance regulates the relationships between the different political and
economic institutions inside as well as outside the state (Pierre and Peters, 2020, p. 4).
Governance can organize relationships in a hierarchical way. Structures can also revolve
around the market given the importance of economic actors and institutions. One of the most
common perceptions on the structural definition of governance is the understanding of
Governance as networks (Pierre and Peters, 2020, p.11; Börzel & Risse, 2010; Marcussen &
Torfing, 2006). Network governance deals with the relationship between networks in the policy
arena as well as collaborations among actors and stakeholders in a given area “ranging from
local government or neighbourhood to networks of states, or actors with joint stakes in a
particular issue” (Pierre & Peters, 2020, p. 11). Governance as a process focuses both on
outomces as well as institutional arrangements (Pierre & Peters, 2020, p. 12). Thus, governance
is not only concerned with structures but most importantly, relationships between them. In this
regard, governance is dynamic with regards to both its configuration as well as objectives
(Pierre & Peters, 2020, p.13). For the state this means that proper governance requires the state
to coordinate and steer its efforts. Finally, governance can be regarded as a theory or analytic
framework rather than a phenomenon.
Although there is no single definition of governance, this work takes a more operational
perspective on governance. The focus is on the application of adequate governance mechanism
rather than the theory of governance. Hence, this thesis’ working definition of governance is
one which highlights the importance of both governance as a structure - i.e. institutional
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capacity - but also governance as a process which is dynamic. Governance includes the steering
of subjects and practices in a way which helps reach social and politico-economic goals
(Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003).
This work also emphasizes the importance of accountability to governance (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). While a large portion of the corporate governance literature
highlights the significance of accountability (Solomon & Solomon, 2004; Brennan & Solomon,
2008; Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2005; Solomon J. , 2007), accountability relationships
are crucial for the governance of the public sector, as well (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012). In this regard, accountability can be defined as a set of “principal-agent relationships
between policymakers, providers and citizens” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
This thesis’ conceptualization and working definition of governance is elaborated in Chapter
four.

3.2.

Understanding Social Protection

The terms Social Policy and Social Protection cannot be used interchangeably. Social
Policy is a field of policy and academic inquiry that is predominately based on the early 2000s
Western European welfare state literature (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). It is a feature
of postwar democracies which provides overarching theoretical and empirical setting to the
current study of SP (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). SP is a newer but related concept that
can be considered the more nuanced arm of social policy which includes more targeted SSN as
well as social insurance schemes, which were, however, often neglected in the Global South
(Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019b). Thus, SP can be considered the emerging paradigm for
social policy in developing countries that contributes to the reduction of vulnerability and
poverty in the Global South (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Because SP is not merely a policy
framework but includes different approaches to economic and social development, the
governance of SP can be more easily operationalized than that of social policy (Barrientos &
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Hulme, 2008). Additionally, SP is the more contemporary phenomenon (Jawad, Jones, &
Messkoub, 2019b). For this reason, this work focuses on the governance of SP in Egypt.
Before analyzing the governance of social protection, it is crucial to map out the discourse
on social protection that has been evolving for more than a decade. The term Social Protection
has been defined differently by academics, donor agencies, governments and NGOs. Although
there is no consensus on a single perception of SP, it is agreed-upon that SP is concerned with
populations that are vulnerable and at risk, such as children, women, elderly, disabled,
displaced, unemployed, sick, among others (Scott, 2012). Especially in developing countries,
social protection puts an emphasis on poverty and poverty reduction strategies that reduce
vulnerability and stimulate economic growth (Arjona, Ladaique, & Pearson, 2003; Barrientos
& Hulme, 2009; Barrientos & Hulme, 2008; Barrientos & DeJong, 2006; Norton, Conway, &
Foster, 2002).
The International Labor Office (ILO) takes a rights-based approach on social protection
and extends it beyond SSN (ILO, 2014). Indeed, SP is a human right based on shared principles
of social justice and corresponds to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ call for
appropriate living standards, access to health and education, food, housing and social security
(ILO, 2019). This is why, every country should develop a Social Protection Floor (SPF) and
establish a coherent SP system. SPFs are nationally-defined guarantees which provide
protection against illness, health, poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion (Ortiz, Schmitt, &
De, 2016). These guarantees should make sure that citizens have access to health care and
income security over the life cycle (ILO, 2019).
The World Bank’s discourse on SP, on the other hand, focuses on risk management. The
Social Risk Management Framework developed by the World Bank is grounded on the notion
that the poor are most exposed to various types of risks and have the least instruments to deal
with such risks (Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, & Tesliuc, 2003). Thus, the poor should have
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more access to Social Risk Management instruments (Holzmann, Sherburne-Benz, & Tesliuc,
2003). The main elements of Social Risk Management include risk reduction, risk mitigation
and risk coping. Finally, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) approach emphasizes
the importance of multi-dimensional poverty and its impact on children’s poverty and
deprivation. Their approach towards social protection is fixated around child poverty and
providing children with inclusive and integrated SP systems that are equitable (UNICEF,
2012). A more elaborative account of different international organizations’ and donor agencies’
conceptualizations of SP is provided by Cook & Kabeer (2009).
It is evident that there are significant variations in the approaches towards SP as well as the
objectives and design of SP interventions (Cook & Kabeer, 2009). While the World Bank’s
Social Risk Management framework has dominated international policy discourse for a long
period of time, among others due to the Bank’s influence, other scholarly accounts of SP have
been influential, as well (Cook & Kabeer, 2009). Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2007)
conceptual framework on Social protection for transformation focuses on the link between
social protection and the reduction of vulnerabilities. It is one of the most elaborative and
widely acknowledged conceptualizations of SP. Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux argue that
social protection is broader than mere SSN and that it has to incorporate protective,
preventative, promotive and transformative measures. Provision instruments describe social
assistance programs as well as social services targeted at needy populations. Preventive
measures aim to prevent deprivation and focuses on the eradication of poverty. Such
instruments include social insurance and security programs that are targeted at economically
vulnerable groups. Prevention tries to avert households from negative coping strategies
(Carpenter, Slater, & Mallett, 2012). Promotive interventions focus on the improvement of real
income and capacities by developing programs that enhance the livelihood, assets and
productivity of individuals. Such programs include, for instance, ALMPs and microcredit.
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Finally, transformative measures focus on social justice and inclusivity (Sabates-Wheeler &
Devereux, 2007).
Aside from the conceptualizations of SP, the discourse on SP includes studies that map out
the evolution of the field (Cook & Kabeer, 2009; Norton, Conway, & Foster, 2002; Barrientos
& Hulme, 2009; Scott, 2012; European Commission, 2015). These trace the evolution of SP
from short-term protective SSN that reduce the impacts of shocks and insurance interventions
linked to formal employment to long-term preventive and promotive SP schemes which
support equitable growth, address the structural causes of poverty and attempt to help people
climb out of poverty.
Another strand in the literature focuses on regional developments and the impact of
political economy on SP. Machado, Bilo, Veras Soares, & Guerreiro Osorio (2018) and
Devereux (2015) provide a descriptive account of the development and status quo of SP
programs in the Middle East and North Africa. On the other hand, Karshenas & Moghadam
(2009) examine the evolution of social policy in the region before the revolution while the
political economy of SP in the Middle East and North Africa received even more attention after
the 2011 revolution calling for social justice (Loewe, 2013; Loewe & Jawad, 2018; Karshenas,
Moghadam, & Alami, 2014; Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Studies on the Latin American
experience trace stronger and deeper structural developments that have started almost two
decades ago (Barrientos A. , 2019). Since the beginning of the 1990s, newly democratized
Latin American countries embarked on a mission to secure social rights (Levitsky & Roberts,
2012) and with the help of international organizations and donor agencies, they started
developing large-scale social assistance programs targeting low-income and informal
employment groups (Molyneux, 2007; Barrientos & Hinojosa-Valencia, 2009; Barrientos &
Santibáñez, 2009; Ferreira & Robalino, 2010). More contemporary accounts of the Latin
American experience assess the shock-responsiveness of SP in the region (Beazley, 2017) as
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well as ways to move beyond SSN (Cruz-Martínez, 2019; Barrientos A., 2019; Papadopoulos
& Leyer, 2016). The Sub-Saharan and South Asian experiences with SP are also crucial in the
discourse on SP (Devereux & Cipryk, 2009; Kohler, Cali, & Stirbu, 2009).
Aside from the conceptualization and regional accounts on SP, a large portion of the
literature analyzes the effectiveness and efficiency of different types of SP (Howell, 2001;
Palacios & Sluchynsky, 2006; Betcherman, Olivas, & Dar, 2004) as well as the design and
implementation challenges and lessons learnt (Barrientos A., 2007; von Gliszczynski, 2015;
Slater & Farrington, 2009; Devereux, 2010). With regards to the types of SP, a wealth of
literature assesses the impact and programming options of cash transfers; conditonal and
unconditional, targeted and universal, etc. (Slater, Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008;
Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010; Hanlon, 2004; Fiszbien & Schady, 2009; Holmes &
Slater, 2007). This is mainly because cash transfers are regarded as a feasible and viable
measure in both developmental and humanitarian contexts (Scott, 2012).

3.3.

Governance and Social Protection

This section maps out the literature on the governance of social protection. As noted
previously, while social protection has gained momentum in contemporary studies, the
discourse on social policy preceded SP. This is why, this section begins with an analysis of the
relationship between governance and social policy, followed by an examination of works
assessing the governance of social protection systems. Afterwards, the review zooms into the
governance of social protection programs; cash transfers and contributory schemes.
3.3.1. Governance and Social Policy
The utility of governance as a frame of analysis to the study of social policy was firstly
examined by Mary Daly (2003). She traces back the different definitions and
conceptualizations of governance and shows that the concept is not foreign to social policy.
Her definition of governance includes the analysis of relationships among local, regional and
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national levels, the role of the state and its relation to civil society as well as the formulation,
orientation and implementation of policies (Daly, 2003, p. 115). The analysis sheds light on
the question whether governance extends beyond management and can lend itself to an analysis
and understanding of social policy. In order to answer the question, she develops an analytic
framework for governance and social policy and applies it to analyze the New Labor Law in
the United Kingdom. The conceptual framework identifies four dimensions of governance;
Public Sphere, Policy-Making, Policy Implementation and Societal Incorporation as well as
the operationalizeable referents that help analyze these dimensions. Although the conceptual
framework is holistic and involves most parameters that need to be assessed when studying
social policies, it is not easily operationalizable, as opposed to the framework used in this study
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Daly (2003) reaches the conclusion that
governance extends far beyond management and similar academic disciplies, however, further
research is needed in order to further embed and integrate governance into the study of social
policy. Her assessment is unique insofar as it is the inauguration of the linkage between the
two domains. This paper also represents one of the few theoretically grounded studies linking
governance to social policy. The conceptual framework used in this thesis will be briefly
introduced in the next section and elaborated in Chapter four of the thesis.
3.4.

Governance of Social Protection Systems

The World Bank has done extensive research on the governance of social protection as it
has developed a holisitic approach to analyze the governance of SP. The World Bank’s
Giannozzi & Khan (2011) find that the expansion of already inadequate SSN, requires an
assessment of the current governance schemes of SSN in East Asia. They develop a conceptual
framework which examines the governance of non-contributory SSN and apply it on the
assessment of East Asia.
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Building on this framework, Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012) develop the
conceptual framework Rules, Roles and Controls used in this thesis. Instead of merely focusing
on the governance of SSN, this framework examines the governance of contributory and noncontributory schemes as well as active labor market policies. This conceptual framework will
be elaborated in depth in the next chapter. It is centered around the importance of accountability
to good governance and identifies operational entry points for the governance of SP; (1) Rules
of the Game, (2) Roles and Responsibilities, (3) Controls and Accountability Mechanisms.
Most importantly, it does not only tackle governance from the program level, but it identifies
the three levels at which governance is crucial; (1) Macro-level, (2) Meso-level, (3) Micro-or
Program-level. In parallel, another framework is developed at the World Bank which does not
directly discuss the governance of SP but is closely linked to it. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker
(2012) provide a framework for designing and applying SP and labor systems in developing
countries.
Similar to Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), the paper is concerned with social
protection systems, i.e. a country’s set of different SP programs which are often disintegrated
and fragmented. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker (2012) analyze some of the prerequisties of a
well-designed SP system, among which is effective risk management, improved financial
sustainablity, equitable redistribution of resources, economies of scale in administration as well
as better incentives. Many of these pre-requisites are incorporated into this study’s conceptual
framework. Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker (2012) assess these design and implementation
features on the SP systems of Brazil, Chile, India, Niger, Romania and Vietnam andconclude
that three levels are crucial to the design of efficient SP and labor systems— (1) policy level,
(2) program level as well as the (3) administrative level. These three levels are similar to the
categorization provided by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).
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Although not many, some scholars in different organizations and countries have worked on
the governance enablers and challenges of social protection. Rohregger (2010) analyzes the
conditions which are essential in establishing efficient and effective SP programs. Among the
enablers are political consensus, adequate administrative structures, sustainable financing and
economic growth as well as international conditioning. Rohregger identifies governance
challenges that are entry points for the assessment of SP programs, among which are
administrative structures, legal and political framework, lack of data and monitoring and
evaluation, sustainable conditions, among others. Similar to Daly (2003), this study requires a
more nuanced assessment of the parameters to be measured at the program and the policy level
in order to examine the above-mentioned enablers and challenges. Similarly, the European
Commission’s report on Social Protection Systems (European Commission, 2015) examines
issues related to the design and implementation of social protection systems. Designing
adequate SP systems require the existence of an institutional home, a costing assessment,
proper targeting means, among others. Implementation systems need to pay attention to the
payment and registration systems as well as the development of proper measures for
monitoring and evaluation.
Bozio & Dormont (2016) focus on the level most significant to the French SP system; the
financial feasibility of social protection programs. While it includes other design features, the
study aims to make the spending on SP more efficient and provides a number of reform
recommendations, that are, however, specific to the case at hand. Some of the
recommendations are reiterated in other works, such as the coordination of efforts between
contributory and non-contributory social protection programs and the reorganization of the
architecture and infrastructure of specific programs, especially from the administrative stance.
Thus, although the paper does not provide a generic set of enablers, the recommendations set
forth revolve around policy and administrative capabilities as well as fiscal sustainability.
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A number of studies highlight the role of the international community in the delivery of
effective social protection programs at the national level. Deacon (2013) takes governance into
the global scene and analyzes the impact of international organizations, especially United
Nations agencies on the governance of social protection at the country level. Since the focus is
on SP, the ILO and the World Bank are predominantly in the highlight of this paper. Indeed,
the role of the ILO and its Social Protection Floor as well as other International Governmental
Institutions in the extension and governance of social protection is one which is studied
extensively (Deacon, 2016; Çavus, 2016; Shriwise, Kentikelenis, & Stuckler, 2019). These
works focus not only on the governance of social protection, but also the global discourse over
social policy.
3.4.1. Governance of Cash Transfer Programs
The nature of contributory programs is different from non-contributory and active labor
market programs. This is why, the largest portion of studies, whether reports or journal articles,
assesses the governance of one type of social protection programs. Hence, most studies
concerned with the governance of SP focus predominantly on the micro- or program-level of
governance.
Non-contributory SP schemes and especially cash transfer programs have been in focus of
the literature on social protection for decades (Bastagli, et al., 2016). Whether to target or to
provide universal transfers, whether to conditon cash transfers or not, among others are some
of the issues surrounding non-contributory schemes which are studied extensively in the
literature (von Gliszczynski, 2015; Hulme, Hanlon, & Barrientos, 2012; Hanlon, 2004;
Barrientos & Hulme, 2009). This, however, is not in the center of this study. Instead, the focus
is on the governance, implementation challenges and facilitators as well as delivery of noncontributory and contributory schemes.
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UNDP & UNCDF (2013) focus on the governance of social assistance programs including
unconditional and conditional cash transfers, in-kind transfers, among others. The report finds
that non-contributory programs in most countries, especially in the Global South, are
fragmented and characterized by improvished governance as well as a lack of institutional
capacity. After mapping the existing institutional and governance details related to the
implementation of social assistance programs in countries from Asia and the Pacific, it
examines the efficiency and effectiveness of local government in delivering social assistance
programs. The report also develops a conceptual framework for the assessment of local level
governance of social assistance programs.
While UNDP & UNCDF (2013) highlight the role of decentralization and local governance
in the implementation and service delivery of all types of social assistance programs, Slater,
Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey (2008) advance a framework for the assessment of cash transfer
programs. It focuses on three spheres; (1) institutions, politics and governance, (2) capacity
and implementation, (3) local economic and social impacts. While this framework includes
many of the dimensions of governance put forth by all previously elaborated studies, this work
also emphasizes the importance of local governance and impact as well as the interplay
between the different spheres. Although this framework is meant to be implemented on cash
transfers it can easily serve in the assessment of other types of SP service delivery. The
framework requires an in-depth anlaysis of the referents or the ways such spheres can be
measured at the program level.
In contrast to this study, Bastagli, et al. (2016) review the evidence on the impacts of cash
transfers at the individual and household level by analyzing the literature of 15 years spanning
from the year 2000 to 2015. In order to do so, they advance a framework to assess the enablers
and constraints of cash transfer programs at three levels; (1) household-level, (2) local-level
and (3) country-level. As opposed to the conceptual framework used in this work (Bassett,
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Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012), Bastagli, et al. (2016) incorporate the crucial level of the
household in order to also determine the impacts on the household, which is the most important
level of impact. Outcomes and impacts of cash transfers are measured at three levels; (1)
individual, (2) household (3) intra-household. In this thesis, the household level could not be
incorporated given the lack of direct access to household data. The way to mitigate this issue
with regards to Takaful and Karama program in Egypt was to incorporate IFPRI’s impact
assessment which included more than 8000 households in the analysis.
3.4.2. Governance of Contributory Schemes
Even though contributory schemes, such as social and health insurance have been existent
far longer than cash transfers, they still face numerous challenges related to compliance, error,
fraud and corruption as well as corporate governance and financial sustainability (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The International Social Security Association (ISSA) has
developed guidelines on good governance of social security organizations. “[…] [Good]
governance is aimed at delivering what is mandated and ensuring that what is delivered is
responsive to the evolving needs of the individual and society.” (ISSA, 2013, p. 1). Similar to
Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), the guidelines highlight the importance of
transparency and accountability mechanisms as well as strategic long-term planning, actuarial
soundness, investment in human resources and internet communication technology
infrastructure, the prevention of error, fraud and corruption, among others.
Using the recommendations and data of ISSA (2013), Enoff & McKinnon (2011) focus on
the micro-level of the governance of social insurance schemes. Their emphasis lies on the
improvement of program delivery especially with regards to compliance and contribution
collection. Using survey evidence of different social security organizations, Enoff &
McKinnon (2011) propose a set of techniques to improve contribution collection and the
enforcement of compliance.
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The concept of governance is applied differently to study social security policy in the
United Kingdom in Carmel & Papadopoulos (2003). This study defines governance in more
political and macro-level terms. “Governance is […] a form of political regulation of social
subjects […] initiated, organised and partially controlled by an actor or actors vested with […]
political authority […]. Governance involves the ‘steering’ of the subjects’ behavioural
practices towards particular social and politico-economic goals via a set of institutions and
processes that aim to maintain or change the status quo.” (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003, p.
2). Using this perception of governance, this paper analyzes policy developments in social
security policy in the United Kingdom from two areas of concern. The first, is the area
commonly referred to as the policy level of governance, i.e. the government’s policy goals as
well as the principles they are based on. The second area of concern is the more operational
side of governance focusing on the management of policy as well as program delivery.
After mapping out a number of studies analyzing the governance of social protection, it is
crucial to highlight that many of these accounts develop operational conceptual framework for
the assessment of governance. This is because governance of SP tackles the prerequisites and
challenges of the policy and program level implementation of SP and is therefore more applied
than it is theoretical. This also explains why a number of the mapped studies are reports
conducted by scholars in international institutions. Another crucial finding is that whether a
framework is developed for contributory, non-contributory schemes or both, most analyses
pointed at the same governance entry points; coordination instead of fragmentation, political
willingness and support, financial sustainability, administrative and institutional capacity,
among others. While some works delve deeper into the program level, others focus on the
macro-level of governance. The most viable frameworks and accounts are those which
emphasize the different spheres of governance, are holistic and can be applied to different types
of programs and are easily operational, i.e. provide operational parameters.
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3.5.

Literature on Governance of Social Protection in the Middle East

While the governance of SP in the Middle East and particularly in Egypt has not been studied
in the literature extensively, there are a number of studies which analyze the design and
implementation facilitators and challenges of SP in the region. United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Western Asia’s (UN ESCWA) report on Social Protection Reform in
Arab Countries (UN ESCWA, 2019) acknowledges the shortcomings SP systems have
suffered from in the Arab Region. While contributory schemes are faced with challenges of
low coverage, high fragmentation and financial unsustainability, non-contributory SP schemes
have relied for a long period of time on universal subsidies (UN ESCWA, 2019, p. 10). Most
SP systems in the region lack coherence and coordination at the policy level which undermines
effectiveness and efficiency. UN ESCWA (2019) examines the reforms being implemented in
the region from a systems perspective and thus, conducts a meso-level analysis of SP (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The fourth chapter of the report analyzes governance
aspects of SP systems in the region. It provides conditions for adequate program and system
governance that ensure coordination and collaboration between relevant parties in the delivery
of SP. Such recommendations include the establishment of national dialogue processes,
creation of fiscal space as well as the inclusion of stakeholders at the local level. The chapter
concludes with best practices from Morocco and Mauritania.
The Arab Region’s SP systems share a number of common well-documented
characetristics and challenges (Barsoum & Kassem, 2019). Coverage of SP programs and
income support transfers is often inadequate insofar as it covers approximately 30% of those
living in the poorest quinitiles (Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Contributory schemes face
serious coverage challenges since the largest share of the workforce in the region is not covered
by the formal social insurance systems (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019; Silva, Levin, &
Morgandi, 2013). Not only does this exacerbate the urban-rural divide as well as inequality,
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but it worsens the conditions for the missing middle class (UN ESCWA, 2019). In addition,
universal or quasi-universal energy and food subsidy schemes have been key in the region’s
welfare mix (Barsoum & Kassem, 2019). Most of these countries have been undergoing efforts
to reform their subsidy systems, in particular Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia (Jawad,
2014; Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). A number of Arab countries have also implemented
cash transfer programs to mitigate the negative impacts of the gradual removal of subsidies
(UN ESCWA, 2019). Coverage challenges aside, SP systems in the region lack an overarching
and comprehensive long-term strategy, are usually disintegrated and fragmented and are
confronted with challenges of coordination among all relevant actors in the field (Devereux,
2016).
Regarding program design and implementation, the region’s SP programs face challenges
related to targeting, especially in terms of the inherited and deeply flawed subsidy system
(Devereux S., 2016; Jawad, 2015). SP programs also face serious challenges regarding the
institutional capacities, financial adequacy, management information systems and the
development of rigorous monitoring and evaluation systems. In spite of the multiplicity of
studies analyzing the political economy of social policy in the region as well as the challenges
and characteristics of social protection programs in MENA countries, very few studies provide
a systematic examination of the evolution of social policy changes and social developments in
the region (Jawad, Jones, & Messkoub, 2019a).
Studies on the Egyptian SP system analyze the design and implementation challenges
related to the different types of SP schemes. A number of scholars highlight the challenges
related to the contributory scheme and propose possible reforms to the social insurance and
pension schemes in the country (Helmy, 2008; Selwaness & Roushdy, 2014; Selwaness I. ,
2012; Loewe & Westemeier, 2018; Loewe, 2004). The focus remained, however, for a number
of years on the inefficiencies of the food and energy subsidy system as it was the most
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important SSN in the country (Abdalla & Al-Shawarby, 2018; Ecker, Al-Riffai, Breisinger, &
El-Batrawy, 2016; Lofgren & El-Said, 2001; Abdel-baki, 2011; Ramadan & Thomas, 2011).
Recently, a number of studies started mapping the social protection system in Egypt as a whole
with its gaps, challenges and opportunities (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012), especially in light
of the reforms that have started after the revolution in 2013 (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019;
Helmy, Richter, Siddig, & Ghoneim, 2018; Jawad, et al., 2018; El Baradei, 2019). Aside from
Takaful and Karama, since it is a recently launched program, most programs in Egypt have
been studied in depth in the country.
Nevertheless, a significant gap remains; there have been no attempts to analyze neither the
governance nor the challenges and opportunities on all different levels, the program and the
policy spheres. This is also important because most programs in the country - and in the region
- face very similar challenges. Moreover, implementation details have rarely been discussed.
Indeed, even in terms of the well-studied social insurance system, no accounts have been found
which examine the implementation and service delivery challenges, for instance those related
to the institutional and human resource capacities. Finally, linking theory to practice often
provides insights into recommendations and perspectives which have not been considered
before. Many of the studies assessing the countries SP system do not link theory to practice.
This is why, this thesis’ application of the governance framework helps in the formulation of
evidence-based and comprehensive recommendations.
This thesis provides a practical and operational account on the governance of SP in Egypt.
By analyzing the governance of SP in Egypt, not only is a country’s experience reviewed. But
the assessment of governance challenges and prerequisites links between theoretical notions
about how effective SP is designed and implemented as well as the practical hurdles faced both
at the country and program-levels.
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The governance of social policy and social protection is a niche which has not been studied
extensively especially by academics, mostly since it requires an in-depth analysis of programs
and policies in different countries, which are often not easily accessible by scholars.
Additionally, the governance of SP links between theoretical conceptualizations, regional
examinations, design and implementation features as well as program evaluations and thus,
touches upon many of the different accounts on SP.
There are a number of studies analyzing program-level challenges in the delivery of SP in
Egypt. Nevertheless, no studies have been found that incorporate both the “systems”-level of
governance as well as an in-depth examination of the governance of contributory and noncontributory schemes. Furthermore, most studies assess different programs and do not examine
common features, facilitators and challenges. Most of the studies on the Egyptian social
protection system do not assess on the system as a whole. Hence, by providing a holistic and
comprehensive governance examination of SP in Egypt, this study is the first of its kind in
Egypt and the MENA region. Such an assessment is timely in light of the country’s efforts to
reform the SP system.
To sum up, this study fills a gap in the literature on social protection in the Middle East and
Egypt by analyzing the governance of the social protection system as well as the different
programs inside the system. Thus, it not only examines the big picture but it also assesses
design and implementation features and thus, zooms in on the different programs. This way,
reform efforts in the region can be guided by evidence-based comprehensive analyses.
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
As it has been clear from the literature review, the governance of social protection is an
under-researched area, especially when it is analyzed in the context of a country, in this case,
Egypt. As social protection moves to the center of academic research on the social dimension
of development, a body of evidence is produced. Evaluation studies assessing the impacts of
social protection programs on the reduction of poverty and vulnerability, design and
implementation issues at the program level such as targeting, conditionality, financial issues as
well as the impact of social protection on health, education, labor, among others, are areas of
research which have been explored in depth by a number of scholars, international
organizations and donor institutions (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). Nevertheless, issues of
governance and institutional arrangements of social protection have received little attention.
With the scaling up of many programs across the developing world, issues related to the
governance of social protection become more pronounced (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In order
to efficiently and effectively deliver social protection programs at the national level as well as
achieve social justice, it is relevant to examine the governance of SP.
Another reason why governance is in the focus of this study is the increased recognition
and evidence of the importance of good governance in the enhancement of service delivery
and the improvement of the outcomes of social protection programs (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop,
& Ringold, 2012). Governance is a holistic analytic approach which not only aims to reduce
corruption, but provides incentives for policy-makers and program providers, improves the
accountability relationship with citizens, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012). Most importantly, it aims to look inside the “black box” or “missing middle” (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) of SP service delivery and hence, improve legitimacy. Thus,
governance can be viewed as a crucial building block for enhanced implementation and
outcomes and therefore, an integral part of the social protection system. Instead of merely
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examining programs, governance allows for an investigation of the “system” (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) and hence, the interactions among programs, actors,
regulations, institutions, stakeholders and mechanisms.
Still, governance assessments face a number of constraints. First, as previously mentioned,
there is a certain ambiguity around the definition of governance. Not only this, but scholars are
unable to come up with a single definition of the governance of social protection because of
the diversity of programs making up the sector (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
The conceptual framework used in this study tries to overcome this challenge by examining
overarching concepts which do not differ across the various types of programs in the field.
Additionally, an in-depth examination of governance requires a profound understanding of the
political economy as well as country-specific details about the design and implementation of
SP programs. Such data are often difficult to gain access to.
As previously explained, there are various definitions of governance with multiple entry
points. The working definition of governance used in this thesis is derived from Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012). Governance in SP incorporates a set of incentives and
accountability relationships which impacts service provision, accountability behaviours,
service quality, efficiency and outcomes (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 5).
Effective governance enhances implementation and influences outcomes by improving the
coordination of SP programs, framing accountability relationships, promoting transparency
and participation and enhancing service delivery (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Thus, improved
governance could lead to better development outcomes (Overseas Development Institute,
2006; Campos & Pradhan, 2007).
The conceptual framework used in this study Rules, Roles and Controls developed by the
World Bank (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) operationalizes the working definition
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elaborated above. It provides a set of conditions for effective governance. Accordingly, efforts
to strengthen governance are categorized into three main domains7.
A. Rules of the Game: The rules of the game are a prerequisite for functioning accountability
relationships between policy-makers, program providers as well as citizens. This translates
into a clarity of the legal framework governing the SP system as well as a clarity of the
legal, regulatory and operational guidelines at the program level. These guidelines and rules
differ from contributory to non-contributory schemes. While contributory schemes need to
manage compliance, publicize program rules and ensure the consistency of the rules, noncontributory schemes have to develop and publicize clear and transparent program rules,
that are communicated to the citizens and are consistent both in application as well as
content. In terms of non-contributory schemes, these rules need to be clear at all levels of
service delivery; from the determination of eligibility, entry and exit of the programs, the
determination of benefit levels, among others.
B. Roles and Responsibilities: It is crucial for SP systems to determine the roles and
responsibilities of the actors involved both at the system as well as at the program level. In
this regard, it is crucial to clearly identify the principals and agents in the accountability
relationships, to clearly determine the roles and responsibilities across different levels of
government and institutions, to clarify institutional relationships and job descriptions for
providers and to ensure adequate performance incentives. Contributory and noncontributory schemes differ here, as well.
At the level of contributory schemes, it is imperative to define institutional roles and to
establish an effective performance management system. Non-contributory schemes
highlight the importance of accountability relationships. Upon conducting the data analysis
of this study, a number of additional parameters were found to be relevant for the delivery

7

This section is derived from Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).
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of non-contributory programs. First, it is important to be entrepreneurial and to consider
outsourcing as a form of effective division of roles. Moreover, the separation of functions
between payment and service delivery can help enhance the governance of the program.
Finally, the capacities and individuals working on the design and delivery of the programs
are imperative for its success. This is why, a rigorous and impactful capacity development
program can aid in the clarity and effectiveness of the roles and responsibilities.
C. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: In order to enforce accountability, it is
important to include a number of oversight mechanisms and implementation procedures to
ensure “the right benefit gets to the rights person at the right time” (Bassett, Giannozzi,
Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 7). Contributory schemes highlight the importance of proper
corporate governance. Moreover, transferring payments electronically reduces error, fraud
and corruption. It is also essential to ensure the existence of effective, time-based and
systematic checks as well as to ensure that sanctions are in place to penalize fraud and
corruption.
Non-Contributory schemes involve supply-side as well as demand-side controls and
accountability mechanisms. Supply-side mechanisms include the existence of verification
measures, audits and monitoring and evaluation tools. Cross-checking the data provided by
the citizens to other databases is also helpful in detecting fraudulent and corrupt behavior.
Developing feedback loops such as a grievance redress mechanism can also help enhance
the governance and accountability of the system. I have added the parameter Management
Information Systems to the supply-side control measures since digitalization helps reduce
human error as well as decrease and detect intentional corruption and fraud (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Conditionality has also been added as another supplyside mechanism. As will be clear in the analysis section, conditionality helps reveal errors
and corrupt behavior on both sides of service delivery; the citizens as well as the service
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providers. Finally, demand-side control and accountability mechanisms involve citizens in
the oversight framework. The two relevant demand-side mechanisms in the Egyptian
context are community monitoring and public hearing. These are the two forms of social
accountability measures incorporated into Takaful and Karama and are hence, relevant to
this study.
Finally, contributory and non-contributory schemes would not be well-governed if they
were designed in a way which does not ensure sustainability. This is why, the parameter
sustainability has been added to the conceptual framework. Sustainability in social protection
systems and programs can take different forms. Political and financial sustainability are crucial
for all types of programs (György, Peschner, Rosini, & Van Rie, 2019). Financial sustainability
of contributory schemes involves decisions regarding investment management as well as the
choice of actuarially sound and sustainable contribution rates.
The above-mentioned operational entry points, Rules, Roles and Controls, function at
three different levels or spheres that are inter-related and mutually reinforcing.
A. The Macro-level analyzes how social protection is placed in the wider institutional
configuration and within the public sector. This requires the existence of an effective
framework governing human resources, policies, rule of law as well as an adequate
enforcement capacity within the executive body. A civil service code often helps ensure
the SP system is effectively governed at the macro-or policy/legal-level. This level is not
examined in this study in depth, for many reasons. First, I was not able to gather sufficient
data on the issue. Examining the macro-level of governance would require a study on its
own. Even in the study by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012), when applying the
conceptual framework, they exclude the macro-level since the micro-and meso-levels are
more operational. Additionally, all interviewees assured that the legal or regulatory
framework is not among the main challenges facing the country. On the other hand, global
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experiences show that the macro-level of governance is imperative in order to guarantee
effective accountability mechanisms, reduce corruption and enhance the system’s
effectiveness and efficiency (El Baradei, 2019b). This is why, the following paragraph will
provide a brief description of some of the main findings regarding the crucial macro-level
of governance.
In Egypt, rule of law, enforcement capacity and accountability are among the biggest
challenges facing the public sector; the country has spent years without a legislature, the
parliament is ineffective and thus, corruption in the public sector is high. Indeed, the World
Justice Project, an organization working on legal policy issues has ranked Egypt 121 out
of 126 in their perception of how rule of law is applied in the country (El Baradei, 2019b).
Similarly, according to the worldwide governance indicator, in the period between 2009 up
until 2017, Egypt has been ranked below the 50th percentile rank in good governance (El
Baradei, 2019b). Their good governance indicators include accountability, political
stability, absence of violence, government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption,
among others (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). While Egypt’s performance in the
different parameters fluctuates, the country’s performance on control of corruption remains
low (World Bank, 2018c). Many of the challenges to be iterated at the meso- and microlevels of governance relate to these and other macro-level issues. However, since such
challenges require an in-depth examination of the Egyptian constitution as well as an
assessment of the functioning of the public sector under the different governments, it is
difficult to incorporate this level in this work.
B. The Meso-Level tackles governance arrangements at the sector level. Accordingly, this
level focuses on institutional arrangements as well as the coordination of efforts among
ministries and institutions involved in the delivery of SP programs. Challenges at this level
include inadequate inter-ministerial coordination, inconsistent policies as well as

61

disintegrated programs. Choices at the sector level determine how the SP system functions,
as a whole. This level can also be referred to as the sector level.
C. The Micro- or program-level focuses on the design, administration and implementation
of programs. This level highlights the importance of responsibilities and accountability
mechanisms. Governance plays a role at every part of the service delivery chain. Indeed,
from defining eligibility to enrolling the beneficiaries, providing them with the payments
and services, monitoring them as well as facilitating an exit from the program, at all these
stages, micro-level governance ensures effectiveness and efficiency. Challenges at this
level are numerous since they can arise at every stage of service delivery. This is the most
basic level of governance that provides the initial building blocks for the rest of the social
protection system.
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the conceptual framework, the different levels of
governance as well as the three operational entry points. The parameters highlighted in red are
the ones I have incorporated into the framework. This visualization does not incorporate all
parameters, but those that are relevant for the programs studied in this work. An in-depth
assessment of all parameters is provided by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012).
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Figure 1: The Governance of Social Protection - Conceptual Framework

Governance of Social Protection
Macro-Level (Policy/Legal Framework)

Meso-Level (Sector)
Micro-Level (Program)

Rules of the Game

NonContributory
Schemes

Sustainability

Contributory
Schemes

Roles &
Responsibilities

- Managing Compliance
- Publicizing Program
Rules
- Consistency of Rules

- Institutional Roles
- Performance Management
System

- Clear Program rules
- Publicizing Program Rules
- Transparency of rules Communication
- Consistency both in
application and content

-Division of Roles
-TKP and Public-Private
Partnerships
-Separation of Functions
-Capacity Development
-Performance Management
System

Source: Author’s compilation building on Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold (2012)

Controls &
Accountability

- Corporate Governance
- Electronic Transfer of Payments
- Time-based systematic checks
- Ensuring Sanctions are in place

Supply-Side
-Monitoring and Evaluation
-Conditionality
-Database Cross-Checks
-Management Information System
-Grievance Redress Mechanism
Demand-Side
-Community Monitoring
-Public Hearings
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This conceptual framework has been chosen to guide the analysis in this study for many
reasons. First, among the different governance frameworks examined in the literature review,
it is the only one that provides a conceptualization of governance that is holistic and can be
applied across the different types of programs as well as the systems level. Most frameworks
either focus on contributory or non-contributory schemes and do not find common governance
parameters between the Two (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Enoff & McKinnon, 2011; European
Commission, 2015). Rules, Roles and Controls is also the only framework which tackles all
different levels of governance, the macro-, meso- and micro levels. Additionally, the
conceptual framework is operational. Many frameworks fail to operationalize the relevant
variables or parameters that are needed in order to measure governance at the system and the
program level (Daly, 2003; Slater & Farrington, 2009). Other frameworks require the depth of
data only granted to international organizations and partners working in the field (Bastagli, et
al., 2016). Finally, after having collected the data, during the coding process it became apparent
that the three entry points of governance fit well into the emergent themes gathered from the
collected data. For this reason, I have decided to add a number of parameters and use this
conceptual framework to guide the analysis of this work.
On the other hand, the framework faces a number of limitations. Although it provides
details of every level, entry point and parameter of governance, not every identified parameter
could be analyzed in this study. This is because many parameters require detailed data and
information that are not always available. Another delimitation is that the conceptual
framework is more focused on the program than the macro-level. This is why, an in-depth
assessment of the macro-level was not possible. Finally, while the framework highlights the
importance of institutional roles, it neglects the roles of important stakeholders, like for
instance NGOs. While I aimed to mitigate this challenge and tried to incorporate as many
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stakeholders as possible in the study, I was not able to land interviews with the significant
NGOs in Egypt.
In brief, Rules, Roles and Controls is a conceptual framework which tackles governance
across different levels and various types of programs. An examination of governance provides
insights into linkages and relationships that are often overlooked. It opens up the “black box”
of social protection systems. While it has not been used by a large number of scholars, Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold’s (2012) conceptual framework was not only operational, but it fit
easily into the data.
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: METHODOLOGY
In this section, I elaborate on the choice of research method as well as the data collection
methods used in this research. The sampling approach is also illustrated. Afterwards, the study
framework will provide insights as to the researcher’s role in the field and problems that were
encountered in the field. Finally, ethical considerations as well as the limitations of this study
are outlined.

5.1.

Research Method

In order to examine the governance of SP in Egypt, qualitative research methods are
employed. First, this is the first time such research is conducted in Egypt - and generally
speaking the area of governance of SP is under-researched. Tapping into such an area of inquiry
that explores policy and program implications and challenges and whose variables need yet to
be identified requires the use of qualitative data (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Key informants,
policy makers and program beneficiaries8 are crucial for such governance analyses. Moreover,
the research questions are of exploratory nature and delve into complexities, relationships and
structures and thus, require a qualitative research design. Finally, the analysis of governance in
the literature in many domains is usually studied using qualitative methods for the abovementioned reasons (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Almqvist, Grossi, van Helden, & Reichard, 2013;
Santiso, 2001; Mkandawire, 2007).
It has been uncommon in Egypt to analyze social policy using qualitative research methods.
Many of the studies in the field make use of quantitative methods especially when examining
the social security system (Selwaness I. , 2012; Selwaness & Roushdy, 2014; Assaad, 2009;
Assaad & Krafft, 2015; Maait & Demarco, 2012). Quantative techniques are percieved by
many academics in the country as well as informants for this thesis as being more reliable.
Many of the informants with academic and especially economic background advised to use

8

However, for the purpose of this thesis, I was not able to interview program beneficiaries.
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quantitative methods to take the analysis one step further and assess the impacts of the
examined programs on multi-dimensional poverty. Not only would this have widened the scope
of the thesis even further, but upon examination and after attempting to collect the quantitative
data, a lag was found between the data collected on multi-dimensional poverty as well as for
instance, the program evaluation of Takaful and Karama. Moreover, most of the needed data
on programs aside from Takaful and Karama were either not available or could not be made
available. Most importantly, policy-level data are in no way quantitative and hence, qualitative
data are more suitable for a governance analysis (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).

5.2.

Data Collection Method

The data collected and analyzed in this thesis builds predominantly on in-depth and semistructured interviews with policy makers as well as experts in the field (Bogner, Littig, & Menz,
2009). For the purpose of triangulation, I also used content analysis of official documents as
well as scholarly work to increase the validity and reliability of the data. I conducted a total of
twelve interviews over the course of almost two months, from mid-December 2019 up until
mid-February 2020, with policy-makers, experts and consultants working in the different
branches of social protection and social policy in Egypt.
Policy makers are individuals in positions of power and influence (Marshall & Rossman,
2014, p. 155) while experts are individuals who have knowledge, experience and expertise on
a relevant subject-matter, which might not be necessarily possessed by the expert alone but is
not accessible to everyone in the field of study (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009, p. 18). It can be
up to the researcher to determine whether an individual is an expert in a certain field. This
classification is not arbitrary but should be based on recognition and experience in the field
(Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009). On the other hand, policy makers are influential, prominent
and well-informed personas in a certain field (Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 155).
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Conducting interviews with policy makers and experts on social protection in Egypt has
been identified as one of the most efficient, feasible and effective data collection methods for
several reasons. First, such elite interviews provide valuable data and information about social
protection because the positions these individuals hold allow them to be familiar with and to
have access to data, knowledge, agencies, structures and relationships which are complex and
can be difficult to obtain (Lancaster, 2017). Moreover, elite interviews are particularly
significant in policy research (Berry, 2002). Nevertheless, elite interviews pose a number of
challenges especially when the research involves a contested policy domain that is being played
out in real time (Lancaster, 2017). Indeed, very often they might provide politically-subjective
data, might not be willing to disclose information or might be unwilling to participate. This,
however, was not the experience I faced with most policy makers because I was able to gain
access to a number of policy-makers who have academic backgrounds and were therefore,
open, honest and accessible. Still, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the data, I
conducted interviews with experts and consultants who not only work in the government or for
the relevant ministries, many of which work in international and non-governmental
organizations. Not only do experts offer an efficient and effective means of obtaining relevant
data, they usually have first-hand experience but also an outsider perspective which might often
make them more objective (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009). All interviewed experts have
worked on social protection programs with the government within the last two to three years.
As previously mentioned, in the two months of data collection, I have conducted interviews
each of which have lasted for one to two hours. Despite their busy schedules, all informants
blocked at least one hour for the interview and were often very interested in the topic of the
thesis, especially since it is a very timely issue, according to experts from different international
organizations as well as MoSS. All interviews were one-on-one meetings conducted in English,
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audio-taped and materials were transcribed verbatim by myself. All interviews were conducted
at the offices of the informants in Cairo during working days and hours.
Interviewees included three experts and senior specialists from different international
organizations as well as an expert working at an international non-governmental organization
working on issues of social protection in Egypt. Additionally, I have interviewed a senior
policy-maker at the MOSIT, a former as well as a current consultant at the MoSS, a consultant
at the Ministry of Finance, an analyst at the Ministry of Planning and a consultant at NOSI. I
have also conducted interviews with a senior researcher at the National Center for Sociological
and Criminological Research as well as an independent senior consultant who worked with
most of the above-mentioned ministries and organizations. I also had informal interviews with
a number of staff members at MoSS. Interviewees were classified based on whether they work
on the social protection system as a whole or whether their work is more relevant to a particular
SP program - FSS, TKP or the social insurance system.
Finally, I attended three conferences on social protection in which the former minister of
Social Solidarity, Ghada Waly, or the current one, Dr. Nevine El-Qabbage, among other policy
makers and experts were among the key note speakers and discussants. The first was the MOST
Ministerial Forum hosted by the League of Arab States and UNESCO on the 4th of December,
2018. I also attended the Annual conference of the Public Policy Hub held on the 30th of
November, 2019, at the American University in Cairo. Finally, I participated at a workshop
organized by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the International Labor Office to present the
results of their report on “Costing a Social Protection Floor in Egypt”. This workshop was held
on the 5th of December 2019 at the Marriott Hotel in Zamalek, Cairo.
Given the diversity of the programs that are being analyzed in this study as well as the
diversity of backgrounds of many of the interviewees, a different set of questions was prepared
for informants on contributory schemes as opposed to non-contributory schemes. It is also
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crucial to show an understanding of the interviewee’s background to gain their trust and respect
in elite interviews (Lancaster, 2017). This is why, it was imperative to tailor some of the
questions’ to the interviewees’ backgrounds. Nevertheless, there were a lot of recurring
questions in all interviews. Moreover, all of the interview questions revolved around a common
theme which is assessing the conditions and challenges in the design, delivery and
implementation of social protection programs as well as the integration and coordination
challenges and conditions. This is why, the gathered data were complimentary to each other
and I was able to find common themes.
The interviews took the form of topical or guided interviews with semi-structured questions
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014). In this type of interviews, the researcher probes into a number
of topics in order to reveal the participant’s perspective and still allows the informant to steer
a part of the discussion, frame and structure the responses in a direction of their choice
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014). This is because it is crucial in qualitative research for “the
participant’s perspective on the phenomenon of interest [to] unfold as the participant views it
[…] not as the researcher views it.” (Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 155). The in-depth type of
the interviews allowed addressing the issues that are most relevant for the study. Although I
had conducted plenty of literature review prior to the beginning of the interviews, I did not let
the conceptual framework guide the interview questions. The choice of the conceptual
framework occurred after the finalization of the interviews. Still, the understanding of
governance and social protection were clear before the interviews started. Asking more openended type of questions that are less reliant on conceptual frameworks allows the interviews to
be less manipulated by the researcher and instead uncover the participants’ views (Marshall &
Rossman, 2014).
For purposes of triangulation a desk review was being conducted in parallel to the
interviewing process. With regards to contributory schemes, a number of scholars have been
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tracing the development of the social insurance scheme in Egypt for more than a decade;
Markus Loewe, Irene Selwaness, Maia Sieverding, Rania Roushdy, Omneia Helmy, among
others. In addition to the official publication of the new social insurance law, these scholarly
works were reviewed and compared to the primary data as a part of the data collection process.
Regarding the non-contributory schemes and especially Takaful and Karama, as far as I am
concerned, there are still no scholarly papers on the program as it was only launched in 2015.
Still, I have worked with the following studies for the content analysis; the impact evaluations
conducted by IFPRI (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; Breisinger, et al., 2018b; ElDidi, et al., 2018),
the World Bank’s Project Appraisal document (World Bank, 2015) as well as a number of
unpublished reports and evaluations conducted by MoSS.

5.3.

Sampling Approach

Sampling is the choice of specific data sources from which the data are gathered in order
to analyze a certain research objective (Gentles, Charles, & Ploeg, 2015). Decisions about the
sample of the study are made concurrently with the choices of data collection methods
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014, p. 64). Because “all sampling activities are theoretically
informed” (Denzin, 1989, p.73, as cited in Marshall & Rossman, 2014), the literature review
as well as the tentative research questions helped in the sample selection.
The sampling used in this work is purposeful and theoretically guided. Snowballing
technique was used in order to reach the different study participants. Based on prior literature
review and the research question, I identified ministries, organizations and areas of expertise
that are imperative for the study. Since the study focuses on contributory and non-contributory
schemes, MoSS and NOSI were the first institutions I hoped to interview experts and policymakers from. After attending the two afore-mentioned conferences and workshops, I
discovered which international organizations are most relevant to the field in Egypt.
Additionally, since the thesis looks deeply into inter-ministerial coordination, it was crucial to
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interview experts from the Ministry of Planning as well as the Ministry of Finance. I tried to
ensure diversity, relevance and expertise in the sample. Many of the informants were reached
through chain referrals - snowballing. I asked the participants at every single interview who in
their view would be valuable for the study and there were many names which were recurrent.
Very often, since most of the interviewees are policy makers and experts, they were able to
contact relevant informants on the spot and schedule an interview with them. This not only
helped in widening the scope of the organizations and institutions I initally started with, but it
helped me in gaining trust and respect in the eyes of the interviewees, which is crucial in elite
interviewing (Lancaster, 2017). This also helped overcome one of the major obstacles of elite
interviews, availability and reachability of the informants (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Many
of the interviewees gave me insights to significant organizations and individuals whose
relevance I was not aware of. These very different chains of referrals helped in overcoming the
challenge of the “limited range of respondents in snowball sampling” (Barsoum, 2018).
Qualitative research does not claim sample representativeness and so does this thesis
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Instead, the diversity of informants providing in-depth informantion
about policy choices, conditions and challenges elucidates important patterns. The sample size
- twelve interviewees - was identified based on theoretical and practical saturation. Indeed, not
only had I reached a stage where all interviewees would mention informants I had already met
with, but I had already transcribed all the data and reached a stage of saturation of information.

5.4.

Study Framework

In this section, I will highlight the researcher’s role in the data collection process as well
as the challenges that occurred in the field. During the interviews, I presented myself as a
Master’s student of Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. Not only did the
referrals and the reputation of the university for ethically sound research help in making the
interviewees open, critical and honest in their answers and discussions. But also, I researched
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details about these individuals’ careers prior to the interviews, which helped in gaining trust
and respect. My role as the researcher was more exploratory, leaving room for the interviewees
to steer part of the conversation (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). While all interviewees were
experts and policy makers, they differed in their ages, seniority as well as the positions they
held. I interviewed a minister, an associate minister as well as a number of senior consultants
and experts. The type of discussion differed from a minister - who wanted to steer the
conversation - to a consultant who was ready for a two-sided discussion. Ensuring access to a
number of social phenomena and events where these policy makers and experts were present
also helped in gaining their trust prior to the interviews.
Aside from the fact that each interview had to be prepared for separatly for the abovementioned reasons, I faced a difficulty in setting interview dates with top-level government
officials since I was conducting the data collection during a period of ministerial transition.
This is why, many of the interviews were re-scheduled several times, often after I had arrived
to the premises. In the interviews with top-level government officials, very often they were
sceptical at the beginning so I had to demonstrate an understanding of the area of research as
well as their careers to gain their trust. Often, I also had to be very subtle when critiquing the
different programs. On the one hand, both the challenges and conditions are crucial for the
study. On the other hand, usually the interviewees were the ones in charge of the programs I
am targeting so reaching analytical and critical data was not always easy. Nevertheless, most
interviewees, even those in charge of the programs, after gaining my trust, were often open to
a constructive and critical discussion.

5.5.

Data Analysis

After transcribing all interviews verbatim and separately, I started conducting the analysis
of the transcripts traditionally without using a software. Interview data were thematically
categorized based on emergent analytical themes. Contributory and non-contributory schemes
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were sub-divided from the beginning of the analysis. I used the open-coding approach by
segmenting and clustering data into themes and describing them using short sequences of
words (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). The analysis then followed the inductive reasoning
analytic approach (Marshall & Rossman, 2014). Instead of imposing hypotheses a priori on
the data, data collection is a “learning” process (Rossman & Rallis, 2003, as cited in Barsoum,
2018). Afterwards, the codes and data were triangulated with the desk review of works on
contributory and non-contributory schemes in Egypt. In parallel, while conducting the
literature review, I came across the Rules, Roles and Controls conceptual framework (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) cross-checked it with the data and the emergent codes and
noticed how the data fit into the three categories identified by the conceptual framework.
Coding was then guided by the conceptual framework’s division of the meso- and micro-level
analysis. I had to add as well as remove parameters from the conceptual framework which are
less or more relevant to the study on Egypt.

5.6.

Ethical Considerations

Primary data collection that involves human subjects requires an in-depth assessment of
ethical considerations. The Institutional Review Board approved this work’s proposal on the
21st of December 2019 prior to the data collection process. This is why, all possible ethical
considerations were analyzed and approved before the data collection process started.
Participation in the study was completely voluntary. Although many of the interviewees
referred me to other possible study participants, I had to contact all study participants on my
own and make sure they agreed to conduct the interview while aware of all the givens and
details. Moreover, I collected informed consent forms from all participants either orally or in a
written format to guarantee their voluntary participation. I offered to send the interview guides
prior to the interviews, but often, the interviewees were busy and only needed to be aware of
the topic of the study. I obtained consent from all interviewees to audiotape the interviews.
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After transcribing the tapes, all recordings were erased. All interviewees were assured of their
confidentiality prior to the interviews. Because these are policy makers and experts I should
not do harm to (Marshall & Rossman, 2014), pseudonyms were employed in the presentation
of data. However, confidentiality in such interviews is more complex than merely “disguising
the identities of research participants” (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011, p. 198). In this regard,
confidentiality is not static (Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011). It is case-specific and poses the
dilemma of balancing faithful reporting with potentially exposing the participants’ identities
(Tilley & Woodthorpe, 2011). For this reason, I have not mentioned the names of the
international organizations whose experts and specialists participated in this study. This is
because the field of social protection in the country and especially TKP and the social insurance
system involve a limited number of consultants, experts and policy-makers who have worked
together and know each other well. To avoid revealing their identities, I removed the names of
the organizations they represent. This ensures confidentiality even more.

5.7.

Study Limitations

From a methodological stance, the sample size of this study is one of its main limitations.
Although the sample size was chosen based on the saturation of data, I believe more insights
could have been uncovered if I had interviewed even more staff members and policy-makers.
Many of the ministries’ more junior employees refused to participate in the study. Interviewing
local-level officials would have been an added value for the study and would have provided
different type of evidence to cross-check with the elite interviews. Yet, this was not possible
as I would have needed governmental authorization to interview officials at the local units.
Because of the timing of the data collection - ministerial transitions, this was not feasible.
Nevertheless, the diversity of the interviewed officials offset this limitation, to some extent.
Another limitation with regards to the interviewees is the interview setting. As previously
mentioned, most interviews were conducted at the offices of the participants and hence, were

75

included on their official calendars. Although most of them were honest, critical and analytical
to a very large extent, a more informal setting might have reassured them even more.
With regards to the data collected and the interviewees, another limitation is the scope of
the data. I was able to interview more officials, representatives and consultants who work on
TKP than the food subsidy system. This is why, I was not able to conduct a fully-fledged
analysis on the food subsidy system in spite of interviewing a senior official at MOSIT. I was
also unable to gain access to national non-governmental organizations who work with MoSS
and NOSI. Finally, the data gathered on TKP were provided by a larger number of study
participants than the data on the social insurance system. However, the interviewed expert from
NOSI has been working in the field for more than a decade and provided an in-depth
assessment of the system. Additionally, the social insurance system has been extensively
analyzed in scholarly works which were triangulated with the interviews conducted on the
social insurance system.
Finally, while the study can be replicated, replication is not easy especially since the
identities of the study participants are disguised. Moreover, replication requires the
establishment of strong networks in the country being examined. Nevertheless, researchers
who have access to policymakers and experts relevant to social protection can replicate the
study.
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6. CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS
This chapter presents the findings of the data collected on the governance of social
protection in Egypt. As previously mentioned, a macro- or policy-level analysis was not
feasible in this study because of the lack of data on this sphere. Furthermore, this sphere does
not represent the main challenge facing the country’s social protection system. This is why,
this chapter starts with an analysis of the meso- or sector-level of social protection. Here, the
focus lies on the coordination challenges between the ministries, especially in terms of data
sharing. I also highlight the coordination obstacles MoSS is facing in the design and
implementation of TKP as well as the issues NOSI is confronted with when designing and
applying the social insurance system. Afterwards, the analysis is dedicated to the micro- or
program level. In terms of the contributory system, the analysis focuses on the governance of
the social insurance system. Takful and Karama are in the center of the governance assessment
of the non-contributory social protection schemes in Egypt.

6.1.

Meso-or Sector-Level Analysis: Coordination Challenges

Governance of social protection at the meso-level focuses on the institutional
arrangements between ministries involved in the SP system as well as agencies who work on
its service delivery (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This level determines the
coherence as well as integration of the SP system. Effective governance of SP at the mesolevel is an important prerequisite for the achievement of social justice. Challenges at this level
include inadequate inter-ministerial coordination within the SP sector, incongruous policies,
disintegrated programs, lack of capacity for joint action, lack of shared motivation and the lack
of principled engagement (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This sectoral level
determines the success of the SP system, as a whole. Thus, the lack of coordination among
implementing partners impedes the efficiency and effectiveness of the SP system a whole
(European Commission, 2015).
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At the policy level, a Ministerial Committee for Social Justice was established by Prime
Minister’s Decision Number 1940 for 2014 in order to coordinate the policies and financial
resources of social justice programs in Egypt. The committee includes thirteen ministries
among which is MoSS, MOHP, MoF, Ministry of Education, MOSIT, Ministry of Planning
and Economic Development, Telecommunications and Information Technology, Labor,
Higher Education, International Cooperation and Local Development. The committee is
headed by the Prime Minister. Most interviewees, when asked about the committee, argued
that its members met a few times but it has not been active for years.
Another body mandated with the coordination of SP programs is the Economic Justice
Unit of the Ministry of Finance. The unit should provide technical support especially with
regards to M&E to the different SP programs as well as help in the coordination of efforts
(World Bank, 2015). Lack of coordination and coherence between the programs leads to the
fragmentation of the SP system which in turn leads to its inefficiency and ineffectiveness
(European Commission, 2015; UN ESCWA, 2019). According to a consultant, both the unit
and the committee on social justice have been inactive and have not yet taken up the role of
coordinating and ensuring the coherence of SP programs.
“Although the Economic Justice Unit follows up on the progress of TKP it has not taken
up any initiatives to coordinate the efforts of different social protection providers.”
(Interview, Consultant, February 2020)
Inter-ministerial coordination in Egypt faces a number of challenges. First, all
interviewees highlighted the fact that neither the ministerial committee on Social Justice nor
any other coordination efforts will have an impact on social justice unless there is an overall
strategic vision and a clear institutional structure. SP programs are multi-sectoral and fall
under the responsibility of a number of governmental and non-governmental entities
(Devereux, 2016; UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In most cases, their objectives should be inter-
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related and complementary which should automatically translate into an integrated system
(Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012).
There is no single body in charge of the coordination of social protection efforts in
Egypt. The establishment or choice of such a body would pave the way for the integration of
SP programs into a comprehensive and transformative system (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux,
2007). According to an expert consultant who has worked with MoSS, NOSI, MOSIT as well
as MoMM, the MoSS has taken up the role of devising a social protection strategy which
outlines a common vision of SP in Egypt and divides the roles between the different agents in
the country. Still, without a common vision, it will be very difficult to steer social protection
programs towards a common goal.
The expert consultant on SP highlighted the difficulty of reaching a common vision
while the MoSS voluntarily coordinates the efforts. Indeed, according to a top-level
government official at MOSIT, the SP strategy can only be implemented if there is a top-down
political push towards the implementation of a common vision of SP.
“In order for the ministries to implement a common vision and to take it seriously, in
order for the social protection strategy to be designed and implemented by all relevant
partners, it is crucial for the President or Prime Minister to issue a decree or advise these
ministries to work together. Otherwise, every ministry will be busy with its own
mandate and they will not take the time to work together on a comprehensive common
agenda.” (Interview, Top-level Official at MOSIT, December, 2019).
Because ministries are already busy with their own mandates, service delivery and the
implementation of programs, inter-ministerial coordination necessitates top-down intervention,
especially in a country like Egypt.
Cooperation between ministries often depends on the persona and the personal
relationships of the ministers, especially in fragmented settings that lack a common vision
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). A number of respondents noted that cooperation
between the ministries in Egypt depends on the personal and professional relationship between
the relevant ministers.
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“Coordination at all levels of social protection can be very difficult as it depends on the
relationship between the relevant ministers. If they respect and work well with each
other, it is a trickle-down effect and they encourage the relevant parties to cooperate.
[…] One of the relevant ministers in the field of social protection refused to attend the
conference on the launch of TKP so [she/he] would not be obligated to work with MoSS
on the program.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
In Egypt, as long as inter-ministerial cooperation is not coordinated by a superior body,
or as long as there is no single authority in charge of the steering of the whole SP system,
personal relationships will determine the success of the SP system. Even if a common vision
is achieved, it is crucial to institutionalize this vision within the government (Robalino,
Rawlings, & Walker, 2012).
One of the results of the inadequate inter-ministerial coordination in the area of SP is
the lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities. This can lead to an overlap in the mandates
of ministries, according to an expert consultant working on SP.
“Because of the lack of coordination some ministries might take up the mandates of
other ministries despite being overloaded with their own mandate. Is this sustainable or
efficient? […] For instance, ALMPs are presumably the mandate of MoMM. Forsa
program, developed by MoSS is indeed an incredible initiative since it aims to graduate
TKP beneficiaries onto different job opportunities. However, it is not MoSS’ mandate.
Although MoSS have the know-how related to program design and implementation especially after having worked on TKP for almost five years, they do not have the
details related to the needs of the labor market, what skill training is mostly needed in
which area, etc. (Interview, Expert consultant on Social Protection, February, 2020).
Although MoSS has developed delivery capacity and an adequate infrastructure to
manage SP programs, taking up the mandate of a different type of program outside of its scope
might not only overload the ministry but might affect the quality of the program. In addition to
Forsa (El-Shabrawy, 2019), MoSS is working on designing a comprehensive set of programs;
linking TKP to La Ommeya - No illiteracy project (MoSS, 2019a), or to Etnen Kefaya - a
project that aims at limiting the number of children of TKP beneficiaries (MoSS, 2019c).
Although it is understandable that linking such projects to TKP will strengthen the message
and the impact of TKP, these complementary projects are not always impactful and effective,
according to a consultant at MoSS.
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“Many of these projects are ineffective, weak and inefficient on the ground especially
since they are not implemented by the ministry mandated and qualified with delivering
such messages. […] Not only this, but such overlap creates tensions between the
different ministries since every ministry is in charge of a certain mandate.” (Interview,
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Overlaps in the mandates of the ministries exacerbate tensions and disintegration
between the ministries (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) as well as impedes the
effective delivery of the messages. However, it is still plausible that MoSS aims to deliver a
number of messages especially since the conditionality of Takaful creates a communication
channel with beneficiaries through which you can build their awareness on contraceptives,
cultural tolerance, vaccination, antenatal care, the dangers of female genital mutilation and
school attendance, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.
Data freedom and coordination is not only crucial in the reduction of error, fraud and
corruption but it allows for the complementarity of programs. For instance, TKP beneficiaries
who are not registered in the FSS were automatically redirected to MOSIT in order to register
them in the system (World Bank, 2015). Almost 32,000 TKP beneficiaries received ration cards
after the TKP system discovered that they do not receive food subsidies which they should be
entitled for, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.
On the other hand, because data collection and processing is not always digital and
unified, it is sometimes difficult to work with data from other ministries, according to the same
specialist.
“For instance, when implementing Takaful’s conditionality, coordination is difficult
because of the time lag in data collection as well as the fact that MOHP collects data
manually. The Ministry of Education’s data are digital but aggregated at the local level
and thus, it takes too long for the data to arrive at the national scale. Now that MoSS
has signed a protocol with both ministries, it is essential for all partners to find a way
to efficiently collect, aggregate and report the data needed for the application of
conditionality sanctions.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization,
January, 2020).
Even when ministries are open or obligated to share their data with other bodies, often
the lack of unified method impedes the efficiency and effectiveness of data collection and
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analysis. Because all SP programs are multi-sectoral, data coordination is necessary (Devereux,
2016; UNDP & UNCDF, 2013).
Coordination challenges are more pronounced in the implementation of conditional
cash transfers such as Takaful, according to a former consultant at MoSS. For conditionality
to be applied, a number of actors need to be willing to work together in an efficient manner.
“Conditional cash transfer programs in particular present significant institutional
coordination challenges between line ministries due to the need to ensure an adequate
supply of services across sectors, and to verify co‐responsibilities. Close intersectoral
coordination is key to ensure that supply‐side services are provided, that management
information systems to monitor compliance at schools and health clinics are developed,
cross-referenced, and timely, and that monitoring and oversight at the local levels is
effective.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 45)
In order for MoSS to sign the protocols that aim at regulating the implementation of
conditionality with MOHP and the Ministry of Education, TKP Program Task Force were in
constant dialogue with members of the two ministries as well as El-Azhar as an educational
institutions. A former MoSS consultant highlighted the difficulties that were faced during the
process.
“The problem is that MoSS takes the credit for the success of Takaful. So, the staff
members from the other ministries were not always very helpful since they have an
attitude of ‘what is in it for me?’. […] Another challenge is that the whole process is
not institutionalized. You are talking to individuals. So for instance, the representative
of the MOHP changed three times throughout the process which takes us several steps
back.” (Interview, Former consultant MoSS, January, 2020).
This protocol should be implemented now that conditionality is set to be applied in
2020. The real challenges of inter-ministerial coordination will be apparent during the phase
of the implementation since multi-sectoral programs need all partners to be alert, to have a
sense of ownership to the program, to believe in the common objective or goal and to be
responsive and flexible to the needs of the program (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). In Egypt, topdown political support is needed in order to achieve this.
Social insurance faces similar challenges of inter-ministerial coordination in Egypt.
One of the biggest challenges is the conflict of interest between the MoF and the Treasury, on
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the one hand, and NOSI, on the other hand. According to an expert consultant at NOSI, there
is a serious coordination and trust issue in the SIS between the Treasury - MoF - and NOSI,
which is an independent body, as noted earlier. In the old SIS, NOSI calculated different
scenarios for the annual adjustment of social insurance contributions, submitted them to the
MoF which chose the most appropriate scenario which is compatible with the government’s
budget. Legally speaking, MoF is obliged to cover any deficit that faces the SIS.
“MoF argues that these are NOSI’s actuarial experts, and so we cannot trust their
calculations based on which you will hold the Treasury liable. […] NOSI invests the
funds and MoF does not supervise. Hence, if NOSI’s performance is bad, why should
MoF be held accountable?” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
While the annual adjustment of social insurance contributions used to be financed by
MoF, the scenarios and the policies were analyzed by NOSI. If MoF did not agree to the
increase of the optimistic scenario, pensioners revolted and attacked NOSI claiming that it is
against pensioners, according to the expert from NOSI. In this case, NOSI was held
accountable for MoF’s decisions. After MoF approved the budget, it went to the Prime
Minister’s office then the Parliament. “Coordination at all these levels takes a very long time
and is very difficult.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). The new SIS
includes the automatic adjustment of social insurance contributions. Accordingly, NOSI would
be in charge of financing the annual adjustment, and hence a part of this challenge is mitigated.
Data freedom and sharing can have a positive impact on the SIS, as well. The inclusion
of casual workers requires serious intergovernmental coordination, according to the expert
consultant at NOSI.
“Including the informal economy would require for instance, ministries such as the
Ministry of Agriculture to provide data on the ownership of agricultural land. The
Ministry of Interior already does not allow the renewal of drivers’ drivers’ licenses
unless they register for the SIS as casual workers - if they do not own certain categories
of cars.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020)
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Such data sharing efforts are facilitating the inclusion of a portion of the informal
economy. As noted previously, the coverage of the SIS in Egypt is inadequate. In order to
overcome this shortcoming, data sharing and coordination between the ministries is imperative.

In brief, inadequately defined roles and the lack of coordination across implementing
institutions not only affects programs’ effectiveness but it leads to a duplication and an overlap
of roles that make accountability unclear (World Bank, 2015). Indeed, this section has shown
the difficulty of establishing a comprehensive integrated system without the existence of an
institutional home for social protection, without top-down political support and without the
existence of a common vision. In Egypt, this has led to an overlap in the mandates of different
ministries which can create tensions. The design and implementation of Takaful’s
conditionality also revealed the difficulty of coordinating efforts between different ministries.
Indeed, solely the process leading up to the signing of the protocol between the line ministries
spanned more than two years. Finally, the conflict of interest between the Treasury and NOSI
depicts that the old SIS faced a challenge regarding intergovernmental coordination, as well.
In order for SP to achieve social justice, it is crucial not only to coordinate the efforts of
ministries, but also the non-governmental sector. Such coordination requires political will,
preferably top-down support in a country as centralized as Egypt, a unified vision, the
establishment of an oversight body in charge of social justice or SP, the unification of data both in terms of collection as well as sharing, as well as the unification of the tools. For
instance, it is not plausible for MOSIT and MoSS to use different PMT formulas as well as
different data since both ministries target the same category of the population. Nevertheless,
according to a senior researcher the National Center for Sociological and Criminological
Research, the PMT formulas used in both programs are different. “Indeed, neither of the
ministries is aware of the other ministry’s PMT threshold or the details of the calculation of
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the PMT formula.” (Interview, Senior Researcher, January, 2020). Only when the abovementioned challenges are mitigated and a unification of goals and strategies is achieved, can
SP achieve the desired goals of equity, inclusivity and the reduction of poverty.

6.2.

Micro- or Program-Level Analysis

The meso- and micro-levels are essential areas of engagement in building coherent and
strong SP systems (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The program-level of social
protection is the most basic form of engagement which establishes the building blocks of an
effective SP program (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Challenges at this level are
diverse as they arise at every stage of SP service delivery, from beneficiary identification to
monitoring and evaluation (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). This section analyzes the conditions and
challenges that are prevalent in the governance of SP programs; the social insurance system as
well as TKP. Not only were these two programs chosen because of the availability of data and
expert knowledge on them, but TKP is a novelty while the social insurance system has recently
been reformed and hence, they can both provide insights into the improved governance of SP
in Egypt. The two programs are not fully representative of the whole spectrum of SP programs
in Egypt and its strengths and weaknesses, but they are helpful in gaining an understanding of
the common challenges and facilitators of contributory and non-contributory schemes in Egypt.
Thus, an assessment of other programs, like the FSS or the health insurance scheme, would not
be identical but would reap similar findings.
6.2.1. Contributory Schemes - Social Insurance System
As previously noted, the two main contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health
insurance schemes. This section analyzes the governance of the social insurance system by
examining the rules, roles and controls governing SIS in Egypt. The component sustainability
is also added to the analysis. This part of the analysis examines the old and the new social

85

insurance schemes. While the old one has already been legally reformed, many of the
implementation and delivery challenges might still prevail in the new SIS. It is also premature
to judge the application of the new system which started being implemented on the first of
January, 2020. The analysis of the system relies predominantly on interviews with expert
consultants at NOSI as well as scholarly work which has been published on the SIS.
The main challenges facing the SIS were elaborated in the chapter providing a background
on the social protection system in Egypt. These include a significant gap in coverage among
youths, females and males, urban and rural citizens as well as casual workers, which aggravated
socio-economic disparities. Moreover, a large percentage of the workforce evades either fully
or partially from their social insurance contributions. Finally, many scholars criticized the law
enforcement and M&E capacity of the SIS (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012; Roushdy &
Selwaness, 2015).
6.2.1.1.

Rules of the Game

Generally, contributory schemes do not face the same challenges related to the targeting
of non-contributory programs since the beneficiaries of social insurance schemes are
determined by their contributions to the system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
The main governance challenges related to the rules and the legal framework of the SIS which
will be tackled in this section are the following; (1) managing compliance, (2) publicizing
program rules and (3) consistency in the content and application of program rules.
One of the most important prerequisites of an efficient SIS is the ability to manage
compliance (ISSA, 2013; Enoff & McKinnon, 2011). This is because the incentives to evade
or under-report can be very high in many systems (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003). An
effective SIS ensures compliance with legal contributions and wage reporting requirements
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
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In Egypt, a large portion of the participants in the SIS under-report their earnings. This
percentage is particularly higher among private sector workers (Sieverding & Selwaness,
2012). Indeed, roughly 40.3% of private sector workers under-report their salaries, whilst
18.6% of public sector workers under-report their wages (Roushdy & Selwaness, 2019).
According to an expert consultant at NOSI, the “design of the system” encourages underreporting as well as the full evasion of SI contributions.
“Not only have the contribution rates been historically very high, but the presence of
maximum bounds for pensionable wage and the calculation method of benefits does not
provide enough incentive for workers to properly report their earnings. Prior to law
148/2019, pensionable wage used to be linked to the average of a few years’ earnings
prior to retirement. ‘Why would I spend my life receiving a lower salary while only the
last few paychecks count towards my pension benefits?’ This is one of the main
arguments that have led workers and employers to evade the social insurance
contributions.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
The calculation method of benefits has also led many workers to opt for early
retirements which endangers the actuarial and fiscal sustainability of the system (Loewe, 2004).
Moreover, the system’s design acts as a “regressive tax” (Helmy O. , 2008) for low-wage
workers. Typically, more well-educated and “richer” quintiles of the population are more likely
to work in bigger establishments and earn higher wages. Since the SIS puts a maximum bound
on insurable salaries - which stood at approximately LE 5000 and has now changed to around
LE 7000 - low-wage earners pay a larger percentage of their salaries, and thus, have a bigger
incentive to under-report (Selwaness I. , 2012).
According to the expert consultant at NOSI, the new law aims at addressing the abovementioned shortcomings and enhancing the compliance to the system. Law 148/2019 calculates
pensionable salary according to the average of the contributor’s lifetime earnings (NOSI,
2019). Although the system is still defined-benefits, it encourages participation in the system
further by adding a voluntary pension scheme that is contributions-defined, and hence
encourages proper reporting. Another incentive for under-reporting was the relatively low
increase in pensionable wages that are not automatically adjusted for inflation but are subject
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to the government’s periodic and often slow increases (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). This
has led to a system that charges high contribution rates while providing relatively low returns
(Loewe, 2004). The new system foresees the automatic adjustment of the pensionable wage by
15% on an annual basis for the first seven years and afterwards based on the inflation rate.
While drafting law 148/2019, NOSI was fully aware of the needs of the workers since
it holds regular meetings with the Federation of Egyptian Industries. According to the expert
at NOSI, the federation’s main concern was the reduction of contribution rates. This is why, in
the new SIS contribution rates were reduced from around 41% to 29.75% (NOSI, 2019). Thus,
it should be expected that coverage and reporting would be ameliorated. On the other hand, the
new system still includes a cap on the maximum insurable salary. When asked about it, the
NOSI expert responded that a maximum insurable salary is necessary in order to maintain the
private life insurance industry.
“The removal of the cap, on the one hand, could make the system more equitable, but
it would kill the life insurance industry and is, therefore, not feasible.” (Interview,
Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
Thus, it is still possible that the new SIS would retain its bias towards higher-wageearners and would still act as a “regressive tax” (Helmy O., 2008) for low-wage workers.
One of the biggest shortcomings of the system is that it widens the urban-rural divide
and aggravates the difference between social classes (Loewe, 2004; Sieverding & Selwaness,
2012; Selwaness I., 2012). Social insurance benefits mostly reach advantaged groups in the
labor market, formal sector workers, whilst falling short of attaining the most vulnerable;
farmers, casual workers and irregular laborers (Sieverding, 2016). Although the social
insurance scheme for casual workers and irregular laborers has always been mandatory, many
are not aware of their rights and obligations. Moreover, the system does not cover them from
all risks. In the old system, they did not benefit from maternity leave, workplace disability
compensation as well as sickness coverage (Loewe, 2004). According to the expert consultant
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at NOSI, the old SIS was considered as more of an income support mechanism than a social
insurance scheme for casual workers and irregular laborers.
“In the old SIS contributions were made through the acquisition of a stamp of LE 1 on
a monthly basis from NOSI office. Pensions were then provided to those who have
contributed for at least 120 months. These would then receive a monthly pension
payment of LE 63. Beneficiaries would not pay the monthly contributions, and after
reaching pensionable age, they would pay LE 120 in the NOSI office and receive LE
450 in return. This was one of the reasons for the deficit NOSI had calculated for the
year 2037.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
Although many reforms need to be undertaken in order to increase the awareness of the
most vulnerable groups, the new SIS designs a new scheme for casual workers and irregular
laborers (NOSI, 2019). Accordingly, they would be treated as “wage workers” while the
Treasury is the employer, as reported by the consultant at NOSI. The Treasury would then pay
12% of the minimum insurable salary whilst the worker would pay 9% thereof (NOSI, 2019).
“This way, contribution rates would be high and therefore, the benefit level would be high as
well, which would provide an incentive for casual workers to enroll in the system.” (Interview,
Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). Whether this change is sufficient and would lead
to an increase in the coverage of workers in the informal economy is yet to be determined.
It is clear, that the old SIS had a difficulty in managing the compliance to the system.
Nonetheless, the new social insurance law aims to mitigate several of the shortcomings of the
old one. If this would lead to an enhancement of the compliance is still unclear.
Another hurdle reported by the expert consultant at NOSI which deters the SIS capacity
of managing compliance is awareness. One of the biggest challenges facing both the old and
the new SIS in Egypt is the lack of social insurance awareness.
“A large portion of the citizens is not aware of the benefits and rights of the pensioners, the
insured, the survivor. They are not aware that ‘I am entitled to this, secured against that’,
etc.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
It is crucial to underline the significance of raising awareness about the SIS, the calculation
method of benefits, among others (Sieverding, 2016). This is specifically essential among new
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entrants to the labor market as well as youth, especially given the initiation of the new social
insurance law (Sieverding, 2016). Without proper SIS awareness, the coverage and compliance
to the system will remain inadequate.
One of the most important facilitators of the governance of social insurance schemes is the
publicization of program rules (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This is especially
important given the challenge of the lack of social insurance awareness. When asked about the
possibility of launching awareness campaigns, the NOSI expert highlighted the difficulty and
lack of feasibility of implementing such campaigns, at least for the “time being”.
“It is very difficult to spend the organization’s financial resources on awareness.
Awareness campaigns incur large costs; TV and radio campaigns as well as other media
campaigns will require NOSI to allocate a large portion of its funds towards the cause.
This is not feasible, at least not for the time being.” (Interview, Expert consultant at
NOSI, January, 2020).
The consultant also added that such awareness campaigns necessitate the support of
international organizations. Since there are no detailed plans yet to raise the awareness of the
system’s beneficiaries and new entrants, it can be asserted that one of the major issues facing
the SIS is the transparency and communication of program rules. The new social insurance law
is published and is available online, yet communication and awareness campaigns should go
one step further (Enoff & McKinnon, 2011).
Finally, rules also need to be consistent, both in content as well as application
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Consistency can improve both the effectiveness
of SP systems, contribute to better integration, coordination and accountability, as well as
enhance the legitimacy of interventions (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Moreover,
when eligibility and exclusion criteria are consistent with program objectives, not only does
this lessen inclusion and exclusion mistakes but it reduces error, fraud and corruption, as well,
a challenge which faces most social protection programs (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012). Although old and new social insurance systems included relatively consistent rules, the
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old system’s contribution rates and benefit levels were so diverse that it led to complexities
and a rise in error, fraud and corruption, according to the expert consultant at NOSI.
“Law 79 for 1975 of the old SIS divided salaries into a basic and a variable salary. The
calculation of the contribution of each differed, which made it difficult for contributors
to properly estimate and calculate their contributions. The new social insurance law
unifies salaries into one single global salary.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI,
January, 2020).
Moreover, the multiplicity of laws governing different types and schemes of workers
also complicated the social insurance calculations of the old SIS (Loewe & Westemeier, 2018).
Not only did this complicate the calculations of the contributions, but it made it more difficult
for the inspectors to supervise and assess their reporting, and thus, increased the likelihood of
error, fraud and corruption. This is another reason why the SIS faces a difficulty in managing
compliance.
This analysis shows that the old legal framework governing SIS did not include systems
to manage the compliance to rules, did not publicize them properly and involved relatively
complex rules that impeded the consistency of application. Nevertheless, the new law 148 for
2019 tries to establish clear rules of the game. Indeed, to improve compliance to the system,
the new SIS changes the calculation method of pension benefits to include the average of a
contributor’s lifetime earnings. Moreover, the social insurance contribution rate was reduced
to accommodate the needs of the workforce. The SIS was also reformed for casual workers in
order to incentivize them to enroll in the system. The inconsistency of the old social insurance
rules and laws was also addressed. Law 148/2019 unifies all social insurance laws, it unifies
contribution rates and unifies the calculation methods of salaries into one global salary.
Nevertheless, not all of the shortcomings of the old SIS were addressed by the new scheme. In
fact, one of the main challenges linked to the publicization of program rules is the lack of social
insurance awareness which is not addressed by the new SIS.
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6.2.1.2.

Roles and Responsibilities

As previously mentioned, the governance of SP is not only concerned with rules but
rather their implementation. Roles and Responsibilities are central elements to the effective
governance of SP. They ensure the identification and definition of principals and agents in the
accountability triangle (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 7). Mechanisms for
strengthening roles and responsibilities in the design and implementation of contributory
schemes involve (1) creating clear institutional relationships and (2) establishing an effective
performance management system.
It is crucial for the principals and agents to have a clear understanding of their
institutional relationships in order to make accountability relationships work. According to
the expert at NOSI, this is one of the most dire challenges that is difficult to address.
“Many of the employees at the organization are not adequately qualified. Since the job
descriptions were published in the 1970s and have not been changed ever since, you find
people who are not qualified for the positions they are holding. […] NOSI staff members
have to deal with very different social levels while they are not trained to deal with such
exposure. Especially since the load of work is intense, they start dealing with, for instance,
big companies in an unsuitable way. And the salaries do not incentivize them to develop
themselves any further. […] Ever since government hiring has been suspended […], we
have a shortage of employees. So, employees become over-worked and mandates become
unclear.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
It is evident that there is no clear conception of the institutional roles and
responsibilities at NOSI which impedes accountability (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012) and aggravates service delivery. Although there have been efforts by different
administrations to hire new employees in the needed positions, very often the educational level
of the targeted employees - for instance doctoral candidates - is not suitable for the posted titles,
according to the expert. Not only this, but the existing employees who are permanently
employed do not receive proper training and tutelage and can thus, interfere with reform efforts
(Assaad & Krafft, 2015).
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As previously mentioned, law 135/2010 foresaw the change of the system to a
contributions-defined scheme (Maait & Demarco, 2012). Contributions-defined schemes give
stronger incentives to the contributors to report their earnings precisely and to enroll in the
system (Sieverding & Selwaness, 2012). The transition was never carried out due to the
employees’ resistance to change, as stated by the expert consultant at NOSI.
“Law 135/2010 foresaw a change in the system from a benefits-defined system to a
contributions-defined one with individual and solidarity accounts. NOSI employees
resisted the change. They believed it would be difficult to enact such a fundamental
change. They did not want to put the effort to learn a totally new system. For this reason,
this transition was not even included in law 148/2019.” (Interview, Expert consultant
at NOSI, January, 2020).
Although law 148 for 2019 remains benefits-defined, as previously elaborated, the law
has added a voluntary contributions-defined scheme which would be invested in the country’s
new sovereign wealth fund (NOSI, 2019). The expert consultant argued that this would allow
the employees to gradually learn the new system and thus, get slowly accustomed to it. This
way, the next time the system is changed, it might be transformed into a defined-contributions
scheme. Hence, not only are NOSI employees over-worked, often working on different
mandates which they are often not qualified for, they are not incentivized to work on
developing themselves. In this regard, performance management systems are crucial.
Performance management systems (PMS) are essential in order for the staff members
to put effort into their personal and skill development. Putting in place performance incentives
can enhance efficiency and effectiveness (Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012). The expert
at NOSI stated that as with most public sector organizations, NOSI has not developed neither
a proper human resource management and development capacity nor an adequate PMS.
“First of all, up till now, there is no PMS in the public sector. […] Human Resource
functions are distributed among a number of departments. Even these employees are
resistant to change. When the organization introduced the proposal of a new salary
scheme, where the salary would not be fragmented, they rejected the change.”
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
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For this reason, often the employees represent the biggest burden on the social
insurance system. It is difficult to initiate performance incentives since it is often the perception
-of senior officials- that “public sector employees work out of altruism rather than incentives”
(Nevine Qabbage, Minister of Social Solidarity, Annual Conference of the Public Policy Hub,
December, 2019). The lack of financial or performance incentives makes it even more difficult
to motivate the employees to develop their capacities. Indeed, a very large percentage of the
employees in the public sector in Egypt receive monthly salaries that place them below the
international poverty line (El Baradei, 2019a). This is problematic since “providing basic
material support for staff to perform their functions” is crucial (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, &
Ringold, 2012, p. 21).
Finally, another hurdle that faces the contributory SP scheme in Egypt are the constant
changes of the NOSI leadership, according to the expert at NOSI.
“NOSI was first a semi-independent agency headed by the Minister of Insurance and
Social Affairs. Afterwards, its managing director was the Minister of Social Solidarity,
then the Minister of Finance, then again the Minister of Social Solidarity and finally,
an independent managing director should be appointed to head the ministry within the
year.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
This constant change in leadership has led to a difficulty in initiating long-term change
and clearly identifying the roles and responsibilities of the principals and agents at NOSI.
Although the legal framework in Egypt has been reformed, it would be difficult to
implement the changes without the support of the employees at NOSI. This is why, it is
imperative for NOSI to work on re-organizing the already existing human resources into more
suitable positions, work on their capacity development, create a PMS system whereby there
are incentives for those who achieve and work towards the transformation of the system.
Moreover, the appointment of an independent, a full -time, well-trained and educated managing
director for NOSI is another crucial step that is yet to be implemented.
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6.2.1.3.

Controls and Accountability Mechanisms

Controls and Accountability mechanisms bridge the gap between the legal framework
and its implementation; they bridge the discourse-implementation gap (Bassett, Giannozzi,
Pop, & Ringold, 2012). The size of this gap is an indicator of the governance of SP at the
macro-, meso- and micro-levels. “At the program level [controls] help ensure that ‘the right
beneficiary gets the right benefit at the right time’. [They are the] building blocks of program
implementation and administration.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012, p. 53). The
most important controls regarding contributory schemes are (1) transferring payments
electronically which has also been shown to reduce error, fraud and corruption, (2)
guaranteeing that systematic and random checks take place to reduce error, fraud and
corruption and (3) making sure that sanctions are in place to hinder irregularities and ensure
that remedial actions are taken. In order to reduce error, fraud and corruption, the electronic
transfer of payments can be very beneficial. NOSI disburses pensions either through bank
transfers, Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), post offices, or through a debit card that has
been issued by the company E-Finance, as noted by the expert from NOSI. According to the
information available in the literature (Selwaness & Messkoub, 2019; Sieverding & Selwaness,
2012) as well as the informants’ accounts, the SIS does not face issues regarding the electronic
transfer of payments.
The bigger challenge facing the Egyptian SIS is ensuring time-based, systematic and
random checks to reduce error, fraud and corruption. Regular as well as random, timebased and well-designed inspections are crucial in order to avoid the evasion of social insurance
contributions and enhance the accountability of the system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, &
Ringold, 2012). Although there are inspectors who try to assure random and systematic checks
on the reporting and contributions of the different contributors, their number is fairly low and
they are often inefficient and corrupt, according to the expert at NOSI.
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“Only 1500 inspectors work with the PSIF across all governorates in Egypt. 800
inspectors work with GSIF even though the public sector faces less challenges with
regards to the evasion of social insurance contributions. Moreover, the incentives for
inspectors to undergo systematic checks are low and the regulatory framework does not
grant proper means of overseeing the work of the inspectors.” (Interview, Expert
consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
Given the large number and the geographic dispersion of the workforce in Egypt,
inspections are crucial. They would allow the detection of error, fraud and corruption as well
as mitigate several of the challenges the system is facing. As noted above, not only does the
system face a challenge with regards to the number of inspectors, but their incentives to
undergo systematic checks are low. The new social insurance law promulgates the merge of
PSIF and GSIF (NOSI, 2019). However, their integration would require at least three years,
according to the expert from NOSI. Once merged the number of inspectors checking on the
more challenging private sector will grow. However, the new law does not include additional
checks or incentives for the inspectors.
Regarding the detection of fraud and under-reporting, it might be helpful to cross-check
the data NOSI contributors provide about their earnings with those they give to the Tax
Authority. In 2015, NOSI signed a protocol of cooperation with the Tax Authority.
Nevertheless, the Tax Authority refused to provide NOSI with the data about the contributors
due to the “confidentiality of such data since these are client information” (Interview, Expert
consultant at NOSI, January, 2020). Another problem relates to the availability of an electronic
database that is up to date.
“Such authorities [like the Tax Authority] do not have a database in your understanding
of a database. The responsible employees there simply scan the financial statements of
the companies and individuals. So, if NOSI is interested in a contributor’s financial
statement, the most the authority can offer is pull it out of the archives and show it to
us. However, the databases would not be linked, especially since often the Tax
Authority does not categorize the data it receives. Moreover, even if there were an
electronic database, there will always be a time-lag in the update of the database
between NOSI and Tax Authority which would impede a proper cross-check.”
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
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As previously elaborated, the lack of intergovernmental data sharing and coordination of
tools and efforts at the meso-level impedes the development of a well-controlled, efficient and
effective SP system (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In order to implement proper
control and accountability mechanisms, cross-checking with other governmental databases is
crucial. Hence, given that it has not been mentioned as one of NOSI’s priorities to work on this
deficiency, it will remain difficult to detect fraud.
Finally, when irregularities are detected in the system it is essential to ensure the existence
of a system of sanctions to avert the contributor as well as others from defrauding the SIS. It
is also crucial to reduce the corruption committed by the inspectors themselves. According to
the expert from NOSI, the new SIS imposes stricter and more aggravated punitive measures on
those who commit fraud, corruption, among others (NOSI, 2019). Indeed, most of the financial
penalties were doubled, according to law 148/2019 (NOSI, 2019).
Many of the necessary conditions of a proper control and accountability mechanism are
developed in the Egyptian SIS. Since payments are transferred electronically, there are not
many cases of error, fraud and corruption in this regard. Moreover, the new SIS has aggravated
the sanctions imposed on contributors who do not abide by the rules and regulations of the SIS
or who evade their social insurance contributions. Nevertheless, a number of challenges still
persist; the low number of inspectors and the lack of oversight on inspections as well as the
difficulty cross-checking the data provided by the contributors with other governmental
databases, are among the most dire challenges, in this regard.
6.2.1.4.

Sustainability

The success of SP programs rests upon the existence of political and financial
sustainability (Bozio & Dormont, 2016; ISSA, 2013; Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012;
Carmel & Papadopoulos). The political sustainability of the social insurance scheme, generally,
does not pose enormous risks as contibutory schemes are often included within the civil service
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code and embedded in the legal and regulatory framework of the country (ISSA, 2013).
Additionally, contributors to the SIS are often from the middle class, who are usually vocal
and politically influential (Kidd, 2019). Therefore, it is doubtful that the government would
neglect the demands of social insurance contributors.
Financial sustainability determines the success of a SIS. First, according to the Volountary
National Review conducted in 2018, the government of Egypt has been increasing the spending
on social security programs; while the spending on the SIS accounted to 2% of the budget in
2011/2012, this figure reached 11% in the fiscal period 2017/2018 (Ministry of Planning,
Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). To develop a financially sound social insurance
system, it is also crucial to establish an investment strategy which manages investment funds
in a sustainable and actuarially sound way (Bozio & Dormont, 2016). Thus, investment
managers have to be properly incentivized to “maximize returns, manage risks and limit
administrative costs.” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
The old SIS was built on a fully-funded basis but is now partially-funded with aggregated
reserves (Maait & Demarco, 2012). These reserves are then invested in governmental debt
instruments. During the early years of its operation, the Egyptian funds generated surpluses,
however, over the period from 1975 to 2005 the system generated low or negative real returns
as a result of ineffective investment policies (Maait & Demarco, 2012). According to the expert
from NOSI, the old SIS was not financially sustainable. Moreover, the long decision-making
process whereby changes could be initiated in the system, further aggravated the issue of the
financial sustainability of the system.
“The system foresaw that the Treasury would finance any deficits that would occur in the
budget of NOSI. It was anticipated that a cash deficit would occur in 2037. […]
Furthermore, in the old system, changes to the contribution rate or the pensionable salary
had to undergo a very difficult process of decision-making; after the actuarial study is
conducted at NOSI, the Minister of Social Solidarity would send the proposed changes to
the Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministers’ Office, if they agree on the changes, they
would be discussed in the House of Representatives and finally, a presidential decree with
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the changes would be published. This made it difficult to respond to the findings of the
actuarial studies.” (Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
In order to design an actuarially sound and financially sustainable SIS, the new social
insurance law was only published after a number of actuarial studies were conducting. As noted
by the expert at NOSI, the law was almost ready in 2017 but NOSI were awaiting the results
of the actuarial study regarding the sustainable contribution rate. Not only have they come to a
conclusion regarding the rate at which no deficit would occur, but law 148/2019 includes the
automatic adjustment of the insurable salary. Thus, decision-making regarding the changes in
insurable salaries has been facilitated. In addition, a sustainable contribution rate has been
fixed. No data are available regarding changes in the investment of funds.
As mentioned previously, the current SIS contains a well-developed legal framework which
aims to address many of the shortcomings of the old system. Nevertheless, the development of
the capacities in charge of implementing the new system has not taken the same level of
attention as the legal framework itself and hence, it might still pose a threat to the governance
of social insurance schemes. Finally, error, fraud and corruption might still be prevalent in the
system especially since there is a lack of monitoring and supervision. Not only this, but the
system itself allows for the occurrence of error, fraud and corruption since many of the
regulations are outdated and very often such errors are therefore, “unintentional” as stated by
an expert consultant at NOSI. The new SIS is designed in a way which is financially sustainable
and therefore, the issue of sustainability seems to be resolved, for the time being. In brief, it is
imperative to focus on the roles and responsibilities as well as the control and accountability
mechanisms in order to ensure the proper governance of contributory SP schemes in Egypt.
6.2.2. Non-Contributory Schemes - Takaful and Karama
Non-contributory cash and in-kind benefits, also known as social assistance schemes or
social safety nets, are designed to “help individuals and households cope with chronic poverty,
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destitution and vulnerability” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 5). The food subsidy system and cash
transfer programs are the two most important social safety nets in Egypt, as noted previously.
Due to the lack of data availability and the complexity of the FSS, the analysis focuses on
the country’s “iconic” (World Bank, 2018b) cash transfer program, Takaful and Karama.
Indeed, cash transfer programs are gaining importance in the MENA region (Silva, Levin, &
Morgandi, 2013). While in the past, governments used to respond to political and economic
instabilities with the scaling up of in-kind transfers and subsidies, the focus shifted to cash
transfers as subsidies proved their difficulty to be sustained as well as their ineffectiveness
(Silva, Levin, & Morgandi, 2013). Generally speaking, cash transfer programs have gained
momentum since the mid-2000s in the Global South (von Gliszczynski, 2015), a phenomenon
which was often referred to as a “development revolution” (Hanlon, 2004).
It is worth noting that the Egyptian government is shifting the largest portion of its focus on
the development of SSN and more importantly, the advancement of TKP. This is not only
apparent in the increase in budgetary resources of the program by 250% since it was launched
in 2015 until 2017-2018 (MoSS, 2019), but an economist at the Ministry of Planning and
Economic Development emphasized the macro-economic significance of the program. The
problem with the emphasis on cash transfers is that policies remain focused on the poor (von
Gliszczynski, 2015) and neglect the missing middle class (UN ESCWA, 2019), an issue which
will be discussed in the section on Sustainability.
This part of the thesis highlights the main governance conditions and challenges that TKP
has confronted since its launch in 2015. It is worth noting that cash transfer programs are often
exclusively delivered by government agencies and include a degree of decentralization in terms
of the service delivery (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). Generally speaking, the main governance
challenges that face most cash transfer programs are how to target the most needy in society
and how to reduce error, fraud and corruption (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
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While this section incorporates data about TKP as a whole, it is essential to note that many of
the data concern the conditional cash transfer program, Takaful. Since it is the more
developmental (Ido, 2018) scheme, its design and implementation requires a more nuanced
governance analysis (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This section depends on data
collected from in-depth interviews with policy-makers, experts and consultants in the field and
a content analysis of IFPRI’s impact evaluations and unpublished documents provided by
MoSS.
6.2.2.1.

Rules of the Game

In order to adequately deliver SP services and benefits, a clear, transparent and consistent
regulatory and legal framework is a prerequisite. Such clear and enforceable rules of the game
ensure a proper accountability mechanism between all actors involved; policy-makers, service
providers, program managers as well as the beneficiaries (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012). Rules need to be clear at all levels of the service delivery chain. With regards to the
delivery of non-contributory SP programs, it is crucial to have clear, transparent and consistent
rules and procedures at all stages of service delivery; from enrolling the beneficiaries, to
determining the benefit level, exit criteria, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold,
2012). This way, both inclusion and exclusion errors are reduced and uneven interpretation of
rules and ad hoc decision-making are avoided. This section examines (1) the clarity and
publicization of eligibility criteria, targeting methods, calculation of benefit levels as well as
the application of conditionality, (2) the transparency and (3) consistency in their application
at the program level.
Clear and Publicized Program Rules
As previously mentioned, program rules need to be clear for the beneficiaries as well as the
service providers at all levels of the service delivery chain. Rules also need to be publicized.
The geographic reach that TKP has achieved after less than five years of its launch speaks for
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the fact that the application process was relatively clear for the citizens. TKP is currently in 27
governorates in Egypt. The program disburses cash transfers to roughly 2.5 million households,
among which are approximately 1.98 million Takaful household recipients (MoSS, 2018).
According to a senior specialist at an international organization working with MoSS as well as
a consultant at the ministry, roughly 27 million Egyptians applied for the program which was
only launched in 2015.
In spite of the fact that many of the beneficiaries were not aware of the program and its
eligibility criteria at the beginning, awareness was built, as is clear from the statistics above.
“In the early years of the program, many of the beneficiaries were not aware of the selftargeting component of TKP, i.e. that they needed to apply for the program. So, MoSS
needed to build their awareness on the existence of such a SSN.” (Interview, Senior
specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).
Even if many were not aware of the application process at the beginning, as is evident from
IFPRI’s impact evaluation conducted between 2017-2018, the largest percentage of the
beneficiaries in the sample believed the program’s required paperwork was clear (ElDidi, et
al., 2018).
In terms of the clarity regarding the targeting, acceptance and rejection criteria of the
program, the same impact evaluation depicts that most of the beneficiaries reported a confusion
associated with the acceptance and targeting criteria (ElDidi, et al., 2018). As previously
mentioned, Takaful and Karama used a multilayer targeting formula, first through
geographical targeting using the PMT and finally, using categorical criteria (World Bank,
2015). The targeting is designed in a way which aims at significantly reducing error, fraud and
corruption, according to a former consultant at MoSS as well as a senior specialist at an
international organization.
“After the beneficiaries have applied for TKP at the local social unit, to determine their
eligibility, field visits were conducted by MoSS field workers. These field workers had a
tablet with the questionnaire and the possible scores. The questionnaire was based on the
poverty criteria set by HIECS. The questions included details about the size and type of
housing, electricity and water usage, the location of bathroom, stove type, flooring, roofing,
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the number of children, among others. The field workers themselves are not aware of the
weights of the scores they are giving to the different households, which aims at ensuring the
reduction of error, whether intentional or unintentional.” (Interview, Former consultant at
MoSS, January, 2020).
From the perspective of service providers, the design of the program ensures the reduction
of targeting errors, especially since the multi-layer targeting formula depends on a variety of
different data sources, thus, increasing the reliability and validity of the data (World Bank,
2015).
In addition to the field workers, data provided by the beneficiaries were cross-checked
against other governmental databases at the central level. Although the targeting of the program
might seem clear and just for the program providers, acceptance and rejection criteria are not
clear for the majority of the beneficiaries since they are not aware of the details of the PMT
formula (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Moreover, the eligibility to the program caused a confusion for
many of the beneficiaries since the PMT threshold was changed several times in order to adjust
it to the budget of the program whilst targeting the poorest 40% in the country (Kurdi, et al.,
2018). This has also increased the exclusion error of poor households. When the cut-off score
was updated, the new threshold was applied to households that were registered previously
(Kurdi, et al., 2018). Nevertheless, it was sometimes difficult to include these households
previously excluded because of the lower threshold, which caused an increase in the incidence
of error. The budgetary constraints and the changes of the PMT threshold are some of the
reasons why the program is currently only reaching 20% of the poorest quintile in Egypt
(Breisinger, et al., 2018b).
Despite the changing policies of acceptance and rejection for the beneficiaries and field
workers, as well as the changes of the PMT threshold, the TKP’s targeting efficiency has met
the original goal (Breisinger, et al., 2018a). According to IFPRI’s impact assessment, 67% of
TKP households are in the lowest two quintiles of households with children.
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Another rule of the game which has to be clear for all parties involved are the criteria for
setting benefit level of TKP transfers as well as the program’s exclusion criteria. On the one
hand, the calculation formula of benefit level is clear - as it has been elaborated in the
background section - although not sufficient for the beneficiaries, as stated by a social policy
expert at an international organization working closely with MoSS. On the other hand,
beneficiaries are not aware of the exit criteria. There is a number of possible exclusion as well
as rejection criteria from the program, among which is the ownership of assets, the receipt of
other governmental types of support and the receipt of transfers from abroad (Kurdi, et al.,
2018). According to an expert consultant at an International NGO, these criteria are clear for
the program providers but unclear for the applicants, which is plausible, in the consultant’s
view.
“Employees involved in the delivery of TKP benefits at all levels - central and local - are
aware of these rejection criteria. Although the clarity of program rules makes service
delivery more efficient and effective, it seems plausible not to inform the beneficiaries
because a large percentage of the applicants tries to defraud the system and lies on their
application. Thus, providing them with information as to the program’s exclusion criteria
would only increase the chances they would lie on their applications.” (Interview, Expert
consultant at an International NGO, December, 2019).
As will be clear in the following sections, many citizens lie on their applications in diverse
ways in order to be accepted or to receive higher benefit levels. This is a phenomenon which
is not unusual for cash transfer programs (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008;
UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Fiszbien & Schady, 2009). This is why, it seems plausible not to
inform applicants of the possible rejection criteria, which they might try to disguise.
One of the biggest shortcomings of the system is the lack of clarity on the application of
conditionality. It is crucial for beneficiaries to be aware of conditionality, in order for
conditional cash transfer programs to reap the developmental impact they aspire to achieve
(Giannozzi & Khan, 2011; Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Takaful is a cash
transfer program conditioned on 80% school attendance by children aged six to18 as well as
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two visits to the health clinics by mothers and children below six years (World Bank, 2015).
Although the program conducted a service readiness assessment at the beginning of its launch
(El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016), up until now, conditionality has not been fully implemented
yet, according to consultants at MoSS. Moreover, only 2.5% of the beneficiaries are aware that
conditions would be added to the program (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). Not only does this
contradict with the program’s developmental approach, but it makes it even more difficult to
implement conditionality, as argued by the consultant at MoSS.
“You cannot impose conditionality unless you establish the proper regiment, unless you
succeed in convincing the people of the importance of health and education. Still, how do
you think does it sound for someone living in the poorest quintile, if you suddenly tell them
‘we care about you, but we cannot give you the monthly transfers’ especially if you do not
first mentally prepare them? […] Another problem related to conditionality is that the local
social units are not fully aware of how it should be implemented yet. Finally, one of the
main reasons why conditionality is not applied yet is because of the quality of the [health
and educational] services. When conducting the service readiness assessment, there were so
many cases in which the health facility was not even open during so-called opening hours.
Other cases where the facility did not even have a scale -which is needed for antenatal care.”
(Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Thus, the implementation of conditionality will face a number challenges. First, the lack of
awareness on conditionality, will make it difficult for vulnerable and poor households to accept
the conditions since they are neither accustomed to nor informed of the conditions. Another
challenge relates to the program providers. As elaborated above and will be explained in depth
in the following sections, employees at the social unit are not fully aware of the means of
implementing conditionality. Finally, the supply-side of conditionality poses a number of risks.
Indeed, as stated by an expert consultant on social protection issues, service delivery at the
local health and educational unit need to first be enhanced before the ministry can apply
conditionality. A former consultant at MoSS emphasized the same challenge.
“Our biggest problem is that we cannot condition transfers without the existence of the
‘supply’. For instance, we tell the families to send their children to schools but the
school is far away, or there are no teachers, or the teachers do not like their child so
they do not include them in the attendance, or many examples like this.” (Interview,
Expert consultant on Social Protection, February, 2020).
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Thus, not only does the program face challenges with regards to the clarity of conditionality,
but it might be argued that there is still a lack of readiness for its implementation from both
sides of the service delivery.
On the other hand, the former consultant at MoSS argued that MoSS has put effort into
building the awareness of the beneficiaries on TKP as well as conditionality in many ways.
“First, [we tried to build awareness] through a television and radio campaign which
included advertisements on the program. We also conducted a Guerrilla marketing
campaign where we organized around 32 public events with singers and games for the
kids and disbursed eco-friendly bags with TKP details printed on them. We also
distributed flyers, and printed the details on the Toktoks in relevant areas. […] Then,
we thought we had to reach even women who are always at home and won’t get to see
all of these marketing tools. So, we created a system of door-to-door awareness and
trained 2000 MoSS social workers on the issue of conditionality. In addition to the 2000
social workers, we worked with 4000 women who are conducting their civil service to
help with the door-to-door awareness. As far as I am concerned almost one million
visits were reported up until now.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January,
2020).
It is evident that there are different opinions with regards to MoSS’ efforts in publicizing
program rules as well as conditionality. The MoSS is to a large extent successful in publicizing
program rules and encouraging applications. Yet, with regards to conditionality, although, the
marketing and awareness campaigns were conducted, IFPRI report indicates the small portion
of beneficiaries were aware of its details. This might be attributed to the efficiency and
effectiveness of the tools used. An expert at an International NGO criticized the door-to-door
awareness highlighting the inability of the social workers to deliver the message. The senior
specialist at an international organization argued that the social workers had ten to twelve
messages to deliver to the households with regards to family planning, conditionality, health
issues, among others. This might have caused confusion and have led to the lack of awareness.
Another possible reason for the discrepancy between the beneficiaries actual knowledge and
the conducted awareness campaigns might be the time that is needed in order for the campaigns
to have an actual impact. In fact, the impact evaluation was conducted between 2017 and 2018
and by the time, not all the awareness campaigns were conducted, yet. Thus, the impact
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assessment to be started by the end of the year 2020 can provide more definitive answers in
this regard, according to an expert at an international organization.
Transparency of Program Rules
Along with clarity and publicization of program rules, transparency is crucial (Giannozzi
& Khan, 2011). A lack of communication and transparency between local social units and TKP
beneficiaries has been reported by many beneficiaries and has often led to grievances and a
feeling of unfairness (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Indeed, a large portion of non-beneficiaries
complained about not being informed of the status of their application despite numerous visits
to the local MoSS office (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Many of the applicants who were rejected
complained about the lack of communication with regards to the reasons for rejection.
Moreover, some beneficiaries argued that the transfers stopped suddenly without prior notice
and without knowing the reasons after filing complaints (ElDidi, et al., 2018). The lack of
transparency has led to a culture whereby the people “do not trust and try to defraud the
government.” (Interview, Expert at an International NGO, December 2019).
Consistency in the Content and Application of Rules
Not only does the lack of transparency aggravate the perception and acceptance of the
program, but the consistency in the content and application of TKP is essential (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Although, the PMT formula is like a “ruler” (Interview,
Senior specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020) applied on all applicants,
corruption often raises doubts with regards to the consistency of application. Many of the
beneficiaries in IFPRI’s sample do not perceive the program’s targeting as fair (Breisinger, et
al., 2018a). A large percentage of those interviewed in the sample highlighted the issue that
there are many “well-off” (ElDidi, et al., 2018) families who receive Takaful transfers whilst
there are very poor ones who do not.
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These issues can occur due to error, fraud and corruption on both sides of TKP service
delivery (Campos & Pradhan, 2007). Some field assistants do not properly process and assess
the registration forms (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Others would facilitate paperwork for relatives or
friends (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Indeed, many beneficiaries complained about the local social
units in charge of screening and application process (ElDidi, et al., 2018). Many “of the
documents submitted to the MoSS unit are simply piled on the floor and don’t travel to Cairo”
(ElDidi, et al., 2018, p.41). This is why, many beneficiaries emphasized their openness to audits
and random visits - which will be discussed in-depth in the following parts (ElDidi, et al.,
2018). The senior specialist at an International Organization stressed on the existence of many
oversight mechanisms to reduce such errors in the processing of the application which is made
possible by automation of the process. Another interviewee argued that automation is not yet
being effectively and efficiently implemented.
“Automation is fairly new and is not always easily applied by the field assistants. So, we
cannot say that the automation of the system has drastically reduced errors.” (Interview,
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Even if there was no corruption or favoritism on the side of the service providers, the
existence of error along with the lack of transparency aggravates the beneficiaries’ lack of trust
in MoSS employees. This lack of trust leads many beneficiaries to submit false documents, to
lie on their applications, to hide assets, among others, according to many of the interviewees.
“It has even become a cultural issue that the beneficiaries want to defraud the government
in any kind of way.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)
Thus, the existence of error, fraud and corruption on both sides of service delivery precludes
a fully consistent delivery of TKP benefits. Making the beneficiaries trust the program is one
of the most important steps in order to reduce intentionally providing wrongful data.
Another challenge which affects the consistency of the application of cash transfers is the
confusion between the solidarity pension and TKP, according to a senior specialist at an
international organization.
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“Not only is the confusion available among the beneficiaries but also among MoSS
employees at the social units. This is why, the World Bank is working with MoSS on a
second phase whereby the old solidarity pension is dissolved, its beneficiaries re-assessed
and either included or excluded from TKP. Since the old scheme had many flaws, it is
probable that a significant portion of its beneficiaries would not qualify for TKP which
would create a fiscal space to increase TKP benefits or its number of beneficiaries. By
consolidating all cash transfers into one program, TKP, with one targeting formula, you’re
enhancing the equity and social justice. This way, there is one measurement against which
everyone is being assessed.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization,
January, 2020).
The co-existence of the two schemes exacerbates the challenges related to the consistency
of the application of TKP. It is therefore, crucial to unify the solidarity pension and TKP as
more consistent rules would lead to better integration and outcomes of SP programs as well as
improve the accountability and legitimacy of the system.
Although not absent of flaws, it is evident that MoSS has created a cash transfer program
which has relatively clear eligibility criteria and benefit levels. The ministry has established a
number of regiments to optimize the targeting and build the awareness of the people.
Nevertheless, the program is currently in its fifth year of implementation and is therefore still
in a “trial and error phase” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020) in which it
is constantly being re-evaluated. Challenges regarding the rules of the program include the
transparency and communication with the citizenry, the efficiency of service delivery - both at
the local social units as well as at the education and health facilities - as well as the
irregularities, favoritism and error, fraud and corruption which can be caused by MoSS
employees as well as by the beneficiaries themselves. TKP is a novelty and is a state-of-the-art
program with regards to its implementation in Egypt, according to a senior specialist at an
international organization. This is why, it is crucial to constantly come up with innovative
solutions to ever-existing challenges in the country.
6.2.2.2.

Roles and Responsibilities

In the last section, it became apparent that many of the governance and implementation
challenges of TKP are related to the capacities and the service providers working on the

109

program. Effective governance requires the existence of clear and well-functioning
accountability relationships, an institutional incentive structure, coordination among the
different levels of service providers, separation of functions, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi,
Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Thus, Roles and Responsibilities across different levels of government
and institutions involved in SP need to be clearly identified and communicated (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In this section I will first analyze the (1) division of tasks
and responsibilities, (2) TKP and public-private partnerships, (3) separation of functions, (4)
capacity development of the resources and the (5) program’s performance management system
and incentive structure. It is crucial to highlight that this section is predominantly based on the
data collected by the interviewees since there are no scholarly accounts on the issue.
Division of Responsibilities between MoSS and the local offices
Decentralization and coordination efforts between the central and local levels are crucial
when implementing cash transfer programs (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013; Bastagli, et al., 2016).
Thus, it is essential to have clear division of tasks between the two levels. According to a
number of interviewees, the division of tasks between the central and local level is relatively
clear. Not only this but the division is driven by a logic which aims to reduce error, fraud and
corruption. A senior specialist at an international organization emphasized that the division of
tasks at TKP aims at reducing corrupt behavior.
“We do not want the field workers to come and tell us, we believe this person is poor and is
eligible for TKP. Their role is merely to observe and collect descriptive data. Analysis
occurs at the central level since the data is submitted on the database of MoSS. […] After
having collected the data about the households, according to the cut-off point of the PMT,
the MoSS identifies who is in and who is out. It is like a ruler which is applied on all
applicants. The system is therefore very objective and harsh. You could be rejected because
of a decimal point, but that is the beauty and the difficulty of the PMT; this decimal point
might exclude you from the program although you are still poor or near-poor.” (Interview,
Senior specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).
Hence, when it comes to, for instance, determining eligibility; at the local level, the field
workers collect the necessary data about the households without having prior knowledge as to
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the PMT threshold or how the data would affect the application. This aims to reduce favoritism.
This division of roles and responsibilities is also institutionalized as described in the
background section (World Bank, 2015). Another example concerns the grievance redress
mechanism - which will be described in one of the following sections. The data on the citizens’
grievances are collected at the local level, some of which are resolved at the same level while
other decisions are taken at the central scale. All of this is elaborated in depth in the World
Bank’s Project Appraisal document (World Bank, 2015).
Effective decentralization is relevant in the application of conditionality, as a large portion
of the tasks is carried out by the local-level authorities (World Bank, 2015). In terms of the
implementation of conditionality, the responsibilities are distributed between the local
education and health units and coordinated by the social unit and later MoSS, as described by
a former consultant at MoSS.
“The data collection about the attendance of children to school is run digitally by the local
education offices, while the collection of data about the beneficiaries’ health visits are still
collected manually and provided to the social units. Then, on a quarterly basis, a report is
sent to MoSS with details of the different households’ compliance to the conditionality
standards and the sanctions are then imposed digitally by the MoSS.” (Interview, Former
consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)
In order for the local education and health units to implement the described system, not only
was there a protocol signed between the relevant ministries, but a capacity development (CD)
program was designed and implemented, according to the same consultant.
“The capacity development program targeted 60,000 employees working at the local
education, health and social units. It included four chapters; (1) introduction to TKP, (2)
what is conditionality, (3) how the system of conditionality and reporting will work and (4)
a training on soft skills and training of trainers. The MoSS first trained 27 trainers across 24
governorates who in turn were trained to train employees at the local, district and village
levels.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Despite the design and implementation of a capacity building program for the staff members
at the local level, “the concept of conditionality is a novelty which is also implemented by three
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different bodies, automation is a novelty, so errors are very much prevalent.” (Interview,
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Although tasks may be divided in a plausible way between the center and the peripheries,
this does not mean that the system is decentralized. Decentralization requires more of the
decision-making process to be taken at the local level (UNDP & UNCDF, 2013). One of the
main hurdles of decentralization efforts is the lack of ownership and accountability towards the
program from the side of the local officials and especially governors, according to an expert
consultant at an international NGO. Not only this, but he argued that the authorities at the local
level are not sufficiently qualified for a program like TKP to be fully decentralized.
“The governors receive three- to four-day training workshops which are not sufficient. Most
of them do not want to be held accountable for TKP. Legally speaking, many of the tasks
are delegated to the governors. Many of them, however, do not want to receive more
authorities and tasks. But there are also some of them who want to take up the delegated
responsibilities but can’t because of the lack of adequate training and capacity
development.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an international NGO, December, 2019).
Decentralization efforts are crucial in the context of the division of tasks between the central
and local levels (Giannozzi & Khan, 2011). Decentralizing the system can make TKP more
effective and efficient (Bastagli, et al., 2016). Nevertheless, there are a number of facilitators
of decentralization which have not been established yet, like for instance, the establishment of
the necessary legal and regulatory framework, the development of the capacities of the
authorities at the local level, as well as the inclusion of local civil society organizations (UNDP
& UNCDF, 2013).
By and large, although tasks are divided between the local and central levels. In many areas,
such as the determination of eligibility, the division is clear and does not pose many risks.
Theoretically, the division is also clear in the implementation of conditionality. Because
conditionality has not been applied yet, no judgement can be rendered. Furthermore, there are
a number of prerequisites for effective decentralization which are not evident in the case of
TKP.
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TKP and public-private partnerships
The fact that TKP works with the private sector and fosters public-private partnerships is
one of its main strengths. According to a senior specialist at an international organization, this
entrepreneurial approach towards program implementation is what allowed the program to
have “such an impact in such a short period of time” (Interview, Senior specialist at an
International Organization, January, 2020). Although the MoSS has a specialist on
management information systems in TKP’s task force, the automation of TKP services - from
registration to payment - was conducted by an Egyptian company named E-Finance (World
Bank, 2015).
“The government should not do everything. The government should have the flexibility to
outsource. MoSS exceeded the number of target beneficiaries ahead of schedule because it
was entrepreneurial. […] For instance, regarding the door-to-door-awareness, MoSS social
workers were not sufficient in order to roll out the program on a national scale as quickly as
it did. This is why, they worked with other social workers from other ministries as well as
the girls conducting their civil service. Very often, these were even more efficient than
MoSS’ social workers.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization,
January, 2020).
The Ministry also worked with Care International in order to pilot and develop its social
accountability committees (World Bank, 2015). A local consultancy firm conducted the
program’s service readiness assessment (El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016), IFPRI was in charge
of the impact assessment, among other consultants that MoSS worked with in order for the
program to have this reach and impact in just five years (Interview, Expert at an International
Organization, February, 2020). Hence, it is clear that TKP was rolled out in an efficient manner,
among other reasons due to MoSS’ ability to outsource relevant portions of the program and
to separate and divide functions effectively.
On the other hand, this entrepreneurial approach is criticized by a number of interviewees.
As with the social insurance system, there are a number of crucial positions which require
calibers to be hired at MoSS, however, due to the government’s suspension or reduction in
hiring, these positions are either not filled or the ministry relies on consultants, according to an
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expert consultant on social protection. She/He emphasized that MoSS and many other
ministries and governmental agencies are overcoming this challenge by hiring consultants on
project contracts. According to a consultant at MoSS, the reliance on consultants is not
sustainable “because the project could break down as soon as the consultant leaves.”
(Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020). Additionally, it is difficult to retain such
calibers since they get offered more competitive positions in the private and non-profit sectors.
“I was just watching one Parliamentarian argue that the government is, indeed, working
with ‘A class’ consultants who are well-educated and are efficient and productive. But this
way, the government is creating a system that is reliant on consultants who do not have the
time or the energy to transfer skills to the employees at the ministries. In addition, these
consultants are working with frameworks and tools, the traditional Egyptian public sector
employee has not learnt to operate with.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
On the other hand, a former consultant at MoSS underlined the fact that the former and
current ministers of Social Solidarity have always been keen on the transfer of knowledge
between the consultants and the employees at the MoSS.
“Not only did we [the consultants] always have to work with them [the employees] even if
the task did not require more than one staff member working on it, but there were so many
procedures we could not have ever been able to do without them. Consultants are not aware
of the governmental procedures with regards to filing paper work as well as the details of
the legal and regulatory framework. This is why, the ministry’s employees were always
imperative.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Although the government of Egypt is relying to a very large extent on consultants, many
ministries and especially MoSS care about the development of their human resources and are
aware of the difficulty of retaining high-caliber consultants. Still, MoSS entrepreneurial
approach has been complimented by a number of the interviewees for being effective and
efficient. Whether it is sustainable or not is questionable.
Separation of Functions between Payment and Processing
The separation of functions between payment and processing is another one of TKP’s
advantages which aims to significantly reduce error, fraud and corruption. Once a beneficiary
registers for TKP, the enrollment to the program is managed electronically through a system
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designed and managed by E-Finance (World Bank, 2015). TKP payments are administered by
the local post offices through individual accounts. Beneficiaries can withdraw the transfers
using TKP smarts-cards -also developed and administered by E-Finance - through ATMs or
points of sale at the post office or the social units (World Bank, 2015). According to IFPRI’s
impact assessment, the majority of the sampled beneficiaries believe the delivery of transfer
payments is smooth (Breisinger, et al., 2018a).
Capacity Development
Capacity development is another area with substantial shortcomings. It is true that MoSS
trained the social workers, field assistants and conditionality officers at all relevant bodies
(MoSS, 2017). Nevertheless, several challenges related to the implementation and the impact
of service delivery are apparent, for instance during the registration and processing, the doorto-door-awareness as well as the implementation of conditionality - as elaborated in the
previous parts. A consultant at MoSS highlighted that these challenges arise in spite of the
delivery of capacity development, since the training programs are not outcome-oriented but
process-oriented.
“In Egypt, we do not have a problem of the quality of design, we have a problem of the
quality of delivering the program. You give a capacity development program on M&E
but do not even introduce it with the definition of M&E. Instead of investing in the
human capital, we invest in the projects that cross the boxes of the checklists. […] For
instance, we would like to automate several processes, we buy the software, train 20
individuals on its usage and then you find out that the software is not being used. So
what is the unit of measurement? In Egypt, the unit of measurement is process-based
not results-based. ‘What were the impacts of the program’, is the question we should
be asking? What are the indicators you are using to measure the impact? […] In order
for the investment in human capacity to reap results, it takes time. Policy-makers want
the impact to appear while they are in office in order to be attributed to them. This is
why, they choose processes over results. […]” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS,
January, 2020)
Not only does this reflect a challenge with regards to the measurement of CD programs and
their impacts, but these challenges are also related to the capacities implementing the service
delivery. The large number of public sector employees and civil servants and their permanent
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contracts have always been highlighted as some of the main acute challenges of public
administration in Egypt (Assaad, 2009; Assaad & Krafft, 2015). As it has been clear in the
context of the SIS, the lack of an incentive structure often makes the employees a burden on
the system.
TKP’s Performance Management System and Incentive Structure
The large number of permanent hires in the public sector, the inadequate division of tasks,
their incomplete training on important tools and the lack of a performance management system
are some of the most dire challenges facing MoSS. Similar to the rest of the governmental
bodies in Egypt, MoSS does not have an efficient PMS, according to an expert at an
international NGO as well as a consultant at MoSS.
“The regulations in Egypt favor the employee. Even the Minister cannot fire an employee.
Also, the system is not merit-based which affects the quality of service delivery. It is all
about seniority. It is not about excelling and getting promoted. It is about the number of
years I have served. Employees take trainings just to get promoted. They do not focus on
what to learn from the capacity building programs, but rather it is a ‘tick’ on their CV. This
goes for a large portion of the public sector. The legal and regulatory framework is fairly
adequate but the system is flawed.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)
Generally speaking, a large percentage of the public sector employees in Egypt are not
incentivized to work on their self-development because of the lack of an effective PMS. Yet,
MoSS has developed a simple incentive mechanism for TKP social workers, according to a
number of interviewees.
“By paying the social workers by visit, they were incentivized to conduct the largest number
of visits.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020)

Still, many of the social workers, although efficient, were not effective for many reasons
among which is the number of different messages they needed to convey (Kurdi, et al., 2018).
Even if there is an incentive structure for social workers, it is crucial to institutionalize it and
apply it all stages of service delivery (Sholkamy, 2018). Currently, the Ministry of Planning
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and Economic Development is working on such a PMS and a human resource management
system, according to an economist at the same ministry.
In brief, the MoSS has developed an institutional structure as well as specific roles and
responsibilities for TKP. Although the ministry has worked with calibers and consultants,
increased the efficiency of many aspects of the program by outsourcing them, automated
several of the steps of service delivery, MoSS has to deal with many of the challenges that face
the Egyptian public sector. These include a shortage in high-caliber staff members in important
positions, an inadequate division of tasks, a reliance on consultants, a difficulty in
implementing impactful CD programs as well as the lack of an effective PMS.
6.2.2.3.

Controls and Accountability Mechanism

For SP programs to be governed effectively, it is crucial to incorporate oversight
mechanisms that ensure adequate flows of information and financial resources (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). Such controls and accountability mechanisms can be subdivided into supply-side and demand-side measures. Supply-side mechanisms include
verification, M&E processes, spot checks, database crosschecks as well as a formal grievance
redress mechanism (GRM). This section starts with an examination of these measures followed
by the demand-side mechanisms. These include oversight mechanisms by the citizenry. For
instance, they could take the form of social audits, social accountability committees, public
hearings, third-party monitoring, among others (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012).
Proper control and accountability mechanisms can lead to the significant reduction of error,
fraud and corruption.
Before analyzing the demand-and supply-side mechanisms that ensure proper governance
of SP, it is crucial to reiterate a challenge that was previously alluded at and that underscores
the importance of controls and accountability mechanisms. Due to the economic instability,
persistent poverty levels as well as years of corruption, a large percentage of the Egyptian
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population believes they can “casually deceive the government”, according to most of the
interviewees. The citizens do not trust the government, hence they believe it is acceptable to
defraud the government and provide false information to receive more money from the
government.
“Because one of the exclusion criteria of TKP is the ownership of assets like cars, there are
cases where applicants fake documents selling their cars to acquaintances, then receive a
document enabling them to drive it. This way, it looks like they do not own any assets and
they can receive TKP benefits. Other women hire men to look like their husbands to deceive
the field assistants during the interviews while in fact, their husbands are working abroad
which would also make them not eligible for TKP.” (Interview, Expert Consultant at an
international NGO, December, 2019).
Aside from the usual importance of controls and accountability mechanisms, in a culture
where there is a lack of trust between the citizenry and the government, it is crucial to make
sure the right benefits reach the right beneficiaries at the right time (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop,
& Ringold, 2012). Thus, by developing rigorous supply-and demand-side mechanisms, MoSS
can significantly reduce corrupt behavior.
Monitoring and Evaluation
With regards to the supply-side mechanisms, MoSS designed and implemented a number
of M&E tools, especially with the help of the World Bank. Conducted and still to be conducted
evaluations focus on the targeting accuracy, process improvements as well as the measurement
of the program’s impact, both on the long-and the short-run (MoSS, 2016; MoSS, 2017; World
Bank, 2015). To assess the targeting accuracy as well as the program’s impact, MoSS hired
IFPRI to manage such evaluations. IFPRI conducted both a qualitative as well as a quantitative
impact assessment (Breisinger, et al., 2018a; ElDidi, et al., 2018). With the help of a local
survey firm, they included both beneficiaries as well as non-beneficiaries in their sample,
according to a consultant who was involved in the impact evaluation. In addition, a service
readiness assessment was undertaken in order to analyze the beneficiaries’ readiness for the
implementation of conditionality (El-Zanaty and Associates, 2016) as well as to enhance
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MoSS’ understanding of the beneficiaries’ perception of the program and its processes (World
Bank, 2015). Nevertheless, it is crucial to highlight the fact that such an impact assessment
covers solely the sampled population.
Conditionality
Another mechanism for auditing conditional cash transfer programs, like Takaful, is the
implementation of conditionality itself (Bastagli, et al., 2016). According to some of the
interviewees, conditionality will reveal both supply-side as well as demand-side error, fraud
and corruption (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS, January, 2020; Interview, Senior
specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).
“For instance, if you have a beneficiary who is living in Cairo but has registered for TKP in
Assiut since he knows the chances of getting admitted into the program are higher in the
Southern part of Egypt, we will detect this. As soon as we implement Conditionality, we
will be able to catch him since his son will not be attending the school he is supposed to be
registered in in Assiut. This way, the ministry will be able to check whether he really is
eligible for TKP but given all the right information.” (Interview, Former consultant at
MoSS, January, 2020)
In addition, conditionality will allow MoSS to track and report mishaps on the supply-side
of service delivery. Indeed, as soon conditionality is applied, households will be keen on
receiving the educational and health services needed in order not to be excluded from TKP.
Through the program’s GRM - which will be elaborated below - they can then report any issues
they face, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.
“For instance, they can report having visited the health facility during normal opening hours
and finding it closed. They could also report if their children are being bullied at school and
are therefore not attending or if the school is too far away or if there are not any teachers
available at the schools.” (Interview, Senior specialist at an International Organization,
January, 2020).
This way, MoSS can hold those accountable for such errors, sanction them, audit the local
service providers as well as work on the enhancement of the educational and health facilities
and the supply-side services.
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Database Cross-Checks
Other crucial supply-side evaluation mechanisms are database cross-checks. The
government is working on a Unified National Registry (UNR) together with the Ministry of
Planning and Economic Development (Government of Egypt, 2015). The UNR is an integrated
database of beneficiary information which includes data about a large portion of the citizens
and is linked to their national identification cards (World Bank, 2015). The database includes
data from various sources among which the MOSIT, NOSI, MoSS as well as water and
electricity usage, among others (MoSS, 2016). The main objective of the UNR is to “establish
a national database platform to support consolidation of SSN programs and facilitate
coordinated targeting and delivery mechanisms.” (World Bank, 2015). Thus, it should provide
verifiable administrative information on household characteristics and thus, enhance targeting
and reduce errors and fraudulent behavior. Although the UNR is still under development, the
MoSS has been able to use its data in many cases, according to an expert on Social Protection.
Yet, many interviewees argued that one of the biggest challenges facing evidence-based policymaking and service delivery in Egypt is the lack of data freedom.
“Before the development of the UNR, it was very difficult to obtain data from other
ministries unless there was political support, the minister intervenes or the projects were
intertwined and hence, it would be plausible to share data. The biggest challenge, however,
is still the culture and mind-set of the sanctity and the secrecy of the data.” (Interview,
Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
Even after the UNR is fully developed, only few individuals at every ministry will have
access to the database, according to an economist at the Ministry of Planning.
Before the development of the UNR, MoSS worked with NOSI in order to determine the
eligibility or disqualification of TKP applicants. Since the SIS’ minimum pension stands at LE
900 whilst TKP beneficiaries receive approximately half of this amount, applicants receiving
social pension are not entitled for TKP transfers, according to an expert consultant at NOSI.
This is why, while determining the eligibility of TKP applicants, MoSS staff members had
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access to NOSI’s database. “They were able to cross-check and validate the answers provided
by the applicants with regards to the receipt of other types of governmental support.”
(Interview, Expert consultant at NOSI, January, 2020).
Spot checks
Another crucial set of control mechanisms are spot checks. Spot checks are usually
conducted on a periodic basis by a third-party to provide a deeper evaluation and analysis of
the program effectiveness and efficiency as well as prevent fraud and corruption through
deterrence (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). TKP spot checks are not conducted by
a third party and are not regular. IFPRI’s qualitative impact assessment showed that most study
participants recommended the MoSS should send more regular inspectors to do background
checks since “otherwise, it’s government’s money lost for nothing” (Study Participant, as cited
in ElDidi, et al., 2018). According to a consultant at MoSS, there are areas in the country where
spot checks are effective and efficient.
“Spot checks are functioning in some governorates better than others since inspectors in
some governorates are corrupt and provide data of inspections they have not conducted,
while in others, they are conscious.” (Interview, Consultant at MoSS, January, 2020).
The consultant’s recommendation is to improve automation and MIS and thus, mainstream
and tighten the system. It is also essential to have measurable and specific key perfomance
indicators which are evaluated on a regular basis, but which are not available yet.
Management Information System
MoSS has developed a rigorous Management Information System that was praised by
almost all interviewees as being state-of-the-art and well-developed. From registration, to
back-office registry, payment cycle, case management, GRM, compliance with coresponsibilities in health and education for Takaful beneficiaries, all steps of the management
of TKP service delivery are automated and included in the MIS (World Bank, 2015). The MoSS
is working on a regular basis with the World Bank, E-Finance as well as Ministry of Planning
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and Economic Development in order to maintain, update and upgrade TKP management
information system (MoSS, 2016). Additionally, it hired an international consulting firm to
conduct an MIS gap analysis (MoSS, 2016). Also, an MIS team is working inside the ministry
to coordinate the efforts and consolidate the data. Because of the strides in digitalization, TKP
is moving faster than many of the Latin American countries’ experiences with cash transfer
programs, according to a senior specialist at an international organization.
“All TKP modules are automated. Running the PMT, enrolling the beneficiaries, rejecting
the disqualified applicants, the payment process, the GRM, all are IT-based. This is why,
you can say the program has achieved a paradigm shift both at the ministry as well as in the
government. In order to design and implement a program which is well-targeted and wellmonitored , you have to create built-in oversight mechanisms. Egypt has started these cash
transfer programs twenty years after the Latin American experience. In that time, technology
has achieved huge strides so technology is allowing the program to move fast and be more
efficient.” (Interview, Senior Specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020).
Although the MIS is relatively advanced, the capacities working on it are not yet wellacquainted with the system. The system is also not yet tight enough to prevent error, fraud and
corruption, as argued by a consultant at MoSS. Yet, it has made strides and is being upgraded
so as to close any loopholes or significant gaps. Therefore, the MIS might be used as an
efficient tool to reduce fraudulent and corrupt behavior.
Grievance Redress Mechanism
A grievance redress mechanism includes a number of systems and procedures aiming at
resolving complaints, queries and requests (World Bank, 2015, p. 65). Channels to receive
complaints are both at the local -social units- and the central level (MoSS, 2015). The national
office is in charge of more complex complaints including targeting and misreporting whilst
local social units are trained to deal with more simpler day-to-day complaints and case
management (MoSS, 2015). The resolution rate of grievances takes five to ten working days if
the issue is concerned with MoSS solely (MoSS, 2017). If it is a complaint related to other
ministries, resolution rate is slower since it requires coordination with other ministries,
according to a former consultant at MoSS. This consultant also highlighted that the GRM helps
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in implementing a softer and more flexible type of conditionality, that gives a voice to the
beneficiaries.
“Takaful was rolled out nationally and in a quick manner. Yet, the system will stay fair since
it is a very flexible system. If the school is further away than 10-15 kilometers - depending
on the age group, the family can easily file a complaint through the GRM and the sanctions
[imposed on the lack of school attendance due to the distance of the school] would be lifted.
[…] We tell the families in general that there is a GRM, however, we do not provide them
with the details as to the flexibility of the system because we do not want to give them ideas.
[…] There were cases where the women went to the health facilities for the quarterly checkups and found it closed. Naturally, this would cause a sanction to be implemented under the
system of conditionality. The GRM allows her to tell her story, the grievance officer reports
the mishap and the sanctions are then lifted.” (Interview, Former consultant at MoSS,
January, 2020)
Such a GRM which includes the option to complain and appeal can help ensure the cash
transfers reach the intended population and minimize social tensions and grievances (Bastagli,
et al., 2016; Overseas Development Institute, 2006). This is because this platform gives a voice
to the beneficiaries and allows the system to be more equitable and “democratic” (Bastagli, et
al., 2016).
According to the biannual TKP assessment conducted by MoSS, a large portion of TKP
beneficiaries are not aware of the existence of a GRM (MoSS, 2016). The majority of the
respondent have not filed complaints through the GRM system before. Many of the
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who are aware of the possibility of filing complaints
through the GRM refrain from doing it since they do not trust the process (MoSS, 2016).
According to the report, they believe it will not make a difference. This is why, it is crucial to
raise the awareness of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to their rights and the due
process to file complaints and grievances.
Although the system is designed according to international standards, it is still premature to
judge the GRM system, especially since conditionality has not yet been implemented and many
of the (non-) beneficiaries are not aware of its existence. As soon as awareness is raised and
conditionality is implemented, more complaints will be filed since beneficiaries’ actions would
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have consequences such as the imposition of sanctions. In order to avoid being sanctioned,
beneficiaries would resort to the GRM. This will represent a true evaluator of the system.
Nevertheless, the GRM is automated and there is a certain resolution rate that is expected.
Thus, given the data available, one can say that the GRM is developed according to
international standards and can lead to more equitable program delivery.
Community Monitoring and Public Hearings
As mentioned previously, TKP’s targeting efficiency met its original goal. Nevertheless, the
program faced some significant inclusion error - including undeserving beneficiaries from
higher income quintiles - as well as exclusion errors - leaving a large portion of the poor
uncovered by the program (Breisinger, et al., 2018a). In order for such errors and
misrepresentations to be detected, the MoSS is starting to establish “co-responsibility” or
“social accountability” committees to conduct community monitoring. Such committees also
target an enhancement of the communication channels between MoSS and the beneficiaries,
one of the recommendations of IFPRI’s impact assessment (Breisinger, et al., 2018b). In 2018,
the government passed decree number 794/2018 to establish community monitoring
committees. The main objective of the committees is to ensure “transparency of efficient
resource management [and] monitoring the quality of social services […]” (Amr, Heikal, &
Moharram, 2019, p. 10). To date 449 committees were formed in Qena, Assiut, Minia, Beni
Suef and Sohag involving 3,725 members (MoSS, 2017). Each committee included 13
members among which the village head, village lead workers, MOHP and Ministry of
Education representatives, religious representatives, youth representatives, Non-Governmental
Organizations’ representatives, among others (MoSS, 2017). Selection of these members is
approved by the village or city head (MoSS, 2017). The committees were trained for
approximately two days on TKP details as well as critical skills needed for communication and
awareness building (MoSS, 2017). More than 100 beneficiaries were disqualified from
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receiving TKP benefits after community monitors discovered them misreporting their earnings
(Amr, Heikal, & Moharram, 2019). Thus, they were able to reduce inclusion errors.
Although many committee members’ work out of a sense of religious consciousness, they
face several challenges. According to an expert consultant at an international NGO some of the
most dire challenges the are confronted with are the lack of social acceptance in the community,
as well as the lack of communication with the local social units.
“Many of the communities regard community monitors as intruders who spy on them to try
to disqualify them from the program which creates tensions that can sometimes get
physical.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an International NGO, December, 2019).
In addition to the poor understanding of the goals of community monitors, communication
between the monitors and TKP staff members is weak. This is why, many of the community
monitors do not have a proper understanding of the program, its target beneficiaries as well the
selection criteria which exacerbates the issue of distrust between committee members and
program beneficiaries (Amr, Heikal, & Moharram, 2019). Finally, in light of the distrust and
social tensions community monitors face, it is doubtful whether the committees will stay
incentivized to raise the awareness of the beneficiaries and report wrong-doings. One possible
way to incentivize them would have been providing them with a financial return (Bassett,
Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). This proposition was, however, declined by current minister
of social solidarity Dr. Nevine El-Qabbage at the annual conference of the Public Policy Hub
held at the American University in Cairo. She argued that they should be working out of a
sense of nationalism and that these are honorable committees that are not working for the
financial return. It is also crucial to highlight to the beneficiaries that community monitors not
only monitor and report wrong-doings on the side of the beneficiaries, but they also monitor
service delivery on the side of TKP program providers.
Another successful model of demand-side control mechanism is a public hearing. Care
International was conducting the pilot of community monitoring in Assiut when its staff
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members noticed huge discrepancies in the transfers provided to the beneficiaries. Some were
receiving transfers that were less than the minimum provided by TKP.
“In order to close this feedback loop, a public hearing was conducted. The head of the post
office, social unit, among others were all attending. The people then started voicing their
complaints on the low level of benefits they were receiving. This is when, in front of
everyone, we started asking them how they were receiving the benefits. We then found out
that the officer at the post office had collected 1000 cards from mostly illiterate beneficiaries
and was giving them an amount less than what they were entitled to every month. After
having detected this roguery and reported it to MoSS, changes to the payment scheme
through the post office were made in order to ensure that such actions are not repeated in
any other community.” (Interview, Expert consultant at an International NGO, December,
2019).
To date, no other public hearings were conducted, according to the above-mentioned
consultant. Whether through a public hearing or community monitoring it is crucial to ensure
transparency at every level. It is also necessary to include all different partners, so not only the
ministry of education and the MOHP, but also the post offices. Although public hearings might
not always be feasible but they should be conducted in an aggressive manner, especially in
areas where corruption is persistent, as highlighted by the expert consultant above.
For a program that is the first targeted cash transfer in Egypt, which was rolled out on a
national scale in a very expedited manner and reached millions of beneficiaries in less than a
year (MoSS, 2015), TKP has an advanced set of control mechanisms. Not only is the program
being constantly evaluated, both in terms of the processes as well as the progress and the
impacts. But also, the program has automated most parts of service delivery and established a
rigorous and constantly upgraded MIS. MoSS is also working with other partners as well as
the UNR in order to do cross-checks on the data provided by its applicants. Conditionality is
also set to ensure misreporting and inadequate service delivery is detected. This should also be
guaranteed through the GRM. Finally, social accountability committees are being developed
across the country to add another layer of demand-side M&E. On the other hand, the program’s
biannual evaluations are conducted by the Ministry itself which might represent a conflict of
interest. Spot checks are also not conducted by a third party. The GRM, although well-
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developed and embedded into the MIS, has still not been fully tested since conditionality has
not been applied yet. Also, the majority of the beneficiaries are not aware of its existence. Even
though the MIS is supposed to significantly reduce error, fraud and corruption, the capacities
working with it are still not fully acquainted with automation. This is why, some loopholes are
still to be closed. Regarding community monitoring, it is crucial to enhance transparency and
reduce the tension community monitors face by holding such a position. It is also necessary to
find ways to incentivize them.
To sum up, just like most SP programs in Egypt, TKP has demonstrated a disconnect
between design and implementation. The program is designed up to international standards.
Indeed, the World Bank has provided technical support in building the infrastructure of the
system. Nevertheless, the program’s implementation is inadequate in many levels which
highlights the existence of the discrepancy between design and implementation, which is one
of the most challenging parts in the delivery of SP (Bastagli, et al., 2016; Slater R. , Farrington,
Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; Robalino, Rawlings, & Walker, 2012; Giannozzi & Khan, 2011;
Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012)
6.2.2.4.

Sustainability

Unlike social insurance schemes which are ever-existing in most countries, whether
developed or developing, cash transfer programs need to include measures to guarantee their
sustainability (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008; Rohregger, 2010). Especially
in light of the economic instabilities and persistent poverty in Egypt, it was imperative to ensure
that TKP is both financially as well as politically sustainable, according to a senior specialist
at an international organization.
“Since it is the first cash transfer program in the country, the MoSS was keen to
institutionalize it from the beginning. TKP was established by Prime Minister’s Decision
Number 540 of 2015. Afterwards, the program was included in the government’s budget.
The Minister of Social Solidarity at the time, Ghada Waly, was aware that TKP is being
launched after two revolutions, eight cabinet reshuffles, and a very unstable economy. So
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the program had to be protected from a legal and financial point of view.” (Interview, Senior
Specialist at an International Organization, January, 2020)
While at the beginning, the budget that was allocated to the program stood at roughly LE
2.5 billion, over time when the program’s impact became evident the budget increased to LE
19 billion (MoSS, 2018). The Ministry of Finance has committed to increase the program’s
funding in a way that corresponds to the program’s impact. Indeed, budget spending on TKP
increased from 0.1% of the budget in 2011/2012 to reach 3% in 2017/2018 (Ministry of
Planning, Monitoring and Administrative Reform, 2018). Although the cash transfers are
funded by the government’s budget, the program’s infrastructure was financed by a loan
provided by the World Bank in the amount of LE 400 billion (World Bank, 2015). The loan
was renewed this year by the same amount and should be spent over the course of the next four
years on the advancement of the infrastructure, according to a senior specialist at an
international organization.
The program also enjoys political support (World Bank, 2015). It is designed in a way so as
to become the country’s national SSN, to replace the Solidarity pension and to enhance the
human capital of the poor and vulnerable in the country (World Bank, 2015). The program is
also regarded as a model that would aid in the shift from untargeted subsidies to targeted SSN
(Government of Egypt, 2015).
Even though TKP is currently backed by political support, it is doubtful whether it will
continue to do so. First, the implementation of conditionality might reduce the satisfaction with
the program among its beneficiaries. It has been argued in the literature that conditionality does
not respect the agency of the poor (von Gliszczynski, 2015). The consultant from MoSS also
noted that the question of conditionality is a human rights question.
“Conditionality poses a human rights question; does the government have the right to stop
giving money to a child because his parents do not obey the orders?” (Interview, Consultant
at MoSS, January, 2020).
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Also given the lack of awareness on conditionality, it can be anticipated that the
beneficiaries would not be prepared for the application of sanctions. Mexico’s Prospera cash
transfer program was abolished in 2019 (Kidd, 2019). One of the reasons for the
unsustainability of the program is the lack of satisfaction caused by the implementation of
conditionality.
" A further challenge for the Prospera programme – which further enhanced its vulnerability
to closure – is that it probably didn’t even have the support of the majority of those living
in poverty. […] Prospera has also been well-known for its use of sanctions, punishing
families unable to comply with the programme’s conditions by withdrawing the transfer.”
(Kidd, 2019).
Thus, the implementation of conditionality eroded the support and satisfaction with
Prospera in Mexico, which was considered an iconic cash transfer program (Barrientos &
Santibáñez, 2009).
Another hurdle which might affect the program’s political support in the long-run is the lack
of societal support, specifically from the middle class. Indeed, political support for a program
stems from societal satisfaction, buy-in as well as the public support of the program
(Rohregger, 2010). Cash transfer programs aid the poor and vulnerable who are not vocal and
do not steer policies (Sen, 2001), while they neglect the missing middle class (Kidd, 2019) who
pay the taxes and hence, contribute to the government’s budget. The experience of the demise
of Prospera cash transfer program in Mexico suggests that poverty-targeted programs are
usually unpopular with the majority of the populace (Kidd, 2019). This is because the middle
class pays the taxes but is unable to access the benefits. Thus, when the Mexican government
made the decision to terminate the program, there was not a “powerful constituency” (Kidd,
2019) in place to object to the decision, which was not implausible since the majority of the
population was not benefitting from the program but was still paying it through the taxes (Kidd,
2019). Hence, TKP’s political sustainability is endangered by the fact that its constituency is
not vocal and powerful as well as the fact that the program’s beneficiaries might not support it
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when conditionality is applied. This also highlights the importance of focusing on both
contributory and non-contributory schemes and developing an integrated SP system at the
meso-level. Solely investing in non-contributory schemes might antagonize the missing middle
class (von Gliszczynski, 2015), while SSN should not be neglected since they support the poor
and vulnerable.
To sum up, although TKP enjoys political and financial support and thus might be regarded
as sustainable, its impact will only be sustainable if coupled with other SP measures, if the
level of benefits or number of beneficiaries increase, if its governance challenges are overcome
and if there is a true graduation mechanism whereby a percentage of those receiving the
benefits truly graduate poverty. The program’s sustainability is also endangered so long as the
middle class is not benefitting and is not satisfied with the SP system. Unless these aspects are
taken into consideration, the program might demise - like Prospera.
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7. CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter summarizes the main findings of this paper and proposes a number of
recommendations that concern the effective governance of social protection in Egypt. The
concluding remarks briefly elaborate on the different components of this research study, first.
Afterwards, the main findings regarding the conditions and challenges of SP in Egypt are
compiled and a number of recommendations are suggested to the overcome these
shortcomings.

7.1.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis examines the governance of the social protection system in Egypt. By
looking both at the policy and program level, the analysis explores the main conditions and
challenges facing the SP system as a whole as well as the contributory and non-contributory
schemes, specifically.
In light of the Arab Spring which has revealed the importance of social justice, the
rising poverty rates as well as the economic and political instability in Egypt, the focus on
social protection has become even more fundamental for the country. Social protection
measures are aimed at providing an effective response to poverty and vulnerability. The
government of Egypt is currently in the process of reforming the social protection system. In
2014, the government launched a ministerial committee on social justice to demonstrate its
efforts in reducing poverty and inequality. Strengthening social safety nets has become one of
the government’s most important policy targets. This is why, the Ministry of Social Solidarity
launched the country’s first targeted cash transfer program, Takaful and Karama. The
government also embarked on a number of reform efforts of the Food Subsidy system.
Regarding the social security system, the government has passed legislative reforms to the
social and health insurance schemes.
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Social protection systems need to be adequately designed and implemented so as to
achieve the desired outcomes. In the context of SP reforms, it has been common for developing
countries to establish complex systems while failing to respond to a number of common
governance challenges, such as the lack of coordination between SP programs, the incompetent
institutional capacity, the lack of transparency, the discrepancy between design and
implementation, among others. For this reason, it is crucial and timely to assess the governance
of the social protection system in Egypt. An examination of governance necessitates an analysis
both at the systems level as well as at the program level. It provides insights as to the loopholes
and challenges in the design and delivery of SP schemes, but also depicts the facilitators of
effective social protection which are either present or neglected within the Egyptian context.
By analyzing the governance of SP in Egypt, this study aims to enhance accountability,
transparency and legitimacy of the system, as well as base reform efforts on an evidence-based
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the current SP system in Egypt.
In accordance with the World Bank’s (2012) typology of SP schemes, social protection
programs are divided into contributory and non-contributory schemes as well as labor market
interventions. The most important contributory schemes in Egypt are the social and health
insurance schemes. Starting from the first of January, 2020, a new law started governing the
social insurance system in Egypt. It aimed at mitigating many of the challenges of the old legal
framework among which is the complexity of the old framework, the difficulty in managing
compliance, the coverage gap as well as the inadequate law enforcement capacity. The health
insurance system has always been facing a number of challenges regarding the coverage and
the quality of the services. Currently, the universal health insurance scheme is being piloted in
Port Said and is set to be rolled out on a national scale by 2030. Regarding non-contributory
schemes, the Food Subsidy system has undergone a number of reforms which aim at enhancing
its efficiency and effectiveness, among which is the change from an input- to an output-based
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system, the provision of a larger portion of produce to choose from and the rationalization of
bread consumption. In 2015, the government has launched its first targeted cash transfer
program, Takaful and Karama, which has been designed with the help of the World Bank and
has been able to reach 20% of those living in the poorest quintile. The program is supposed to
gradually replace the old Solidarity pension. Active labor market policies face many
shortcomings, among which is the lack of coordination among the players in the field, the
provision of supply-driven programs and the focus on financial services.
It is crucial to place the governance of social protection within the discourse on social
policy and protection. Governance is a term which has been used in many fields and domains
and is conceptualized in a variety of ways. The governance of social protection takes an
operational and structural stance towards SP. Although the relationship between the two
concepts has not been studied extensively, there are a number of accounts which show the
necessity of governance in social protection. Indeed, an examination of governance allows for
an in-depth examination of the “black box” (Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012) of
social protection systems which aims to enhance accountability, improve coordination,
optimize service design and delivery and reduce error, fraud and corruption. This thesis fills a
gap in the literature by examining the governance of social protection in a country in the Middle
East, for the first time. Governance assessments of SP systems have been applied to a number
of developing countries but not in the MENA region. Moreover, studies in the MENA region
and in Egypt lack a holistic and comprehensive analytic framework which examines both the
SP system and the underlying programs.
The analysis of the governance of social protection in Egypt follows the conceptual
framework Rules, Roles and Controls by Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop and Ringold (2012). The
framework is developed in the context of the World Bank’s Social Protection and Labor
strategy. The working definition of governance used in this study is one which highlights the
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importance of accountability relationships as well as the interplay between actors, programs,
rules and regulations, policies as well as outcomes. The framework provides three operational
entry points for the analysis of the governance of SP; the rules of the game, the roles and
responsibilities, as well as the controls and accountability mechanisms. These entry points
which make up the parameters upon which the analysis is built, operate in three spheres; the
macro- or policy-level, the meso- or sector-level and the micro- or program-level of
governance. This study, examines the sector and program levels since they are more
operational, their data are more accessible and are more relevant for the study of governance
of SP in Egypt.
This study is guided by a qualitative research design. Qualitative research methods are
chosen because the study is exploratory, examines a policy arena and probes into complexities,
relationships and structures. Data collection methods include both in-depth, semi-structured
elite and expert interviews as well as a content analysis of scholarly work and published and
unpublished government reports covering the social protection system, Takaful and Karama
as well as the social insurance system in Egypt. Interviewees included policy-makers at
different ministries and governmental institutions such as the Ministry of Social Solidarity and
the National Organization for Social Insurance, expert consultants at different international
governmental and non-governmental organizations who have worked closely with MoSS as
well as a number of researchers and consultants at the ministries, among others. These
interviewees were chosen based on their positions as well as most importantly the organizations
they represent. Purposeful and snowballing sampling approaches guided the interviewee
selection process since the interviews consisted of policy makers and experts who are wellconnected and were able to provide useful and helpful contacts in the field.
Although the data collection process was not influenced by the conceptual framework,
inductive analytic approach, the framework guided the analysis and the organization of the
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emergent themes. This is why, the analysis is sub-divided into the meso-or sector-level and the
micro-level which delves into the governance of contributory schemes, in this case the
Egyptian social insurance system, as well as the non-contributory, Takaful and Karama
program. Due to the data availability, both in terms of the data collected through the interviews
as well as the desk review, and the limited scope of this thesis, the study focused solely on
these two programs. Nevertheless, the two programs, although not totally representative of
other SP schemes, provide an insight into the common challenges and conditions of the SP
system, in Egypt. Moreover, many of the features are common between the two types of
programs and can therefore, to some extent, be generalized on the Egyptian SP system, as a
whole. All necessary ethical dimensions were taken into consideration, in this study, most
importantly the approval of the Institutional Review board, the confidentiality of the study
participants and their voluntary participation. The limitations of the chosen method are firstly,
the difficulty in its replication since it would be crucial to gain access to senior officials and
expert consultants. Another limitation relates to the study participants. Although the
interviewees represented a spectrum of different agencies, I was not able to gain access to local
level officials or local NGOs which might have provided a different perspective to the study.
Finally, the data on TKP are more extensive mainly because the program is in the cornerstone
of contemporary governmental efforts.
Table 3 summarizes the main findings of the micro-level analysis in this study. It lists
the entry points of governance, the parameters that were obtained from the conceptual
framework, as well as the ones that were added. The table also presents some of the main
findings regarding the conditions and challenges prevalent in the governance of SP programs
in Egypt, the social insurance scheme as well as Takaful and Karma.
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Table 3: Micro-level Analysis of the Governance of SP Programs in Egypt
Micro-level Analysis of the Governance of SP Programs
Entry Points of
Governance

Contributory Schemes
Prerequisites

Social Insurance
-

Managing
Compliance

Rules of the
Game

Publicizing
Program
Rules
Consistency
of Rules

-

Institutional
Roles

Prerequisites

Clear Program
Rules

Publicizing
Program Rules

-

Lack of social insurance
awareness

Transparency
of Rules

-

Diversity of rules in the old
SIS led to confusion
New System: Unified
contributions, Global Salary

Consistency of
Rules and
Application

-

Roles and
Responsibilities

More than 50% of workers
under-report their earnings
Lack of coverage of casual
workers
New SIS tries to mitigate
many of the challenges
related to coverage

Non-Contributory Schemes

-

Lack of adequately qualified
personnel
Lack of training and
capacity development
Shortage of employees
Lack of a Performance
Management System

Division of
tasks

Outsourcing
Separation of
functions

Takaful & Karama
-

TKP targeting and eligibility criteria clear
Multilayer targeting formula
Changes in PMT formula create confusion
Criteria for setting benefit level clear
Lack of clarity regarding conditionality
Inadequate awareness and communication campaigns to
build awareness towards TKP and Conditionality
Efficiency of used tools questionable, especially door-todoor awareness

-

Lack of communication and transparency between local
social units and TKP beneficiaries leading to lack of trust

-

PMT formula acts like a ‘ruler’
Existence of error, fraud and corruption on both sides of
service delivery leading to many beneficiaries believing the
targeting of the program is not ‘fair’
Confusion between Solidarity pension and TKP
Clear division of tasks at all levels
Challenges of effective decentralization - Governors and
local capacities
Challenges of effective decentralization related to
conditionality
Entrepreneurial approach
E-Finance, Consultants, IFPRI
Reliance on Consultants vs working with them
Separation of functions between payment and processing as
well as data collection and decision-making

-
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Performance
Management
System

-

Employees resistance to
change
“Employees should work
out of altruism rather than
incentives.”

Employees &
Capacity
Development

-

Electronic
Transfer of
Payments

Controls and
Accountability
Mechanisms

Sanctions

Time-based
Systematic
Checks

Transfer through: bank transfers,
ATMs, post offices, or through a
debit card

-

Sanctions of the new SIS
more severe

-

Low number of inspectors
(exacerbated by division of
GSIF and PSIF)
Lack of incentives for
proper inspections
(Corruption)
Difficulty cross-checking
data

-

-

Sustainability

-

Old System: Anticipated Cash Deficit in
2037 + Difficulty initiating changes in the
system - decision-making
New system: automatic adjustments +
Calculation of contribution rate that would
not cause an actuarial deficit

Training of social workers and field assistants as well as
health and education units at the local level
Unit of measurement of CD process-based not output-based

-

Constant evaluations focusing on the targeting accuracy,
process improvements and the measurement of the
program’s impact
Conditionality as a verification and audit tool

Conditionality

-

Supply-side as well as demand-side checks and balances

Database
crosschecks

-

Unified National Registry
Cross-checking with NOSI

Spot Checks

-

Not conducted by a third-party

Monitoring
and Evaluation

Management
- Includes all stages of TKP service delivery
Information
- State-of-the-art and well-developed
System
- Problem with the capacities working with MIS
Grievance
- High resolution rate
Redress
- Lack of awareness of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of
Mechanism
its existence
Community
- Community monitors face several challenges and tensions
Monitoring &
among which the lack of transparency from social units
Public
- One successful experience of a public hearing
Hearings
- Program embedded in the government’s budget (Financial sustainability as long
as it produces positive impact)
- Political sustainability granted in the short-run since the program cushions from
the economic instability
- In the long-run political sustainability doubtful because of the lack of support
from the missing middle class.

Source: Author
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While the table categorizes the findings according to the structure of the analysis, in the
following, I will cluster, group and elaborate the main findings of the meso- and micro-level
analysis of the governance of SP in Egypt.
A country’s social protection system is often organizationally complex and includes
diverse governmental as well as non-governmental actors, systems, processes and programs
(Bassett, Giannozzi, Pop, & Ringold, 2012). In order for a country to establish a transformative
SP system (Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007) which achieves social justice and inclusivity,
it is crucial to ensure the meso-level is properly governed. In this regard, coordination is
imperative.
A. Coordination: The main challenge facing the social protection system in Egypt and in
many other developing countries, relates to the meso-level of governance. Indeed, the
inadequate intergovernmental coordination as well as the deficient coordination with other
relevant actors impedes the development of a comprehensive and transformative social
protection system.
This study finds that the social protection system in Egypt is fragmented, lacks a unified
vision, is neither comprehensive nor coherent and hence, is not effective in delivering a
bundle of complementary social protection programs which can help the poor out of
poverty, which promotes the livelihood of the middle class and protects them against
shocks and risks. Not only is the coordination inadequate between the different SP
programs, but the different governmental agencies do not coordinate their efforts in the
development of SP tools and methods and often face difficulties in terms of data sharing.
The lack of effective coordination impedes the development of an integrated social
protection system, creates an overlap in the mandates between the different ministries and
deters effective service delivery at the program level.
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Indeed, the Ministry of Social Solidarity has been facing challenges in the implementation
Takaful’s conditionality. This is because the program necessitates the cooperation of line
ministries such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Population.
Due to the lack of the institutionalization of coordination efforts, only the process leading
up the signing of the protocol between the three partners on the implementation of
conditionality spanned more than two years.
Regarding the social insurance system, one of the main shortcomings of the system is the
evasion of social security contributions. Gaining access to the database of the Tax Authority
would pave the way for the NOSI to detect under-reporting practices. This would not only
enhance the fiscal sustainability of the program but it would also increase the coverage and
make the system more equitable. This has not been possible due to the culture of data
secrecy which is persistent in Egypt.
The government has been putting efforts into the improvement of coordination on social
protection, in Egypt. First, the government tried to institutionalize efforts by establishing a
Ministerial Committee on Social Justice. Yet, the committee only convened two to three
times and has therefore, been ineffective.
With regards to the challenge of knowledge and data sharing, the government has been
working on a Unified National Registry which consolidates the data collected by the
different agencies working on SP in Egypt. The consolidation of the data is undertaken by
the Ministry of Interior with the help of the Ministry of Planning and Economic
Development. Although it is still premature to judge the registry, all study participants
highlighted that the data will not be made available for all government employees.
Moreover, the ministries and agencies providing the data, collect them in different period
of times which might create a lag that would impede the feasibility of the usage of the
registry.
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Turning to the challenges and conditions related to the design and delivery of social
protection programs, the micro-level of governance, it is essential to highlight that most of
the challenges center around the disconnect between design and implementation. This
discrepancy is evident whenever programs are well-designed but do not achieve the targets and
outcomes they set out to reach. A governance examination is well-suitable for the detection of
shortcomings in the delivery of programs. Another issue which will be evident in many of the
presented challenges relates to the behavior, culture and misconceptions of the service
providers. Finally, most of the challenges that are highlighted below are inter-connected. This
is why, the challenges are often mutually-aggravating. In the following, these themes will be
apparent in the discussion of a number of governance prerequisites and constraints.
B. Laws, Rules and Regulations: At the program level and even at the policy level, the
challenges of SP rarely relate to the laws, rules and regulations. Especially in the last five
years, the government of Egypt has been investing in reforming the inherited and deeply
flawed SP legislative framework. As it has been clear from the analysis, the social insurance
system has been recently revamped with the issuance of law 148/2019. The law has
changed several of the outdated provisions of the old legal framework, thus, aiming to
mitigate many of the challenges of the old SIS. IFPRI’s impact evaluation as well as the
data provided by the interviewees have also revealed that many of TKP’s rules are clear for
both the beneficiaries as well as the service providers, among which are the eligibility
criteria, the calculation of benefit levels, among others.
Nevertheless, in line with the culture of the secrecy of data, problems persist in the
communication, awareness and transparency towards the different programs’ rules.
This obstacle is apparent in both the social insurance scheme and TKP. The SIS faces a
serious challenge of awareness. Not only is a large portion of the populace unaware of their
social insurance rights and obligations, they are not aware of the benefits of the system and
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are not well-informed about the reforms being undertaken. The challenge here relates to
the resources, both financial resources as well as the know-how to carry out awareness
campaigns and build the awareness of such a large percentage of the population.
TKP does not face the same challenge regarding awareness campaigns. Indeed, the MoSS
has developed the expertise with the help of the World Bank and other partners to conduct
awareness campaigns. The ministry is also capable of financing such campaigns since the
loan provided by the World Bank supports these activities. Nevertheless, such campaigns
have not proven their efficiency and effectiveness. The largest percentage of Takaful’s
beneficiaries are not aware of the application of conditionality, in spite of the use of
different types of awareness techniques such as marketing campaigns and door-to-door
awareness. The next impact evaluation to be conducted within one to two years will reap
more information on the effectiveness of the conducted campaigns. Moreover, many of the
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are not aware of the existence of a grievance redress
mechanism. Hence, although the GRM is developed so as to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the program, to reduce error, fraud and corruption and to enhance
communication with the beneficiaries, a small portion of the beneficiaries is aware of its
existence and made use of the system.
Another challenge relates to the transparency regarding rules and regulations. Both at the
central and the local levels, often service providers are guided not to disclose information
regarding the rejection criteria of the program, the details of the implementation of
conditionality, the existence of community monitoring, among others. On the other hand,
this cultivates a culture of lack of trust from the side of the citizens. They believe the
government is disguising information and hence, they expect officials to be acting in a
corrupt manner, which leads citizens to find it justifiable to provide false information both
regarding their TKP applications as well as regarding their contributions in the SIS. Egypt
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has been referred to as the “security state” (Khalaf, 2016) for many years due to the culture
that portrays hiding information as the safer option, and transparency as the risker variant.
Even when sharing data, the culture of the country - both the officials and the citizens - is
to view data as secret and thus, sacred and should not be shared. Hence, the lack of
transparency leads to an increase in error, fraud and corruption, as well as to the impediment
of effective accountability on both sides of service delivery.
C. Quality of services: Another challenge which is reiterated in both programs is the quality
of service delivery. Regarding the social insurance system, in the old social insurance
system, the management of compliance was difficult because many of the contributors were
not incentivized to report their earnings accurately. Since the system was designed in a way
which, for instance, calculates the pension benefits as the average of the last number of
years’ earnings, neither employers nor employees were encouraged to report their real
salaries. Indeed, contributors did not want to deduct a large amount of their monthly income
and put into a social insurance scheme which would not benefit them on the long-run.
Nevertheless, the new social insurance system reduced the high contribution rates, the
calculation formula of pension benefits and made other changes to the system that aim at
increasing social insurance benefits.
Regarding Takaful, it has been emphasized that the poor quality of educational and health
services at the local level were among the main causes why conditionality has not yet been
applied. The conditionality component of cash transfer programs aims to enhance the
participants’ quality of life by ensuring beneficiaries send their children to school and
health care units for regular checks and vaccines. In order for the system to achieve its
developmental objective, it is crucial for the quality of health and education services to be
adequate. In reality, there are a number of areas with no proximity to schools, many schools
have a deficit in teachers, the quality of the curricula can also present a challenge, and often
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children could be bullied at schools. According to the Egyptian Social Justice Index, the
Egyptian health and education systems are among the sectors facing the greatest degree of
social injustice (El Baradei, 2019a). This is not only the case in Egypt, but lower middle
income countries often have educational systems where public schools do not provide an
adequate learning environment (Slater R. , Farrington, Holmes, & Harvey, 2008). Health
care units also lack adequate resources and competent staff. Thus, the supply-side of the
implementation of conditionality faces dire challenges.
D. Institutional and Human Resource Capacity: Developing the necessary institutional
capacity to design and deliver social protection programs is one of the most important
prerequisites of the effective governance of SP. It is crucial for every program to develop
an adequate human resource capacity to administer service delivery. Generally speaking,
there are a number of shortcomings related to the institutional and human resource
capacities of social protection programs in Egypt.
Starting from the end of the 1990s up until now, the government started suspending public
sector hiring and celebrating understaffing efforts. This has created a gap in the service
delivery of SP programs. Indeed, there are often crucial positions which require calibers
who are difficult to hire due to the hiring freeze. These positions are usually filled by
consultants who are difficult to retain in the public sector due to the inability to provide
them with suitable financial incentives. Even if there are many consultants who have filled
important roles, the sustainability of the reliance on consultants cannot be guaranteed.
Understaffing negatively affects the SIS insofar as the staff members are overloaded and
need to deal with a wide segment of the society which they are often incapable or unable
to deal with, properly. Understaffing has also led to the impediment of the existing controls
and accountability measures since the number of inspectors is so low that it would almost
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be impossible for the inspectors to reach the whole spectrum of contributors across the
country.
MoSS has been able to adapt to the gaps in human resources by outsourcing a portion of
the program. Not only has the MoSS worked with consultants but it worked with women
who are doing their civil service for the door-to-door awareness campaigns.
Labor market regulations in the public sector pose another hurdle. Indeed, most SP
programs do not have effective performance management systems, incentive structure or
human resource capacities. This is why the employees themselves often represent a burden
on the implementation of programs. As previously mentioned, the staff members at NOSI
refused to implement the planned defined-contributions scheme in law 135/2010, which
was one of the main reasons why this change was not included in the reformed legal
framework.
An efficient human resource management system would include a plan for the capacity
development of the service providers. Although many of the staff members of both the SIS
and TKP received a number of training programs, these are often ineffective. One of the
main reasons for the ineffectiveness of capacity development is the unit of measurement,
which is often process-based instead of outcome-oriented.
TKP faces another serious challenge related to decentralization. Indeed, cash transfer
programs need to shift a part of the discretionary power to lower levels of government.
Coordination efforts become more difficult in a decentralized context. Theoretically
speaking, the different functions of TKP are divided between the central and local level. In
the implementation of conditionality, not only the social units will be imperative but also
the local health and education units. Although the line ministries have signed a protocol, it
has been pointed out several times that such coordination efforts are often very difficult.
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On the other hand, it is also important to highlight the positive conditions that are prevalent
in terms of the institutional capacity of the programs. Both programs were able to design
systems where payment and processing are separated. This way, the systems ensured
the reduction of error, fraud and corruption. Moreover, the separation of functions between
data collection and data analysis leads to the same positive outcome.
E. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: While controls and accountability
mechanisms are crucial to reduce error, fraud and corruption, they reveal the system’s
disconnect between design and implementation.
Regarding the SIS, many of the prerequisites of proper control tools are incorporated into
the system. Not only are transfers delivered electronically, but the system foresees the
conduct of random and systematic checks as well as the imposition of sanctions in cases of
misreporting. The implementation of these conditions is, however, faulty. Indeed, as
previously elaborated, the number of inspectors is low and many of them are not
incentivized to conduct regular spot checks. This is why, many contributors get away with
the evasion of their contributions and do not face the necessary sanctions. As opposed to
TKP, the SIS has not been subject to regular monitoring and evaluation.
TKP’s infrastructure is designed according to international standards. The program has
incorporated different types of regular monitoring and evaluation tools which assess the
impact, process and targeting efficiency. The system also involves database crosschecks, a
management information system and automation processes, community monitoring and
social accountability committees as well as a grievance redress mechanism. While all of
these tools have been incorporated into the infrastructure of the system, they all face a
number of implementation challenges. For instance, many of the beneficiaries are not
aware of the existence of the GRM, while many of the staff members are not trained on the
use of the MIS. Additionally, community monitors face social tensions due to the lack of
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transparency and hence, their efficiency and effectiveness is questionable. Therefore, it can
be argued that the SP programs in Egypt have developed rigorous and advanced sets of
controls mechanisms, which are not properly implemented due to a number of related
challenges. Here, it also becomes apparent that the challenges of the SP system are interrelated.
F. (Un-) Sustainability: One of the most dire obstacles facing the social protection system in
Egypt is its (un-) sustainability. While the financial sustainability of the SIS and TKP is
granted so long as the economy is growing, the more dire challenge emanates from the
political sustainability of the system.
Because of the structural adjustment programs and economic instabilities the country was
facing in the last few years, it was crucial to cushion the poor from extreme deprivation.
This is why, TKP was rolled out on a national basis in an expedited fashion. Aside from
TKP, the government of Egypt - similar to other MENA countries - has been fixated on
social safety nets for decades. By nature, such programs target the ultra-poor and are
therefore described as “residualist” (von Gliszczynski, 2015). On the one hand, they benefit
the poor, but they are often financed by the taxes paid by the middle class. Although the
middle class, rightfully, is not eligible for SSN, it is crucial to design policies addressing
them and protecting them against economic crises. Otherwise, the middle class, who is the
more powerful fraction of the society (Kidd, 2019), could revolt. Thus, programs such as
TKP can only be maintained if the middle class is satisfied with the state of social protection
in the country. Moreover, sustainability of cash transfer programs can also be reinforced if
the poor support them. If conditionality is applied in the absence of the necessary supplyside services, this satisfaction might be difficult to maintain.
In order to further the discourse on the governance of SP in Egypt, future research should
incorporate even more programs into the examination. This might require the addition of
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parameters, I was unable to explore. Moreover, it will be beneficial to include more participants
in future studies, most importantly local level officials. Scholars with access to more reports
and data sources from the ministries can also provide more in-depth analyses. Finally, it is
essential for such a governance assessment to be regularly conducted since reform efforts are
underway and it is necessary to keep tracing the efforts, their strengths and their weaknesses,
the big picture as well as the one which is zoomed in.

7.2.

Recommendations

In this section, I will propose a number of recommendations to mitigate the abovementioned challenges. It is crucial to highlight that I am not entering into an in-depth
examination of every policy option because this is out of the scope of this study. Instead, this
is an effort to start a discussion on possible resolutions to the above-mentioned shortcomings
of the SP system. These recommendations are all inter-related, for the SP system is complex
and multi-sectoral and hence, isolated solutions are not feasible. This section will be guided by
the structure of the challenges described above.
A. Coordination: The key word for an enhanced social protection system is coordination.
Indeed, all social protection efforts should be coherent, consistent and well-coordinated.
In order for the social protection system to be fulfill these conditions, it is imperative to
focus on the following measures9.
i.

First, it is necessary to establish an institutional home for social protection. A single
body or authority should be in charge of the coordination of social protection efforts
so as to avoid fragmentation, overlap of mandates and competition. This authority
would be in charge of overseeing the efforts of the different players, facilitating
coordination and steering the system onto a common agenda, strategy and vision.
Such an institutional home could be one of the existing ministries or could involve

9

These measures are not chronologically organized.
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the establishment of an external body. While the establishment of an external body
might seem regressive and inefficient, the choice of a single ministry might create
tensions. The choice of a certain ministry might also lead other actors to refuse to
subjugate themselves to it. Ministries are already overwhelmed with their own
mandates, so adding such a burden might not seem plausible. Thus, I propose the
establishment of an external body to oversee, regulate, coordinate and monitor the
activities of all social protection actors.
ii.

Top-down political support might make it feasible to create the institutional home
inside a certain ministry. Aside from the institutional home, without a top-down push,
it is questionable why ministries would agree to start coordinating their efforts and to
subjugate themselves to additional mandates and tasks.

iii.

Without a common vision, coordination efforts are not attainable. It is essential for
the body in charge of SP to undertake a thorough assessment of the SP system, upon
which a detailed common vision is articulated. This vision should divide mandates
clearly and establish a common goal, towards which all ministries and agents are
working. In addition to the vision, the institutional home would have to prepare a
strategy along with all the necessary implementation and action plans.

iv.

It is also necessary to incentivize policy-makers to implement the common vision.
Since policy-makers are more concerned with short-term rather than long-term
successes, the vision should articulate key deliverables that can be praised if achieved
in the short-run.

v.

In order for ministries to work together, it is crucial to unify the methods. Along
with the vision, the institution in charge of SP should develop a generic social
protection toolkit, which includes the methods of data collection, targeting, the M&E
tools, among others.
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vi.

Knowledge and data sharing and consolidation are also imperative. Since the
government is already establishing the UNR, it might be helpful if the UNR
developed a system of phased data access. Because it could be risky and implausible
in a country like Egypt to share the data with all the different staff members involved
in SP, the UNR could be made available to the agency in charge of SP. This institution
would in turn grant different levels of access to the different levels of government.
Most importantly, it is necessary for data collection efforts to be conducted in a
manner which does not create a time lag between necessary data sources. This would
facilitate data sharing and enhance the analysis that would be conducted on a regular
basis by the institutional home of SP.

vii.

It is important to build evidence about the effectiveness of different approaches for
which there is not enough data. Thus, the body in charge of SP should have a unit in
charge of the conduct of evidence-based research which is geared towards the
assessment of best practices and their suitability to the Egyptian context.

viii.

Finally, social protection programs should aim to truly graduate from poverty. Cash
transfer programs do not suffice. This is why, the linkage to active labor market
programs is necessary.

B. Laws, Rules and Regulations: In order to enhance the communication, awareness and
transparency across SP programs, I propose the following recommendations;
i.

It is necessary to have a system of communication and awareness which differentiates
between SSN as well as programs targeting the middle class. Awareness campaigns
of, for instance, TKP should focus on door-to-door awareness since it is very often
one of the most useful means of communication with beneficiaries who are outside
of the workforce. On the other hand, awareness towards social insurance can take the
form of social media, radio and television campaigns. Such campaigns need to
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highlight the benefits of the enrollment in the social insurance system as well as the
sanctions applied on those evading their contributions.
ii.

Regarding door-to-door awareness, it is imperative to work on a detailed capacity
development plan for social workers. Moreover, a system should be established to
assess their performance and possibly provide them with incentives. For TKP, this
might take the form of quarterly assessments based on the citizens’ abidance to
conditionality, for instance.

iii.

The lack of financial resources can be detrimental for such awareness campaigns.
Even though the investment in such communication tools should increase the
system’s financial viability on the long-run, very often there is an unwillingness to
invest in these measures. In this regard, international organizations can be beneficial
in providing both the expertise as well as the material resources. With regards to the
technical expertise, outsourcing such campaigns might enhance their effectiveness
and might therefore, be feasible, if financially attainable.

iv.

Transparency poses a more deeply-rooted challenge since it requires a change in the
culture and behaviors of the policy-makers, service providers as well as the citizens.
Such change should be top-down. The government should be made aware of the
consequences of the lack of transparency and should try to be more transparent about
issues that do not affect national security. This culture should be transmitted to the
local level officials for they are the ones who deal with the citizenry and are able to
create a behavioral shift. However, it first starts with convincing the policy-makers,
- possibly via quantitative data, of the negative impacts of the lack of trust between
the citizenry and the government.
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C. Quality of Services: While the new SIS has reformed many of the obstacles that precluded
contributors from evading their social insurance contributions, it is still unclear whether
this will have an impact on the contributors’ reporting practices.
The quality of service presents a more serious challenge in terms of the application of
Takaful’s conditionality. On the one hand, Takaful’s conditionality is considered as one of
its main developmental tenets. Although many scholars argue that it does not respect the
agency of the poor and poses, in essence, a human rights dilemma, most interviewees
stressed on the fact that conditionality is imperative for the system. If conditionality is to
be applied, it is necessary for the services to be of adequate quality. Many interviewees
believed the application of conditionality would expose the system. Yet, policy-makers are
aware of the quality of the educational and health services at the local level. Thus, exposing
the quality of the service delivery is not necessarily what is needed. In the following, a
number of recommendations are proposed, however, the challenge of the quality of services
is a more serious challenge which requires interventions on a scale larger than the SP
system.
i.

One way to incentivize the two line ministries to cooperate is to integrate education
and health within the government’s social protection strategy. It is crucial to
incentivize the MOHP and the Ministry of Education to enhance the quality through
key performance indicators as well as performance incentives. Providing them with
a sense of ownership, making TKP the success of more than one ministry might pave
the way for the ministries to focus on enhancing the quality.

ii.

The SP institutional home with its evaluation capacity should make sure the staff
members at the local level receive adequate capacity development. It should also
ensure the existence of a sufficient number of staff members at the local health and
education units.
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iii.

One way to monitor the quality of service provision is through citizen report cards
and community scorecards. Along with the regular spot checks and inspections, the
involvement of the citizens would help gain an understanding of the weaknesses and
deficiencies of service delivery. It would also help create local solutions to local
problems. Another way to guarantee an improved interface with the citizens, is to
create communication channels between the local social units and the local service
providers.

D. Institutional and human resource Capacity: The recommendations regarding the
institutional capacity of the SP system are not innovative, but are rather based on generic
management best practices.
i.

Indeed, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development has been working on a
human resource management system to be rolled out at all governmental institutions.
Thus, this is a crucial first step which has already been initiated.

ii.

Programs should also develop a performance management system as well as an
incentive structure which does not allow employees to become a burden and to halt
progress.

iii.

The design of capacity development programs needs to include an impact evaluation
which is outcome-based instead of process-based. Employees should follow an
organized system of capacity development along with appraisal and evaluation which
leads to their reward or punishment.

iv.

Finally, it can be helpful to ring-fence administrative resources in the program’s
budget. The World Bank’s loan allows for the allocation of a portion of the funds for
administrative and human resources. This needs to be applied to all SP programs.
Ensuring the existence of a budget to reward dedicated employees or hire calibers in
positions where they are needed, can help enhance program administration.
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E. Controls and Accountability Mechanisms: First, all SP programs need to incorporate an
infrastructure which includes the same control and accountability mechanisms as TKP;
M&E tools, database cross-checks, spot checks, management information system,
grievance redress mechanism as well as demand-side measures. Although TKP has
designed and incorporated all of the above-mentioned mechanisms, they do not seem to be
effectively implemented. A governance assessment reveals the implementation challenges
that arise in the application of all the tools. Thus, programs need to develop the capacity to
analyze and examine the governance and implementation obstacles which preclude an
effective program delivery. Afterwards, these challenges need to be reported to the
responsible authorities who in turn should address them in a timely fashion. The whole
process would be overseen by the SP oversight body.
F. (Un-) Sustainability: In order for the social protection system to be politically sustainable,
it needs to be backed up by all fractions of the society. To achieve this, it is crucial to design
programs that cater to all different fractions of the society and thus, enhance inclusiveness,
equality, equity and resilience. This is why, an integrated SP vision and strategy that
provides every fraction of the citizenry with the necessary programs and conditions is
necessary. As previously mentioned, the SP vision needs to be evidence-based, constantly
revised and to explore different types of programming and best practices.
By and large, the development of a properly governed social protection system which is
not fragmented necessitates political support, the establishment of an institutional home for SP
that coordinates the efforts of the different actors involved, the development of a common
vision, the focus on the advancement of the institutional and human resource capacity as well
as the unification of the tools and data that are used. It is also imperative to constantly evaluate
the system, to conduct evidence-based research on best practices and to assess the governance
of the system so as to understand the details related to the very common obstacle of the
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disconnect between design and implementation. Finally, institutional capacities need to be
organized and well-trained, mandates need to be clearly defined at all levels of government
and performance incentives need to be incorporated.
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